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This study analyzes how urban space in Zagreb, Croatia was used to establish and then 
contest the trajectory of the Croatia national project between 1850 and 1940.  To accomplish 
this, the study focuses on the extent to which the Croatian national project and the urban project 
of Zagreb were intertwined in a deliberate effort to establish the city as the “Croatian 
Metropolis.”  The study uses spatiality (the trialectic relationship between real space, imagined 
space, and lived space) to analyze how the national and urban elites deliberately created a city 
landscape which they believed would embed the idea of Croatia as a modern, urban, middleclass, 
Central European nation in the daily lives of the population.  The study also analyzes how the 
population of the city re-imagined the urban space of the city over time, often in ways that the 
elites had not intended or anticipated. 
This study focuses on the interaction of three distinctly identifiable scales, the national, 
the local, and the micro across the first ninety years of Zagreb’s existence as a unified urban 
space.  The first two scales are essentially defined by the choice of the study site, with Croatia 
being the national and Zagreb the local.  The micro scale site in this study is Ban Josip Jelačić 
square, which is the main square for the city of Zagreb and was renamed in honor of the Ban 
(Governor) who led Croatia both politically and militarily through the 1848 crisis in the 
Hapsburg Empire.  A key element of the Ban Jelačić Square micro space is the Ban Jelačić 
Monument, erected in 1866, which clearly placed a key contemporary Croatian national here at 
the center of the city of Zagreb and transformed the city’s main square into a monumental space. 
At the core of the study is an examination of how these three nominally distinct scales, 
the national (Croatia), the local (the urban environment of Zagreb), and the micro (Ban Jelačić 
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Square) are inter-related with each other.  Croatian leaders saw the transformation of the city of 
the old medieval communities of Zagreb into the “Croatian Metropolis,” a modern city that 
would be at the center of all aspects of Croatian political, economic, and cultural life, as a key to 
the overall success of their national project.  A central part of this plan was the transformation of 
significant spaces within Zagreb into national spaces, with a special focus on the city’s main 
square.  The result was a deliberate effort to place Zagreb at the heart of Croatia, while 
simultaneously placing Croatia at the heart of Zagreb.  Yet, in the process of placing Croatia at 
the heart of Zagreb, the national elite created a key venue that would become a primary 
mechanism for contesting and redefining the goals of the national project in the 1930s. 
This dissertation uses a somewhat unique approach to examine what is essentially a 
dialectic process within the Croatian national project between 1850 and 1940.  Rather than 
addressing each scale separately, the study investigates the interactions between the scales 
chronologically, but not in a direct, historical format.  The four empirical chapters of the 
dissertation are broken into distinct time frames, but two of the chapters cover the same time 
frame. The empirical section of the dissertation begins by showing the development of the initial 
“thesis” of the Croatian national project as a modernizing, urbanizing project from 1850 until 
1895 and how the urban project of Zagreb was a central part of this effort.  The second empirical 
chapter then covers the emergence and solidification of an “antithesis” to the existing Croatian 
national project, Croatian Peasantism, an ideology which sought to defend the idea of Croatia by 
slowing modernization to limit the economic and social dislocation it was causing in the 
countryside, between 1895 and 1935.  The third empirical chapter covers the same time period, 
1895 to 1935, but returns the focus to the efforts of the modernizing elements of the Croatian 
national project to continue to implement their plans.  The final empirical chapter covers the 
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contestation between the modernizers and the Peasantists between 1935 and 1940, which results 
in a new urban preservationist consensus among the urban national elite in Croatia.  A key part 
of this contestation was preventing the construction of a modern skyscraper on Ban Jelačić 
square, thus “preserving” the square as an historic location.  This new urban preservationism, a 
fusion of the older urban focus of the Croatian national project with Peasantist preservationism, 
becomes the new “thesis” of the Croatian national project after 1940.   
To prove this argument, the study uses a qualitative analysis of a wide range of primary 
and secondary sources to demonstrate how leaders of the Croatian national project both 
deliberately and inadvertently mobilized the urban space of Zagreb, and Ban Jelačić Square to 
advance their goals as well as how the general population in Zagreb responded, and often 
reinterpreted these efforts.  Spatiality provides a key lens for this project, as it provides a 
framework.  By breaking all three scales involved in this study into spaces which are imagined, 
physically transformed, lived in, and through that process re-imagined, spatiality also provides a 
structure which illustrates how interconnected the national, local, and micro scales in the study 
are.  Ban Jelačić Square is a prime example of how spatiality helps to analyze the interaction 
between scales, as it is at once, a key micro space in the daily life of the city, a key local space in 
the urban structure of Zagreb, linking various parts of the city together, and a key national space 
through its function as a monument space as well. 
 Because this project seeks to integrate and show connections between three separate 
scales, a wide range of sources are engaged.  Key primary sources include newspaper and 
magazine articles and editorials, which seek to communicate specific interpretations and 
relationships between the idea of Croatia as a national community and urban space in Zagreb.  
Official documents as well provide insight into the goals of various actors, especially urban plans 
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and the narratives used to support changes in real space within the city of Zagreb.  Secondary 
sources are also very useful to this project, especially national and local history texts from the 
late 19th and early 20th century, as they clearly elaborate the historic narrative of the time and can 
indicate issues seen as important to the national project.  More recent histories are useful as well 
because they often will include indications to spatial relationships that the authors may want to 
use to enhance their arguments, or may use without being fully aware of the spatial significance.  
It is important to note that many of these sources focus, in theory, on a single scale.  Secondary 
sources of this type can also be very valuable because they illustrate connections between scales 
when an author working at one scale begins to address issues of another scale, often without 
realizing they have drifted out of their primary focus.   
 This project shines new light on many important issues.  This project illustrates the 
spatial trialectic across time, by showing how imagined space, real space, and lived space 
interact and transform each other in a continual process.  In the field of Croatian history, this 
project illuminates an interconnectedness between the urban history of Zagreb and the broader 
history of Croatia that has not previously been investigated.  In the field of Yugoslav history, this 
project indicates that the internal debate within the Croatian national project in the late 1930s 
may have had a much greater impact on the relationship between Croatia and the socialist 
Yugoslav project than previously understood.  In the field of the study of nationalism, this 
project shows that urban projects and urban development can be critical components of national 
projects.  This project also helps illuminate how national projects redefine themselves over time 
to adapt to the new circumstances they confront and illustrates that the antithesis of any given 
national movement may not be cosmopolitanism or “anti-nationalism,” but rather an alternative 
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Metropolis at the Heart of the Nation, Nation at the Heart of the Metropolis 
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There is no disagreement that nationalism has been ‘around’ on the face of the 
globe for, at the very least, two centuries.  Long enough, one might think, for it to 
be reliable and generally understood.  But, it is hard to think of any political 
phenomenon which remains so puzzling and about which there is less analytic 
consensus.  No widely accepted definition exists.  No one has been able to 
demonstrate either its modernity or its antiquity.  Disagreement over its origin is 




Nationalism is a complex process that researchers are only now beginning to deeply 
understand.  Nationalism, as a human phenomenon which is contested, reinforced, reworked, and 
evolving, has been identified broadly as tied to rural social patterns. The study of nationalism 
over the last half century has been roughly divided into two broad schools of thought, but both 
have seen the roots of the nation in rural space, either through the traditions of rural 
communities, or as a response to the disruptions of those traditional patterns of life.2  Even those 
scholars of nationalism who focus on its modernity seem to find root causes as much in the 
transition from a rural, agrarian society or economy to a modern industrial one, as in modern 
society itself.  In this context, absent from the work of modernist scholars and others of 
nationalism is any meaningful attention to urban space.   
Ironically, simultaneous with the rise of nationalism as an ideology in Europe was a 
significant increase in urbanization.  Given this correlation between growing European 
urbanization and the ascendancy of nationalist sentiment, it is worth investigating if there is a 
relational link between these two phenomena.  In his book World City Network: A Global Urban 
Analysis,3 Peter J. Taylor identifies several trends in urban development over time.  One such 
                                                 
1 Benedict Anderson, "Introduction," in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London 
New York: Verso, 1996). @ 1 
2 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism 
(London ; New York Routledge, 1998). @ 1-4. 
3 Peter J. Taylor, World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
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trend is the tendency for a single city to gain disproportionately from other cities within a 
national network from national macro-economic policy.4  Taylor observes that this is a separate 
phenomenon to the political phenomenon of state power concentration in a single city, but also 
observes that: 
In combination, they create an extreme primate city pattern within the state.  Of 
course, capital city privileging… has been a general political process, albeit 
taking different forms in different countries.  The end result is that apart from a 
few large countries, the primate city pattern was nearly universal in twentieth-
century urban development.5  
 
After making this observation though, Taylor goes on to lament the “Nationalization of the study 
of cities.”6  This concern from Taylor about the separation of the study of cities into specific 
national focuses is understandable given the goal of his work, which is to understand urban 
networks which transcend national boundaries, but the effect is to perhaps miss the extent to 
which nationalism may be a key part of this “primate city pattern” which he acknowledges has 
been “nearly universal” in recent human experience. 
 
Zagreb as Croatia’s Metropolis 
  The “primate city” trend is defiantly evident in Croatia, where the city of Zagreb is 
described as the Croatian Metropolis.  The Croatian historian Ivo Perić goes so far as to state that 
“Its [Zagreb’s] affirmation as the Croatian Metropolis is particularly fixed in the time of the 
Illyrian Movement (Croatian National Revival).”7  Yet the Illyrian Movement began in the late 
1820s, and was a cultural movement which became political in the 1930s.  This would indicate 
that the tendencies towards the formation of a “primate” urban pattern in Croatia are rooted in 
                                                 
4 Ibid. @ 187. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. @ 188. 
7 Ivo Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). @ 16. 
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the 19th century and are more associated with the Croatian national project rather than the city’s 
economic development.   In fact, Zagreb’s economic development in the latter half of the 19th 
century was driven by its centrality to Croatian cultural development and the city’s perceived 
central role in the Croatian national project.  As the city’s planning office stated in 1930: 
…its development to today’s cultural and national center begins to flow from the 
beginning of the 19th century when the work of the national awakening with 
which the enthusiasm and belief in the future of southern Slavism overcame 
beyond the night of the old German and Latin spirit of Zagreb.8 
 
This statement clearly indicates that until the early 19th century, Zagreb was not identifiable as a 
Slavic city, but rather a “German and Latin” city.  Zagreb’s emergence as Croatia’s “primate 
city” was directly tied to its transformation into a Croatian national city. 
A review of the population data going back into the 19th century supports the argument 
that the process of Zagreb’s growth into Croatia’s “primate city” was well underway before the 
beginning of the 20th century.   
 
 1857 % 1900 % 1953 % 2001 % 
Zagreb 27,329 - 79,282 289 350,829 1283 686,082 2509 
Split 16,745 - 28,837 172 75,695 452 174,629 1043 
Croatia 2,181,499 - 3,161,456 145 3,936,022 180 4,437,460 203 
 
Table 1 - Comparative Population Growth in Croatia9 
 
The census data indicates that Zagreb was growing much more rapidly than Split, and at nearly 
double the rate of overall population growth in Croatia as a whole well before the development 
of the city as a center for industrial production around the turn of the 20th century. 
 
 
                                                 
8 "Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba Podaci i Smjernica,"  
(Narodne Novine, 1930). @ 18. 
9 Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2003). @ 466 
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Objective of Study 
 This study argues that the production of urban space including, but not limited to specific 
urban micro-spaces can be central to the process of constituting, transmitting, and contesting 
nationalism.  This project therefore examines the interrelationship between two issues that have 
generally not been seen as interrelated; the constitution of nationalism and the production of 
urban space.  Though each of these subjects has been extensively studied for decades, few have 
attempted to make any direct connection between them.  This study thus deepens our 
understanding of nationalism during times of modernism and emerging industrialization, an 
historic time period which was fertile for the production of diverse nationalisms across Europe 
and beyond.10  The empirical focus of this study is the city of Zagreb and its central space, Ban 
Josip Jelačić Square. I demonstrate that the constitution of the city as a complex organic space, 
anchored by the construction of this central space, an assiduously constituted and managed 
terrain, was pivotal to the development of Croatian nationalism between 1850 and 1940. 
My study of the city of Zagreb as an empirical case explores the relationship between the 
main square of the city of Zagreb, the city of Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis, and the 
trajectory of Croatian nationalism, as manifested by the Croatian national project across 90 years 
of time, from 1850 to 1940.  Specifically, I will examine the spatial dynamic which developed 
that located Zagreb, as the Croatian Metropolis, at the center of the Croatian national project, 
while simultaneously placing the main square at the center of the Croatian Metropolis, and 
placed a conception of nation at the center of the square.  Through building a semiotically 
infused city and set of spaces, the nature of Croatia as a national community came to be seen as 
reflective of, and reflected in the urban landscape of Zagreb.  Ultimately, the city’s main square 
became a space which exuded the character of both Croatia and Zagreb.  
                                                 
10 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism  
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My work examines the process of spatialization (spatial structuration) in the main square 
and the city and the broader urban landscape of the Zagreb to show how these processes impact 
and are impacted by the Croatian national project over this time period.  This project chronicles 
the transformation of a specific location (the square) as well as broader urban trends in Zagreb, 
and how those transformations were affected by and, in turn, affected the Croatian national 
project.  This study thus examines how an imagined space was transformed into real space and 
how that transformation impacted the lived space of the city.  This project is ultimately a study of 
a specific location (the square) and a specific space (the city and nation-state directly influenced 
by the square), but with implications for how we may begin theorizing society-space relations 
across different national settings.  
All urban spaces, of course, are transformed spaces.  They are changed by deliberate 
action, but it does not follow that the real space that is produced matches the imagined space as 
originally conceived, or that the new space will be experienced in a way that will re-enforce the 
ideology embedded in the original imagining of the space. This, I chronicle, is the source of 
political resistance. For, as documented, produced spaces are forever mediated by beings which 
generate unintended lived spaces.11  This human product, space, then, will produce unintended 
outcomes through its being lived by people, ascribed meanings, and being mobilized both in 
everyday life and political projects.      
   
Scholarly Definitions of Nation and Nationalism 
 The study of nationalism has attracted immense attention for the last two and a half 
centuries.  Nationalism, as “a political principle which holds that the political unit and the 
                                                 




national unit should be congruent,”12 emerged from the Romantic Movement.  The idea of nation 
was a central element to Romantic understanding of the world.  Thinkers such as Herder sought 
to explain nation as a cultural phenomenon reflective of a national spirit, and focused on 
language as a key element of national identity.  Herder went so far as to argue that: 
Does a nationality (Volk), especially a backward nationality, have anything more 
precious than the language of its fathers?  In this language lives a whole world of 
tradition, history, religion, and principles of life, all of a nationality’s heart and 
soul.  To take this language away from such a people, or to degrade this language, 
means that you are taking away its one immortal possession, that has passed from 
generation to generation…13 
 
Herder thus posited a Volk (a nationality or a people) with a collective spirit, a “soul” of its own.  
This national spirit was expressed in its culture, and became “immortal,” or lived beyond the 
lives of individual inhabitants, as long as the vessel of that culture, the language, survived.  
Though Herder has been associated with the German Enlightenment movement of the second 
half of the 18th century, his view of nation established a foundation upon which the Romantic 
thinkers who came after him would build. 
It was one of the earliest Romantic philosophers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who posited the 
need to link national identity to political order.  Rousseau wrote as early as 1762 on the need for 
a distinctive “civic religion” for each state.14  Eventually, Rousseau settled on the notion of 
nation as the form this civic religion should take, though unlike Herder, he did not see nation as 
an essential element of an individual’s being.15  Rousseau’s view was enshrined in the 
international political order with the end of the First World War, when the President of the 
                                                 
12 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983). @ 1. 
13 Johann Gottfried Herder, Briefe zur Beforderung der Humanitat, Vol. VII of Sammtliche Werke, ed B Suphan 
(Berlin: Weidmannische Buchhandlung, 1881), @ 58. cited by Elinor Murray Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the 
Illyrian Movement (Boulder, New York  Eastern European monographs: no. 12, East European Quarterly, 
distributed by Columbia University Press, 1975). @ 16. 
14 Mads Qvortrup, The Political Philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Impossibility of Reason (Manchester, 
New Yrok: Manchester University Press, 2003). @ 79-81. 
15 Ibid. @ 82-83. 
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United States, Woodrow Wilson, implied national self-determination as the key legitimization 
for governance as a fundamental foundation for his proposed “Fourteen Points” as the 
fundamental basis for ending the war and writing the peace.16    
The ideological response to the Romantic idea of nationalism came initially from 
Marxists.  Yet the Marxist response was more complex than a simple rejection of the idea of 
nation or nationalism.  Marx and Engels were deeply ambivalent on the issue of nation, as this 
passage from the Communist Manifesto written in 1847 illustrates: 
The Communists are further reproached with desiring to abolish countries and 
nationality.   
 The Working men have no country.  We cannot take from them that which 
they have not got.  Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political 
supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself 
the nation, it is, so far, itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense. 
 National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and 
more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of 
commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in 
the conditions of life corresponding thereto.   
 The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.  
United action of the leading civilized countries at least, is one of the first 
conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. 
 In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put and 
end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to.  In 
proportion as the antagonism between classes with the nation vanishes, the 
hostility of one nation to another will come to an end.17 
 
This deeply conflicted passage argues that workers simultaneously have no nation, yet are also 
the truest nationals.   This ambivalence led to a practical pragmatism with regard to nationalism 
and national movements.  As one recent Marxist writer observed: 
                                                 
16 None of Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” specifically stated this argument or used the term National Self-
determination, but point number X. addressed the need for the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to have 
some form of “autonomous development,” and point V. called for an equal consideration of the rights and 
sovereignty of colonial peoples and the claims of colonial powers when determining the post-war status of European 
colonies.  Woodrow Wilson, "President Wilson's Message to Congress, January 8, 1918," ed. Records of the United 
States Senate (National Archives, 1918). 
17 Friedrich Engels Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. Robert C. 
Tucker (New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978). @ 488-489. 
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Thus Marx and Engels did not allow economic criteria to dictate whether they 
would lend support to specific national movements. Rather, they gave or withheld 
support on the basis of a political assessment of each movement in the 
international context.18 
 
This ambivalence allowed Marxist thinkers to take various views of nationalism.   
One school of Marxism in particular, the Austro-Marxists of the Hapsburg Empire, held a 
view of nation as a constituent element of the social condition, and the highest cultural product 
of society.   A goal of the socialist transformation, in this perspective, was the fulfillment of 
nation through the democratization of national culture.  Otto Bauer, a prominent Austro-Marxist 
thinker, argued that it was Capital that sought to demolish nation in pursuit of profit, and 
Socialism would fulfill the nation by providing the working class access to the production and 
consumption of national culture.19  Bauer argued that the concept of national self-determination 
should be understood as a cultural imperative, not a political one.  Therefore, according to Bauer, 
as it was Capitalism which sought to erase national distinctions, and Socialism which would 
naturally lead to the fulfillment of nations, true nationalist must support an international socialist 
order, and abandon the political goal of establishing individual national states. 
Based on this line of thinking, some Marxist thinkers outside the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, such as Rosa Luxemburg, went further to argue that political issues of national self-
determination were, at best, a distraction that Socialist parties should avoid.  She therefore 
criticized the adoption of “the right of nations to self-determination” as embodied by Article 9 of 
the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party adopted in 1903.20  Luxemburg noted in 1908 that, 
even where national self-determination was achieved, its effects economically or socially were 
negligible.  
                                                 
18 Tom Lewis, "Marxism and Nationalism," International Socialist Review no. 13 (2000). 
19 Otto Bauer, "The Nation," in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London, New York: Verso, 1996). 
20 Rosa Luxemburg, "The National Question and Autonomy," Social-Democratic Review 6 (1908). @ 483.  Cited in 
V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination. 
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Can one seriously speak about the ‘self-determination’ of the formally 
independent Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Rumanians, Serbs, Greeks, partly even 
the Swiss, whose independence is itself a result of the political struggle and the 
diplomatic game of the ‘Concert of Europe’?21 
 
Luxemburg concluded that nation, as a political organizing principle, was a manifestation of a 
false consciousness which was deliberately propagated to prevent the European working class 
from recognizing their collective class identity. This concept, she posited, was used to mobilize 
them for their own self destruction during the First World War.22   
Yet, Marxist movements around the world organized themselves along nationalist lines in 
offering notions of national self-determination and national liberation as key components of their 
anti-imperial struggles.  This stance can be traced to the use of the concept of “the national 
question” within the Russian Empire by Lenin to mobilize sympathy for the Bolshevik Party 
before and during World War I.  A key part of the effort was a long essay written by Lenin in 
1914, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination,23 in which he succinctly presented a Marxist 
explanation for the rise of nationalism and its key role in the historical dialectic process: 
Therefore, Rosa Luxemburg not withstanding, the example of the whole of 
progressive, civilized mankind, the example of the Balkans and the example of 
Asia prove that Kautsky’s proposition is absolutely correct: the national state is 
the rule and the “norm” of capitalism; the heterogeneous nation state represents 
backwardness, or is an exception.  From the standpoint of national relations, the 
best conditions for the development of capitalism are undoubtedly provided by 
the national state.  This does not mean, of course, that such a state, while retaining 
bourgeois relations, could avert the exploitation and oppression of nations.  It only 
means that “self determination of nations” in the program of the Marxists can-not, 
from a historic-economic point of view, have any other meaning than political 
self-determination, political independence, the formation of a national state.24 
 
                                                 
21 Ibid. @ 500. 
22 See for example The Junius Pamphlet: The Crisis in the German Social Democracy, written in 1915,  Mary-Alice 
Waters, ed., Rosa Luxemburg Speaks (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970). @ 257-231. 
23 V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947). 
24 Ibid. @ 14. 
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This explicit response to Rosa Luxemburg’s critique sought to circumvent it.  While it noted that 
questions of national self-determination were political rather than social, it placed this political 
issue at the center of the material dialectic process. Thus, nationalism, as a key political 
organizing principle, was ostensibly necessary to supplant feudalism, and to advance capitalism 
within less developed countries.   The singular success of Lenin’s Communist Party in Russia in 
establishing a Marxist Soviet government at the end of World War I resulted in this Leninist 
model of thought about nationalism and national liberation dominating Marxists movements for 
the next 50 years.  The Communist regimes of post World War II Eastern Europe adopted this 
philosophy in practice, creating specific justifications for their nationally based socialist regimes 
by developing nationally specific socialist doctrines derived from distinct national historical 
experiences.   
The Czech Marxist thinker Miroslav Hroch, working in the late 1960s and early 1970s,  
studied the process of national revival in Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe.25 
He also accepted an assumption that elements of nation in some form preceded modern 
circumstances.  His study focused on national revival movements which had both succeeded and 
failed.  But Hroch’s work was more than a set of detailed case studies.  At its core it was an 
effort to bridge the division within the Marxist theory of nationalism.  To that end, he posited a 
new starting point for the study of nationalism: 
This conception is decisively to be differentiated from the notion that nationalism 
is the primary formative factor and the nation is derivative. 
 In contrast with the subjectivist conception of the nation as the product of 
national consciousness, nationalism, the national will and spiritual forces, we 
posit the conception of the nation as a constituent of social reality of historical 
origin. 
                                                 
25 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe : A Comparative Analysis of the Social 
Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations trans. Ben Fowkes (Cambridge, New York 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
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 We consider the origin of the modern nation as the fundamental reality 
and nationalism as a phenomenon derived from the existence of that nation.  
However one must not determine the objective character of the nation with a fixed 
collection of features and attributes given once and for all, just as it is not possible 
to view the nation as an everlasting category, standing outside the concrete social 
relations.26 
 
Marxists were not the only ones to challenge the Romantic vision of nation.  The French 
academic, Ernest Renan wrote a provocative essay in 1882 entitled What is a Nation?27 which 
reflected much French thought at this time.  Renan systematically deconstructed the Romantic 
argument for nation being an essential part of nature. He argued: “The nations are not something 
eternal.  They had their beginnings and they will end.”28  Yet he did not dispute the reality of 
nation, nor did he dispute the characterization of nation as spirit.  Renan argued that nation was a 
spirit of human creation, a product of human choice which would persist as long as people chose 
to continue recreating it on a daily basis.  Renan concluded that: 
Man is a slave neither of his race nor his language, nor of his religion, nor of the 
course of rivers nor of the direction taken by mountain chains.  A large aggregate 
of men, healthy in mind and warm of heart, creates the kind of moral consciences 
we call a nation.29 
 
In this statement, Renan did not reject all Romantic thinkers,30 only the essentialist view 
that many Romantic thinkers espoused, that national identity was somehow embedded in 
an individual from birth, or was a product of the physical environment. 
The end of World War II and the rise of Cold War realities, which was marked by a 
failed nationalist movement seeking global dominance and the entanglement of other 
nationalisms shortly thereafter, provided an opening for newer critical studies of nationalism. An 
                                                 
26 Ibid. @ 3. 
27 Ernest Renan, "What Is a Nation," in Becoming National, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press). @ 42 – 55. 
28 Ibid. @ 53. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Qvortrup, The Political Philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Impossibility of Reason. @ 84. 
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influential new strand of thought was inaugurated by Ernest Gellner.  In 1964 he wrote 
persuasively on the conditions in which nationalism becomes the natural forms of political 
loyalty. Here he offers two central “propositions: (1) Every man a clerk (Universal literacy 
recognized as a valid norm.) (2) Clerks are not horizontally mobile, they can not normally move 
from one language-area to another…”31  Bolstering this, his Nations and Nationalism32 argued 
that the nation was a modern concept, the product of the process of social modernization.   
Nationalism here was not an ideology in its own right, but rather a manifestation of the social 
transformation required by industrialization.  He stated: 
We do not properly understand the range of options available to industrial society, 
and perhaps we never shall; but we understand some of its essential concomitants.  
The kind of cultural homogeneity demanded by nationalism is one of them, and 
we had better make our peace with it.  It is not the case… that nationalism 
imposes homogeneity; it is rather that the homogeneity imposed by objective, 
inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of 
nationalism.33   
 
With this theory, Gellner established the foundation of a sociological counter argument to the 
Romantic visions of nation and nationalism.  In response, a new generation of thinkers began 
building on this modernist argument.   
 Almost simultaneous to Gellner’s work, Benedict Anderson published a provocative new 
work on national identity and nationalism, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism.34  This book took a slightly different approach to the question, by using 
an older Marxist approach (which is to say before Marxism had embraced nation as a political 
organizing principle) to analyzing the issue.  Anderson identified a specific mechanism for the 
                                                 
31 Ernest Gellner, "Nationalism and Modernization," in Nationalism, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 
Oxford Readers (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). @ 56. 
32 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. 
33 Ibid. @ 39. 
34 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Revised 
Edition, Revised and extended ed. (London, New York: Verso, 1991). 
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process, “print capitalism.”  This fusion of cultural and capital production used the printed word 
to create a large, nationally defined market for its product, and then filled that market with 
content which re-enforced the existence of the nation, to both protect and grow the market.   This 
mass consumption print culture created as common understanding of identity among people from 
different regions, thus allowing people from potentially very different cultural backgrounds to 
see each other as partners in a single national enterprise.  This then was the “imagined 
community.”  Yet Anderson stressed that by imagined he did not mean false, invented, or 
fabricated, further stating: “In fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face to face 
contact (and perhaps even those) are imagined.  Communities are to be distinguished, not by 
their falsity/genuiness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”35 
In 1990 E. J. Hobsbawm published Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, 
Myth, Reality,36 which furthered the argument about the specifically modern character of nation 
and even argued that almost all writing about nation and nationalism from previous periods 
should be ignored: 
Not that we should wish to recommend all that much that was written in earlier 
periods.  Our reading list would contain very little that was written in the classic 
period of nineteenth-century liberalism, for reasons which should become clear 
later, but also because very little other than nationalist and racist rhetoric was 
being written then.  And the best work produced at the time was actually very 
brief, like John Stuart Mill’s passage on the subject in his Considerations on 
Representative Government, and Ernest Renan’s famous lecture ‘What is a 
nation?’37  
 
Hobsbawm’s argument went beyond simply critiquing the Romantic view of nation. He offered a 
fundamental critique of nation itself as a legitimate category.  He did not argue that nation and 
nationalism should not be studied, but rather the study of nation and nationalism should focus on 
                                                 
35 Ibid. @ 6. 
36 E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge [England]; New 
York Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
37 Ibid. @ 2. 
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the deconstruction of the concept as anything other than modern.  Further, Hobsbawm suggested 
that all Romantic writings on nation should be simply ignored.  Hobsbawm’s choice of title, 
deriving directly as it did from Gellner’s, was an indication that his desire was to build on the 
modernist argument.  Where Gellner had made a sociological argument about why the idea of 
nationalism came into existence, Hobsbawm was supporting him with an intellectual history of 
nation and nationalism, showing the steps that had been taken in the process. 
Hobsbawm’s work represents the high water mark of the advocates of the modernist 
paradigm of nationalism studies.  This success was based on several factors beyond the high 
quality of scholarship.   In the post war era at least in Western Europe and North America, where 
many of these critical scholars were located, the historic trends supported the modernists’ 
contentions.  With the rapid integration of the Western European nations into the European 
Community, it appeared that Renan’s prediction that “A European confederation will very 
probably replace them [nations]”38 was coming to pass.  Beyond Western Europe, Yugoslavia 
was a scholarly validated success of a multi-national state structure.  In 1991, it was easy to 
accept Hobsbawm’s description of the period between 1918 and 1950 as “The apogee of 
nationalism” with the ideology on a downward trend for 40 years.39  In addition to the apparent 
historical trends, there were also very strong social prohibitions to challenging the modernist 
paradigm.  Any effort to explore nation as non-modern ran the risk of being labeled as an effort 
to apologize for the racially based nationalism of the corporatists movements of the interwar 
period.  As a result, the modernist paradigm dominated western nationalism scholarship almost 
unchallenged. 
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The decade of the 1990s was not supportive of the modernist outlook towards 
nationalism.  The end of the ideological struggle of the Cold War resulted in what appeared to be 
a sudden re-emergence of nationalist movements.  In addition, the opening up of Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union to western scholars provided an opportunity to discover just how 
deeply embedded nationalism was in the governing practices of the Soviet Bloc.  Most shocking 
though, was the violent, and eventually brutal wars that ripped the multi-national Yugoslav state 
apart into smaller nation states.  This event was shocking on many levels.  For nearly three 
decades western scholars had been free to enter and study the Yugoslav system and had judged it 
a success on social, economic, and to some degree political grounds.  Further, and of particular 
relevance to the modernist scholars of nationalism, was that fact that the Yugoslav system had 
virtually unchallenged control of the means of cultural production which the modernists had 
identified as the key means of national identity formation.  The failure of the Yugoslav system to 
produce a pervasive Yugoslav identity, and the persistence of older national identities through 
four decades of the Socialist Yugoslav system challenged a fundamental premise of the 
modernist paradigm. 
One result of the events of the 1990s and the violence of Yugoslavia’s demise was a turn 
to scholars of nationalism whose work might shed light on these events.  Anthony D. Smith’s 
work is a primary example of this type of thinking.  Smith was not an anti-modernist in his 
thinking, but rather argued that, though modern nations were a new phenomenon, they were also 
a modern adaptation of a long standing human tendency to create larger collective community 
identities.  Smith argued that failure to appreciate this pre-modern element of nationalism lead to 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the phenomenon which undermined efforts to defuse ethno-
17 
 
national conflicts.  Smith’s book, The Ethnic Origins of Nations,40 first published in 1986, 
became immensely popular in the 1990s, being reprinted nine times during that decade, twice 
during 1993, when the war in Bosnia was at its height, and twice again in 1999 when the war in 
Kosovo spurred NATO intervention and a 78 day bombing campaign against Yugoslavia.   
Some scholars took a different approach to the events of the early 1990s.  Michael Billig 
sought to explain the failure of the modernists to predict the strong resurgence of nationalism by 
applying a Gramscian analysis to the issue.  Antonio Gramsci had developed the theory of 
Cultural Hegemony between the First and Second World Wars in an effort to explain why 
Marx’s theory that revolution would emerge in the most advanced capitalist societies had not 
proven true over time.  Gramsci argued that the reason for this was that bourgeois society had 
embedded capitalism so deeply in the culture of western industrial society that revolution 
became impossible.41  Billig used a similar argument to explain the persistence of nationalism in 
modern western societies, positing that the nation had become embedded in the daily use of 
language and leisure to the point where it pervaded everything.  To explain the modernists’ 
failure to identify the persistence of nationalism, Billig argued that the nationalist rhetoric was so 
subtle as to be nearly invisible during periods of political calm, only emerging at times of crisis.    
Billig termed this phenomenon Banal Nationalism.42 
There was one other school of thought that gained some prominence during the 1990s.  
These were neo-Marxists who had argued against the modernist movement not on the 
fundamental analysis of the modernity of nations, but rather the fundamentally negative 
character of national projects.  These thinkers were echoing Renan, who had seen nation as a 
                                                 
40 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). 
41 Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince & Other Writings, trans. Louis Marks (New York: International Publishers, 
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tremendously progressive force in European society and Otto Bauer’s earlier ideas about nation 
as a means of dividing and resisting capital, and therefore argued that nation should be embraced 
by Marxist thinkers in the new post-Cold War order.  These thinkers also generally rejected the 
premise that nationalism was in a terminal decline.  The challenge for this school of thinkers was 
to deal with the reality of brutal violence which had accompanied the national resurgences of the 
1990s.   
Tom Nairn addressed this issue by locating negative nationalism in rural space.  In his 
essay The Curse of Rurality: Limits of Modernization Theory,43 Nairn posited that the violence 
currently being perpetrated in the name of nation originated in rural communities: 
However, in none of these examples did the conflict itself originate in the cities…  
The resultant generational warfare may penetrate or even take over cities, the 
urban sites to which extended families of land dwellers have moved or, 
sometimes, been expelled.  But the violent side of the conflict appears invariably 
to have its origins in the peasant or small-town world they have left behind.44 
 
Nairn went further to argue that there were two basic forms of nationalism; civic nationalism and 
an ethnic nationalism.  These distinctions were not new to the study of nationalism, but Nairn 
argued that the distinction between these two was very different than previously articulated.  
Nairn argued that civic nationalism was a positive, urban based nationalism, and ethnic 
nationalism was a distorted form of this civic nationalism:   
Ethnic nationalism is in essence a peasantry transmuted, at least in ideal terms, 
into a nation.  Granted, the formation of modern national identities has 
notoriously involved a multiplicity of other factors, all attended to by different 
brands of social scientist: states, frontiers, literacy, industrialization, school 
systems, symbols and complex cultural artifacts.  But it can read along this other 
axis too. Underneath all the accumulating paraphernalia of the modern lies a 
prolonged and massive social Calvary out of peasant subsistence and towards 
eventual urban inter-dependence.  On the level of the Gemeinschaft-Gesellshaft 
journey terrible accidents have been common.  Peasantries may be ‘reimagined’ 
essentially as a form of leverage, a way of helping to erect the modern nation, and 
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in the end such imagining of communities may turn to green politics and ecology.  
However, it is not impossible for the instrumental lever to assume a life of its own 
and, at least for a time, to take over and dominate the processes by which nations 
are built.45   
 
With this argument, Nairn sought to transfer the negative elements of nation to a particular, 
“ruralized” form of nation which distorted the form of a positive, older “urban” civic 
nationalism.  Nairn was also straddling the modernist/non-modernist divide, but in a new way, 
identifying an older national form based on urban civic values, which was more “modern” than 
the newer, ethnic nationalism, which he saw as a regressive, potentially violent force. 
 In this argument about the urban origin of nation, Nairn was echoing an argument made 
three decades earlier by Eugen Weber in his provocative work Peasants into Frenchmen: the 
modernization of rural France 1870 – 1914.46 Weber describes the process by which rural 
communities in France became both modernized and nationalized.  What Weber describes is a 
process by which self sustaining rural communities were transformed into towns dependent on 
the urban network of France for innovation and cultural production.  Referring to the writings of 
Andre Varagnac he states: 
The novelty now [the nineteenth century] was that the renewal process ceased: 
traditions died and were not replaced; there was no longer any spontaneous 
innovation in the countryside.  A whole mentality was dieing – had died – out.47   
 
Though Weber focuses on the nationalizing aspects of this process, embedded in his work is the 
urbanizing process as well.  In fact, it is clear from his statements in the introduction that 
modernization and urbanization are closely related, if not inseparable.  Describing the French 
historian Thabault’s characterization of the role of the new institution of the school in villages he 
says: 
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The school was important because conditions changed, because it served new 
conditions, and  the conditions that it helped to change were no longer local ones 
but national; they were urban, they were modern.48 
 
In his argument, Weber focused on the nationalizing aspect of this project over the urbanizing 
aspect.  Weber’s work was well received at the time it was written, but it was generally seen as 
further evidence to support the modernist theory of nation.  In the last thirty five years few 
scholars have explored the link between the urban and the national that Weber’s work would 
seem to imply. 
 One continuity in the study of nation does exist between the Romantics and the 
contemporary scholars.  Both of these groups of thinkers start with language as a key point of 
reference in their thinking.  Romantic scholars, building on Herder’s work, identified language as 
a key defining element of nation.  Modern scholars such as Ernest Gellner, and Anthony D. 
Smith both started in the field of language (Gellner as a linguist and Smith as a classicist) before 
moving into nationalism studies, and Benedict Anderson and Michael Billig, though not scholars 
of language, clearly focused on the use of language in mass media for their studies of 
nationalism. 
 
Geographic Engagement with Nation and Nationalism 
 As a discipline, Geography’s engagement with the idea of nationalism has been as 
diverse as the general academic debate on the topic, tackling the subject from many different 
vantage points.  In 1985, C.H. Williams offered no less than five separate areas in which 
geographers had or could contribute to the study of nationalism: 
1) The national construction of social space 
2) Uneven development and nationalism 




3) The secular intelligentsia 
4) Structural preconditions and triggering factors 
5) Ecological analysis49 
In 1982, David B. Knight wrote in the Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers: 
In some general works by political geographers lip service is given to the 
emotional bonds of group to politico-territorial identities, generally defined 
loosely as the nation or nation-state, but remarkably little has been done beyond 
this. Rather than quickly bypassing such bonds of group as being of little 
importance, we should focus further attention on the theme…50 
 
Knight’s article, “Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and 
Regionalism,” was, as the title suggests, a call for geographers to apply the concept of territory to 
the issue of nationalism.  The theory of Territoriality, as discussed by Robert Sack in the book 
Human Territoriality: Its theory and history,51 is a broad approach to the human organization of 
space. As Sack states at the outset of his work: 
Territoriality in Humans is best thought of not as biologically motivated, but 
rather as socially and geographically rooted.  Its use depends on who is 
influencing and controlling whom and on the geographical context of place, 
space, and time.  Territorially is intimately related to how people use the land, 
how they organize themselves in space, and how they give meaning to place.  
Clearly these relationships change, and the best means of studying them is to 
reveal their changing character over time. 52 
 
Given this definition and approach to territoriality, its applicability to the study of nation and 
nationalism is easy to see.  In 1986, Anthony D. Smith observed how “poetic spaces” are tied to 
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“golden ages” in the process of national mythology creation.53  Geographers have used 
territoriality to explore this process and applied it to specific geographic contexts to examine 
how territory is significant to specific national communities.  David Newman, an Israeli 
geographer who has applied Territoriality to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has succinctly laid 
out an argument for the relational nature of the material and the symbolic in questions of 
territory, stating:  
The concrete and the symbolic manifestations of territory constitute a single 
system in which each feeds into, and reinforces, the other.  Proponents of one will 
often use the arguments of the other as a means of strengthening their case for a 
specific form of territorial policy54 
 
George W. White has applied territoriality to Southeastern Europe in his book Nationalism and 
Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe.55  White identifies one of the 
key challenges to effectively using territoriality: 
Nations being territorial or having other subjective qualities is not new.  
Nevertheless, the subjective components of national identity frequently are not 
addressed because they are difficult to measure, whereas, it is easier to grasp 
objective criteria.  Measuring something more concrete, such as language use or 
religious affiliation, is attractive because it is seemingly easier to accomplish and 
less controversial than analyzing the emotional bonds that nations have with 
particular places and territories.  Geographers too have great difficulty “mapping” 
these subjective components and likewise prefer to map more tangible criteria.56   
 
Other geographers have sought to apply scale to territoriality, for example Nested Identities: 
Nationalism, Territory, and Scale, edited by Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplin,57 and 
O’Lear and Whiting “Which Comes First, the Nation or the State? A Multiple Scale Model 
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Applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Caucasus.”58  Some authors have also used 
territoriality to explore how space is securitized, such as Arnon Soffer and Julian V. Minghi’s 
“Israel's Security Landscapes: The Impact of Military Considerations on Land Uses”59 and Ami 
Oren and David Newman’s “Competing Land Uses: The Territorial Dimension of Civil–Military 
Relations in Israel.”60  Though this type of work does not address nationalism directly, it does 
address it obliquely. 
Within geography, a subfield of territoriality has developed, focusing on the study of 
boundaries and borderlands.  Anssi Paasi has been a leading scholar in this field of study, 
exploring the ways that boundaries are produced and re-produced socially.  Paasi has argued that 
boundaries should “be understood not merely as static lines, but as sets of practices and 
discourses which “spread” into the whole of society and are not restricted to border areas.”61  
Paasi and Newman have also argued that narratives are a key part of the production of 
boundaries, in “Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Rethinking Boundaries in 
Political Geography.”62   
Some geographers have approaches other than territoriality and boundaries to study 
geopolitical issues, including nationalism.  In 1994, John Agnew published “The Territorial 
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Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory.”63  In this article, 
Agnew argued that: 
The end of the Cold War, the increased velocity and volatility of the world 
economy, and the emergence of political movements outside the framework of 
territorial states, suggest the need to consider the territoriality of states in 
historical context. Conventional thinking relies on three geographical assumptions 
- states as fixed units of sovereign space, the domestic/foreign polarity, and states 
as 'containers' of societies - that have led into the 'territorial trap'.64   
  
Agnew’s piece was not specifically focused on the study of nationalism, but rather a call for a 
more nuanced approach to geopolitics which questioned these underlying geographical 
assumptions.  Agnew concluded: 
The critical theoretical issue, therefore, is the historical relationship between 
territorial states and the broader social and economic structures and geopolitical 
order (or form of spatial practice) in which these states must operate. It has been 
the lack of attention in the mainstream literature to this connection that has led 
into the territorial trap. In idealizing the territorial state we cannot see a world in 
which its role and meaning change. In international relations theory territorial 
space has most definitely conquered time. Only historical-geographical 
consciousness can release us from its dead hand.65 
 
Guntram H. Herb has argued that “The focus of critical geopolitics on boundaries 
introduces an imbalance in its treatment of the territorial dimensions of nations. It seems to 
suggest that borders are the sole means through which a national community becomes linked to a 
given territory.”66  Herb argues that this imbalance can be corrected for by incorporating the 
cultural ways in which territorial identification is communicated to members of a national 
community.  In this case, Herb used geography textbooks.  He argues that textbooks are of 
particular value in this type of investigation of nationalism because they have a singular role: 
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All texts with a wide audience, including popular magazines, schoolbooks, 
novels, films, or news reports, are important in the ‘‘common-sensical 
construction’’ of the nation (Sharp 1993, 494–95), but school geography texts are 
uniquely suited to convey the border between us and the Other that is at the heart 
of national identity (Paasi 1999, 226–27). Moreover, they are consumed at a 
crucial stage in the development of sociospatial knowledge of the nation 
(Schleicher 1993, 23–24; Dijkink 1996, 2–3).  Textbooks do not fall neatly into 
the category of popular geographs, however. Textbooks reflect popular 
conceptions, but they are written by an intellectual elite, and their content is 
regulated by ‘‘gatekeepers’’ such as publishers and government ministries 
(Buttimer, Brunn, and Wardenga 1999, 130).Thus, they are at the intersection of 
elite and popular geographs and a bona fide reflection of the shared beliefs 
between elites and national popular masses. 
 
John Agnew has made a more extensive critique of boundary studies recently.  In “No Borders, 
No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia,”67 Agnew argues that: 
Macedonia’s centrality to the making of Greece over the past century provides the 
empirical grounding for an exploration of how cultural-symbolic borrowing rather 
than cross-border othering has been crucial for border making in Modern Greece 
and, by extension, everywhere in the world.68 
 
Agnew also makes this specific critique of the current approach to the study of borders: 
 
The more recent literature on borders has attended much more closely to how 
borders are socioterritorial constructs reflecting the discourses and practices of 
national identity and bordering under conditions of globalization (Paasi 2005; van 
Houtum 2005; van Houtum, Kramsch, and Zierhofer 2005; Newman 2006; 
Rumford, forthcoming). Yet, whether naturalistic or post-structuralist in 
conception, most border studies still tend to conceive of borders in cross-pressure 
terms. The emphasis on cross-pressures across a border between adjacent states 
both making and maintaining it in place reflects a completely territorialized image 
of spatiality in which territorialized states are seen as monopolizing the geography 
of power when, as is well known, power can be deployed spatially in various 
networked as well as territorial forms.69 
 
These observations are echoed in a range of new scholarship on the history of nation identity 
formation in borderlands.  Works such as Keely Stauter-Halsted’s The Nation in the Village: The 
                                                 
67 John Agnew, "No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia," Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 97, no. 2 (2007). 
68 Ibid. @ 398. 
69 Ibid. @ 399. 
26 
 
Genesis of Peasant National Identity in Austrian Poland, 1848-191470 (2002), Jeremy King’s 
Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics71 (2002), James 
Bjork’s Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in the Central 
European Borderland72 (2008), Tara Zahra’s Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the 
Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-194873 (2008), and Caitlin Murdock’s 
Changing Places : Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian Borderlands, 1870-
194674 (2010), explore the dynamics of national identity formation in borderlands and show how 
contingent and problematic this process can be just in the area at the center of Europe. 
Another approach which geographers have taken to engaging the subject of nationalism is 
through the study of landscapes.  Landscape has been an object of study in the social sciences for 
a long period of time.  Direct linkages between the production of urban landscapes and power 
were illuminated by Carl E. Schoreske with the publication of Fin-De-Siecle Vienna: Politics 
and Culture75 in 1961, in which he chronicled how the Ringstrasse project was a key part of the 
newly emerging middle class in Vienna transforming the city to reflect their new dominance in 
society.  In 1990, James S. Duncan published The City As Text: The Politics of Landscape 
Interpretation in the Kandyan Kingdom,76 in which he built a strong argument for landscape as a 
key part of cultural communication: 
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The landscape, I would argue is one of the central elements in a cultural system, 
for as an ordered assemblage of objects, as text, it acts as a signifying system 
through which a social system is communicated, reproduced, experienced, and 
explored.  In order to understand this structured and structuring quality of 
landscape, we must first inquire into what is signified by the landscape.77 
 
Geographers have applied this urban landscape approach primarily through the study of street 
names and monuments.  Even before Duncan’s work had been published, David Harvey 
“Monument and Myth”78 in which he discussed the Basilica of Sacre-Coeur in Paris and the 
class struggle that its history illuminates.  In 1990 Allan Pred first published his discussion of 
working class resistance through a popular geography which, among a range of geographic 
practices in daily life, included the naming of local places and refusing to accept the formal new 
names for streets in Stockholm.  The working class of Stockholm even turned the formal name of 
the main central park, the Arsenalsgatan, upon which were located the statue of King Gustav II 
Adolf, the Royal Opera House, the Foreign Ministry, and other important social buildings, into 
an obscenity describing part of a woman’s body in local slang.79 
 In 1994, Nuala Johnson published “Cast in Stone: monuments, geography, and 
nationalism,”80 in which she argued specifically for the use of monuments on the part of 
geographers to investigate nationalism.  Johnson noted “there is an increasing emphasis on the 
fluid and fragmented nature of political or cultural identity, yet the empirical focus has largely 
been on minority cultures within states.”81 In the conclusion of her article, Johnson states: 
Using Anderson’s (1983) thesis that nations are ‘imagined political communities’ 
as a guiding principle, I have argued that the examination of public statues 
enables the researcher to gain some insight into how the public imagination is 
aroused and developed in the context of the ongoing task of nation-building.  
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Statues, as part of the cityscape or rural landscape, act not only as concentrated 
nodes but also as circuits of memory where individual elements can be jettisoned 
from popular consciousness.  Their role in the geography of the city as points of 
physical and ideological orientation requires much further research.82 
 
Johnson has written a significant amount of work which demonstrates how Irish national identity 
has been expressed in monuments, and how the history of those monumental projects illuminate 
the political contestation between various concepts of Irish national identity during the time of 
the monuments’ creation.83  Following Johnson’s lead, other geographers have also adopted the 
technique of using monuments to investigate other national identities.  David Atkinson and Denis 
Cosgrove have explored the monument to Vittorio Emanuele II in Rome,84 and Dmitri Sidorov 
has investigated the rebuilding of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow after the end of 
the Soviet Union.85 In the context of Northern Ireland, B. Graham and P. Shirlow’s “The Battle 
of the Somme in Ulster memory and identity”86 uses informal monuments to the Irish 
participation in the battle of the Somme, in the form of local murals, to examine how local 
paramilitaries worked to “distance the loyalist working classes from the former hegemonic 
Britishness of official unionism and the sectarianism of the Orange Order.”87  Though, as Maoz 
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Azaryahu has pointed out in his article “Mcisrael? On the “Americanization of Israel,”” not all 
monumentalization is fully conscious or deliberate.88 
It is important to note that geographers are not the only ones using monuments to explore 
questions of identity.  Nuala Johnson relied on previous studies by historians of the post-Civil 
War South, such as Gaines M. Foster,89 who have looked at the significance of monuments in 
various aspects of the South’s reconciliation with defeat.  Historians have also continued to 
pursue the use of monuments as well, with works such as Monuments to the Lost Cause: Women, 
Art, and the Landscapes of Southern Memory ,90 edited by Cynthia Mills, and Pamela H. 
Simpson.  This mode of research is easily transferable to many locations, as Martin Simpson’s 
“Republicanizing the City: Radical Republicans in Toulouse, 1880-90,” demonstrates, and which 
also addresses the use of street names as “an ideal, cheap, and effective mechanism for the 
"republicanization" of public space.”91 
 Street and location names are essentially micro-monuments which signify important ideas 
or events to an urban community.  The study of street and location names as ideological markers 
extends to more issues than the study of nationalism and many disciplines beyond geography.  
Just a few examples include Maoz Azaryahu’s “Street Names and Political Identity: The Case of 
East Berlin” 92 (1986), David Young’s “East-End Street Names and British Imperialism”93 
(1992) and J. Carlos Gonza Faraco and Michael Dean Murphy’s “Street Names and Political 
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Regimes in an Andalusian Town”94 (1997).  The area of Israel and Palestine has been a 
particular focus of this type of study, for example, “Cultural-Geographical Aspects of Street 
Names in the Towns of Israel” 95 (1989), “Mapping the Nation: Street Names and Arab-
Palestinian Identity: Three Case Studies”96 (2002), and “Signifying Passages: The Signs of 
Change in Israeli Street Names”97 (2002). In the contemporary United States context, geographer 
Derek Alderman has focused on efforts to rename streets in the South after Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. to analyze the politics of memory.98   
A significant contribution of geographers in this field has been tying territoriality back to 
urban street and place naming, such as Helga Leitner and Petei Kang’s work which shows how 
the Kuomintang government in Taiwan has worked to inscribe place names from mainland 
China into the broad urban landscape of Taipei.99 Other geographers have found other links 
between urban landscape and territoriality.  Carol Gallaher and Peter Shirlow have shown how 
one loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland has used commemorative murals depicting 
images of a “proper Protestant history of suffering and resistance” to delineate the territory they 
controlled.100  These murals therefore served a dual function of both re-enforcing a specific 
image of an identity, while simultaneously identifying their group as the controlling entity in the 
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areas where the murals were created.  Another innovative approach to the relationship between 
nationalism and territoriality in an urban setting has been explored by Shaul Cohen in his study 
“Winning While Losing: The Apprentice Boys of Derry Walk Their Beat,” discusses how ritual 
“marching” by a loyalist group in Derry/Londonderry, Northern Ireland, is an effort to 
symbolically reassert power over areas in which they no longer have real power. 
 
Capital Cities 
Despite the innovative work that has been done on the symbolic relationship between 
urban space and national identity, at present, there is very little work on the relationship between 
nationalism and the urban development of modern cities, especially capital cities.  The 
phenomenon of the national capital growing to dominate in size, economic power, and cultural 
significance was recognized by Mark Jefferson in 1939.  Jefferson proposed “The Law of the 
Primate City,” which he summarized as “it is the Law of the Capitals that the largest city shall be 
supereminent, and not merely in size, but in national influence.”101  Jefferson did recognize that 
the “law” was not universal, and specifically identified the American case as an exception, 
writing in a footnote: “Outside America “capital” connotes the same thing as “primate city.”  It is 
only in America that the word is limited to political capitals, often very unimportant towns.”102  
Jefferson provided a very basic statistical analysis to demonstrate the basic validity of his 
observation, at least with regard to size.103  Ultimately, Jefferson tied the phenomenon he was 
identifying directly to nationalism, stating: “Primacy of a leading city is thus an earmark of 
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intense nationalism.  Here are the nation’s mind and soul.”104  Jefferson concluded his piece by 
stating simply: “Nationalism crystallizes in primate cities.”105 
 Since this article, capital cities have drawn little attention from geographers.  Some 
attention has been paid to the phenomenon of capital relocation in post-colonial states,106 and to 
the phenomenon in the United States, where the political capital is distinctly not the economic or 
cultural center.107  A rare exception was a 1983 special issue of the journal Ekistics: the 
problems and science of human settlements, which was entirely dedicated to the subject of 
capital cities.  At the beginning of the issue, the editor laid out the importance of capital cities: 
A capital city is the center of the whole political and geographical structure of the 
nation.  Its location is crucial to the life of the nation and the management of its 
politics.  The study of capitals, past and present, and of their evolution is therefore 
and important chapter in the general analysis of human settlements.108  
 
 Yet geographers have not aggressively engaged capital cities as a subject of inquiry in their own 
right. 
 Other disciplines have begun addressing the topic in the last few years.  In 2002, the 
sociologist Goran Therborn published “Monumental Europe: The National Years. On the 
Iconography of European Capital Cities,”109 which was a comparative study of how major 
European capital cities have developed, and the types monumentalism they employed.  In the 
region of Central Europe, monographs such as The Once and Future Budapest110 (2005), and 
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Habsburg Lemberg: Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the Galician Capital111 (2009) 
have examined the complex interaction between public space, national identity, and political 
power in capital cities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  In the area of Former Yugoslavia, 
books such as Sarajevo: A Biography 112 (2006), Project Zagreb: Transition as Condition, 
Strategy, Practice 113 (2007), Zagreb: A Cultural History 114 (2008), and Sarajevo: A Bosnian 
Kaleidoscope 115 (2010) all address various aspects of the development of these two capital 
cities.  Other disciplines are also taking the study of urban space and identity beyond capital 
cities to other major cities, such as Becoming Metropolitan: Urban Selfhood and the Making of 
Modern Cracow116 (2010), which investigates modernization and its impact on identity in 
Galicia’s ‘second city.’   
 
Nation, Space, and Place 
The current situation in the study of nation and nationalism presents Geographers with a 
significant opportunity.  Geography has produced significant new scholarship on the issue of 
place, yet this work has not energetically engaged the idea of nation or nationalism.  The concept 
of place has been a particular focus of human geographers recently.  This concept in particular 
would seem to be very applicable to the issue of nation, yet the scholars of place have focused 
much more on the local level rather than the national.  Tim Cresswell’s recent survey, Place, a 
short introduction,117 illustrates this trend.  In 123 pages of text, nation is discussed only in one 
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three page section, and this section, Regions and nations as places, as the title suggests, is as 
much about region as nation.  Interestingly, though the title of the section leads with regions, the 
first topic of discussion is nation, which, after one page, segues into region.  This construction 
tends to argue against the legitimacy of nation, by posting nation as a form of place, then, 
developing the variations between regions as subjects of investigation, thus presenting a field of 
study which itself calls the legitimacy of nation as a unifying identity further into question.  This 
attitude is also reflected in the recent survey work, Key Thinkers on Space and Place.118  This 
book covers 52 separate individuals and their work; of these, the only scholar of nationalism 
profiled is, not surprisingly, Benedict Anderson.  These observations are not intended as a 
critique of the authors’ work, which are fine surveys of the current state of the field, but rather, to 
use them as a reflection of the way the subject of nation has been addressed within human 
geography.   
The opportunity for geographers is to engage nationalism with the most recent 
innovations in geographic thought.  There is a recognition among some leading geographers that 
nationalism is an ideology that has changed significantly over time, and may be in the process of 
another significant transformation.  As Colin Flint and Peter Taylor state in Political Geography: 
World-Economy, Nation-State, and Locality:  
We argued that nationalism underwent a massive metamorphosis in the late 
nineteenth century.  Is there evidence of a second metamorphosis occurring 
today? 
 A renegotiation of nation can only mean a departure from nationalism’s 
monolithic tendencies, from national determinism.  Quite simply, nationalism 
from above is under attack.  Challenging the unchallengeable can come in many 
unexpected places.119 
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To answer this question, if nationalism today is being challenged from bellow, will be difficult, 
as any trend is much easier to identify after the fact, rather than as it unfolds.  An important step 
in the process would be to analyze previous individual cases of national transformation and 
contestation.  Spatiality would seem to be an excellent theoretical frame to use in exploring this 
process of contestation within national communities. 
 
Spatiality 
       A key concern in this study is the production and deployment of urban space. To 
operationalize this concern, I turn to one of the key innovations in geographic thought over the 
last few decades, the notion of spatiality, which seeks to understand the power of space to shape 
human understanding of realities.                  
Allen Pred’s articles Social Reproduction and the Time-Geography of Everyday Life120 
and Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time Geography of 
Becoming Places121 have been crucial contributions to the development of this idea.   These two 
articles depict space as a central element in the process of structuration, the dialectical process by 
which individuals participate in the creation of social structures while they are also shaped by 
those  structures.  Pred’s work posits space as a centerpiece of this ongoing structuration process.  
Pred uses the concept of “time geography” to show how “daily life paths” come into contact with 
and are influenced by larger social “projects.”  Space, central to this process, grounds and gives 
form to every action.  Space, to Pred, most notably enables actions to occur and infuses them 
with meanings and symbolism as a complex semiotic purveyor.       
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Henri Lefebvre took a different, but complementary approach to the process of spatial 
structuration.  Lefebvre’s The Production of Space122 argued that the human production of space 
results in three inter-related spatial forms: spatial practice (the physical spaces that society 
constructs), representations of space (people’s understandings of the proper and improper uses 
and understandings of space), and representational spaces (space as actually lived by individual 
members of society).123  These three elements constituted a spatial trialectic, an intertwined 
process by which space is continually being created, re-imagined, and lived.  These three forms 
of space can be thought of as real space, imagined space, and lived space. Though each of these 
forms of space has a distinct definition, they are continually interacting, and no one space exists 
without interaction with the other two.  Thus, real spaces can be re-imagined and transformed 
into new real spaces, which also can change the way people live in those spaces.  Similarly, 
living within a given space can transform the way people imagine that space, without any 
physical change to the space.  Lefebvre’s argument was that only by examining the interaction 
between these three forms of space can we fully examine and understand how space is produced 
and transformed over time.  Lefebvre’s work, highly theoretical in nature, focused on the 
interactions of urban and rural spaces in society.   
Edward Soja’s Third Space: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined 
Places furthered Lefebvre’s line of theorizing by operationalizing it and using the spatial 
trialectic to analyze specific urban sites.124  But Soja pushed farther, arguing for the use of the 
city as an analytic object for issues beyond questions of urbanism.  This concept, which he called 
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“putting cities first,” is presented in Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions.125  
Soja identifies a particular characteristic of urban environments which he calls synekism.  This 
synekism references the explosive creativity and productivity of human society in urban 
environments.  Because so much of human society is a product of this synekism, Soja argues that 
cities should be a starting point for the study of modern human phenomenon.   
The applications of spatiality to questions of nation by geographers to date have focused 
on how the imagined space of national territory is transformed into the real space of state 
territory.  Anssi Paasi’s work on the border between Finland and the Soviet Union/Russia shows 
the spatial trialectic in action.  Though he does not expressly invoke spatiality, Paasi does show 
the border regions being imagined, implemented, and lived spaces which are interactive with 
each other at every stage of the process.126  Paasi’s work focuses on the effort to transform a 
“remote” space, the boundary region, to conform to the national government’s image of how that 
region should be, and the tensions that are created by people in the boundary region attempting 
to live in this remotely imagined space in the ways that have been imagined for it.  This creates a 
changed, lived space that is neither the boundary as imagined by the remote core, nor a boundary 
that had existed previously. 
In this project I will apply spatiality to the process of producing the city of Zagreb as the 
Croatian Metropolis.  The goal is to examine the emergence of the Croatian Metropolis as an 
imagined space, and the practical steps that were taken to transform it into a real space.  This 
Croatian Metropolis project was focused as much on defining the nature of Croatia as a nation 
though the way the population of Zagreb lived, as it was about establishing Croatian sovereignty 
over specific territories.  This project therefore examines how changes in the imagined, real, and 
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lived spaces of the city of Zagreb were both driven by and recursively influenced the trajectory 
of the Croatian national project. 
  
Conclusion 
Existing scholarship in geography has been fragmented with regard to the relationship 
between urban space and national identity, and has looked primarily at inscription of meaning in 
distinct parts and micro-spaces of cities.  Geographers have looked at how space is used to evoke 
existing senses of meaning, as a “text” which is “read” by people.  But this assumes a common 
understand in existence when the text is written.  What has not been done to date in the study of 
urban space and nationalism, is integrating how nationalism transforms people’s understanding 
of meaning though the use of urban space, how it essentially changes the language in which 
people communicate, or how people transform an existing meaning into a new understanding.  
Existing scholarship has looked primarily at how advocates of one nationalism mobilizes urban 
space to challenge other national identities, it has not examined how urban space has been used 
to contest and transform the meaning of a nation itself by re-imagining a national identity. 
Though the original presentation of the concept of “primate cities” is deeply flawed by its 
positivist perspective, and the desire to identify a “law” of social science, the basic observation 
has remained remarkably accurate.  We should view the “primate city pattern” not as the result 
of a “law” of social science, but rather as a phenomenon that needs to be examined and 
understood.  The original observation that primate cities emerge because they are “national 
cities” is uncritical of the concept of nation and nationalism, and unsupported by any real 
evidence beyond anecdotes, and therefore must be taken as an assertion, rather than a finding.  
The Croatian case indicates that there is a strong relationship between the phenomenon of nation 
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and nationalism, and the emergence of the primate city pattern there. Before 1850, Zagreb was 
just one of several Croatian towns of similar size and not integrated into, let alone central to a 
national economy.  Yet, by 1900 the city was firmly established as the political, cultural, and 
economic center of Croatia.  The only significant advantage Zagreb possessed as a community 
over the other large towns of the Triune Kingdom was a local urban elite that saw themselves as 
a national elite as well, and dedicated themselves to the project of building a nation by building a 
city capable of being that nation’s metropolis. 
By employing spatiality this project looks beyond the use of symbolic landscapes as text 
which resonates with already understood meanings, to show how symbolic spaces interact with 
everyday landscapes to transform popular understanding, to transform meaning.  In doing so, this 
project seeks to use spatiality to integrate various strands of geographic enquiry on the 
relationship between urban space and nationalism.  This project demonstrates the connection 
between the clearly symbolic, the coding of Zagreb as a Croatian city, and the use of everyday 
urban space, the city’s private buildings and economic infrastructure, to define Croatia and 
Croats as modern, urban, and bourgeois.  This transformation was planned through the 
construction of key monumental spaces and the promulgation of building codes and city plans, 
but accomplished through the daily life of the city in these built spaces.   This project also shows 
how symbolic spaces can be successfully contested to redefine a national community from 
within. 
To date, academic work on nationalism has only nominally been informed by the insights 
of spatiality theory.  This project uses spatiality to advance the understanding of how nationalism 
as an ideology becomes spatialized as something intimately tied to the production of semiotically 
infused spaces in cities.  A key part of the study will be examining the role of urban space in 
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transmitting and contesting nationalism.   Although an urban study in form, this project is thus 
fundamentally about nationalism -- how it is constituted, transmitted, and contested.   To that 
end, I am applying Soja’s approach by endeavoring to study the phenomenon of nationalism in 
Croatia using the city of Zagreb as an analytical object. My argument is focused on showing that 
in Zagreb the project of nation building and the project of city building became two intertwined 
parts of the same project.  To that end, spatial practice and practices in space in Zagreb will be 

















This study uses central and ancillary data sources to interrogate the interconnections 
between the constitution of nationalism and spatial production and iconography in Zagreb and its 
main square. I chose qualitative analysis because of the desire to unearth the complex, 
interconnecting forces and processes that were acting in this time to make urban space. My goal 
was to excavate the role of groups and institutions in pushing to semiotically code urban space 
from a range of scales: the national, the regional, and the local. Moreover, I sought to decipher 
the power of reflexive individuals “on the ground” to mediate diverse forces and to construct 




I reconstructed the social history of Zagreb between 1850 and 1940 using an array of data 
sources.  Two main types of central sources for this project were newspapers and periodicals.  
These often provide very good insight into the context in which policy debates and decisions 
were made, as well as discussions of public reaction to these events.1  Because of the absence of 
reliable public surveys during this time frame, such documents were viewed as suspect unless its 
content could be verified from multiple sources.2  I relied primarily on four newspapers:  
Narodne novine, Obzor, Večer, and Hrvatski dnevnik as well as two significant periodicals, the 
magazine Svijet and the social journal Zagreb, and the personal writings of some key actors. 
Each of these sources was significant for different reasons.  It is also important to note that the 
press in Croatia has always had strong and very open ideological leanings.   
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Narodne novine was the first Croatian language newspaper which focused on local and 
international news of political interest in Zagreb, and by 1850 was also the Croatian Službeni list, 
which meant that all official government announcements were published in the paper as well.  
Obzor began publication as an opposition newspaper in 1860 under the name Pozor, and went 
through several name changes, but published from 1871 to 1941 under the Obzor banner.  
Though initially an opposition newspaper, over time and especially after the outbreak of World 
War I, the paper become the voice of the urban elite of Zagreb with a focus on local and 
international news of political significance.  Večer began in 1920 from the same publisher as 
Obzor as a complementary product with a focus on local Zagreb news.  Večer’s local focus 
meant that major construction projects in Zagreb were addressed extensively in its coverage.   
Hrvatski dnevnik began publication in 1936 as the voice of the right wing of the Croatian Peasant 
Party.  Though formally a national newspaper, it became very involved in debates about urban 
development in Zagreb. 
The two periodicals I used each had their own strengths as sources as well.  Svijet 
magazine was a bi-monthly published between 1926 and 1936 in Zagreb.   Though the 
magazine’s subject matter was eclectic, ranging from news to fiction and local to global, it did 
publish a significant number of pieces on urban development and urban projects in Zagreb.  The 
magazine even proposed specific projects to be implemented.  This made it a very valuable 
resource, despite its short publication history.  The journal Zagreb was published between 1933 
and 1944.  This quarterly publication was focused broadly on Zagreb’s history, cultural 
development, and present and future of Croatian and Yugoslav society.  It was essentially written 
by the city’s elite for the city’s elite, and therefore provides a valuable insight into ideas in 
circulation at the top level of Zagreb society.  In addition to these periodicals, a key central 
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source for discussions of Stejpan Radić and Croatian Peasantism were his own writings, which 
were collected and reprinted in the early 1970s and again after 1989.3 
At the same time, I used relevant archival materials. Most influential was a complete 
copy of the Competition Announcement published to support the 1931 international competition 
to develop a new Urban Plan for the City of Zagreb.  This document, located in the Zagreb 
collection of the City Library of Zagreb was extremely valuable as it represented a complete 
expression of the Croatian urban elites’ image of Zagreb as a city, its role in Yugoslavia, and 
their goals for the future of the city.  In addition to this document, another valuable archival 
source was the public presentation materials from the International Completion for a new urban 
plan held in 1931, which are still in the Croatian State Archive for the City of Zagreb.  This 
archive contains original design proposals for the competition and thus illustrates visions for the 
future for the urban space of the city.  These designs visually illustrated visions of the ideal city, 
and perceptions of an evolving nationalism and how this interconnected with city purpose and 
form, and therefore were useful in capturing various concepts of how to fulfill the concept of the 
Croatian Metropolis.        
 
Ancillary Sources 
Ancillary data sources, that is, sources of information that were especially useful as 
information for cross-verifying initial presuppositions, or providing context to central source 
material, were also important. I used a mix of written materials by other authors. In particular, 
two articles, Ivan Rogić’s "What Has Happened in Zagreb"4 and Dunja Rihtman-Aguštin’s "The 
                                                 
3 Zvonimir Kulundžić, ed., Stjepan Radić  Politički Spisi  Autobiografija/Članci/Govori Rasprave, Hrvatska 
Politička Misao Xix I Xx Stoljeća (Zagreb: Znanje, 1971). 




Monument in the Main City Square: Constructing and Erasing Memory in Contemporary 
Croatia,"5 provided a starting point for the project, confirming the significance of urban space, 
Zagreb’s main square, and the Ban Jelačić monument as a key to understanding social 
development in Zagreb.  I used other recent academic texts to establish the broader context of 
social, economic, and political developments. On the national level, there have been several 
recent histories of Croatia in both Croatian and English.6  There are also several older histories 
that provide significant insight into events, though the constraints under which the authors were 
writing must be taken into account when using them.7   
There has also been good contemporary historical work done on the city of Zagreb itself.8  
In addition to this recent historical work, there are also several older histories of Zagreb (and 
once again, the previous caveats about the limits under which the authors worked are 
important).9  One Croatian author, Olga Maruševski has written extensively on the history of 
Ban Jelačić square, as well as other sites around Zagreb.10   Maruševski’s detailed historical 
work on Ban Jelačić square has been invaluable in providing a basic chronology, as well as 
                                                 
5 Dunja Rihtman-Aguštin, "The Monument in the Main City Square: Constructing and Erasing Memory in 
Contemporary Croatia," in Balkan Identities : Nation and Memory, ed. Maria Todorova (New York: New York 
University Press, 2004). 
6 In Croatian, there is an excellent short history of Croatia by Ivo Goldstein: Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest 
(Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2003).  In English there is a large history by Branka Magaš.  This has some issues in specific 
cases, but overall is a valuable resource for the broad history of Croatia.  Branka Magaš, Croatia through History 
(London, San Francisco, Beirut: SAQI, 2007). 
7 For example: Josip Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska (Zagreb: Binoza-Svjetski Pisci, 1936). Also, the reprint: 
Josip Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska 1 (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1990), Josip Horvat, Politička Povijest 
Hrvatska 2 (Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1990). 
8 See Ivo Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). for a recent 
example of the type of urban history that is available on Zagreb in Croatian.   
9 For example: Emilij Laszowski, Stari i Novi Zagreb (Zagreb: Braća Hrvatskog Zmaja, 1925; reprint, 1994, Školska 
knjiga).  Also: Gjuro Szabo, Stari Zagreb (Zagreb: Spektar, 1971). (note that this is a reprint of the original 
published in 1940)  and Rudolf Horvat, Zagreb - Povijest Hrvatskoga Glavnog Grada (Zagreb: 1942).  There is also 
a series of book from the Socialist period, for example: Zdravko Blažina, ed., Zagreb Jučer Danas Sutra, 2 vols., 
vol. I, Gradu Zagrebu u Povodu 20 - Godišnjice Oslobođenja (Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1965), Zdravko 
Blažina, ed., Zagreb Jučer Danas Sutra, 2 vols., vol. II, Gradu Zagrebu u Povodu 20 - Godišnjice Oslobođenja 
(Zagreb: 1965). 
10 See Olga Maruševski, Iz Zagrebačke Sponeničke Baštine (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2006), Olga Maruševski, Od 
Manduševca do Trga Republike (Zagreb: 1987). 
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social context across time.  The Croatian architectural and urban planning journal Čovjek i 
Prostor (Man and Space) also provided a significant number of articles discussing the history of 
urban development and planning in Zagreb.  I also used several political and personal 
biographies of Stjepan Radić to put his personal writings in context.11 
 Another source of data that proved important to my study were museum and public 
exhibition catalogs.   These were valuable because they often included collections of source 
documents which had been photographed and republished.  One example of this type of source is 
Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću (Anton Dominik Fernkorn : The 
Monument to Ban Josip Jelačić). 12  This document contains narratives and photographs of all the 
key documents relating to the original efforts to create the Ban Jelačić monument.  Its photos and 
text allowed me to visually reconstruct the changes in the statue, square, and city. 
  
Data Collection 
 The bulk of the data for this project was collected during 2 three month field research 
trips to Zagreb, Croatia in the fall of 2006 and the spring of 2007.  I made one prior excursion to 
Zagreb for this project, where I focused on where data could be obtained.  This trip enabled me 
to tap this array of central and ancillary data sources quickly and efficiently.  The first field 
research trip allowed me to focus on central data sources, though ancillary sources were also 
collected. Central in this was the appraisal of newspaper articles up to the end of World War I 
(1918). The second trip focused on collecting ancillary sources of data, including the 
                                                 
11 For example, Mark Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 
1904-1928 (Toronto, Buffalo University of Toronto Press, 2000)., Ivo Perić, Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928. (Zagreb: 
Dom i Svijet, 2003)., Mark Biondich, "The Politics of Peasantism: Stjepan Radić, the Croatian Peasant Party and the 
Intelligentsia, 1904-1928" (University of Toronto, 1997). 
12 Vladimir Maleković, ed., Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću (Zagreb: Muzej za 
Umjetnost i Obrt, 1990). 
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aforementioned wealth of articles on Croatian architectural and urban planning, though central 
sources, including newspaper and periodical articles from the interwar period (1919-1940) were 
collected as well. Upon obtaining the data, an intense period of deciphering the text involved a 
constant reading and melding of insights from the central and ancillary data sources. 
 The prime resources for central sources were the City of Zagreb Library Newspaper 
collection and the City Museum Library.  The City Library has an extensive collection of the 
main newspapers published in Zagreb for the entire period of the study.  The City Museum 
Library also contained a complete collection of the periodicals Svijet and Zagreb.  The main 
source for Ancillary Sources was the City Library of Zagreb, which, in addition to their general 
collection, has a separate specialized library dedicated to the subject of the city of Zagreb with 
over 11,000 non-circulating items. 
 A challenge with a project like this is both too much, and too little data.  The availability 
of Central Sources increases significantly over the period of this study, as the volume of material 
published in Zagreb grows.  Initially, there were few newspapers and fewer other periodicals 
published, and those that were published were not very systematically archived.  In addition, a 
significant amount actual source documents from the archives has been lost over time.  Even 
archival copies of many newspapers were missing or incomplete before 1945.  Conversely, 
where the newspapers were available, the nature of the debates involved in this study make it 
difficult to pin a specific event to a specific date.  As a result, every page of the selected 
newspapers or magazines had to be checked for relevant news stories or opinion pieces.  A key 
resource and assistance in the collection of this data was the Library of the City Museum of 
Zagreb, which maintains a collection of important newspaper stories relating to the city.  This 
pre-selected collection of articles from Zagreb newspapers dramatically improved my ability to 
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find relevant information as well as gave me much more targeted time periods for broader 
searches of newspapers.  This collection also proved invaluable as it contained copies of articles 
from newspapers which had not been considered either significant or newsworthy enough to 
have been daily archived by the City Library of Zagreb’s Newspaper Library at the time of their 
original publication.   
 A second significant data collection challenge was the nature of Croatian print culture.  
With a Croatian population of less than five million people, Croatian publishers rarely print more 
than one thousand copies of many books, and rarely reprint them. Thus, it is often difficult to 
find book copies that have not been recently published, as the limited numbers of library copies 
were often unavailable. Often, the Antikvaritjati (used book stores), were the only way to locate 
books important to this study.  Fortunately, many older books were republished in their entirety 



















A nation without nationalism 
Is like a body without bones (Croatian Proverb)1 
 
Introduction to the Study Site 
This chapter establishes the context for the empirical investigation for this study.  It 
provides background to understand the economic, social, and political situation in Zagreb, 
Croatia in 1850 (the starting-point for my investigation).  This chapter provides important 
context to this study by providing a survey of the political, economic and social history of the 
three places that are the core of this study, Croatia, Zagreb, and the main square of Zagreb.  This 
chapter also provides an historical sketch of two key periods before the beginning of the study 
itself, the Croatian National Awakening of the 1830s, and 40s, and the political turmoil of 1848. 
This is important to the study because Croatia, Zagreb and the square provided the physical and 
imaginative raw materials that would become the core of the Croatian Metropolis project once it 
emerged.  The Croatian National Awakening and the events of 1848 shaped the cultural and 
political environment that enabled the Croatian Metropolis project to emerge.  
 
Croatia  
 The Croatian national project unfolded amid the influence of some specific historical 
relationships.  The Croatian state, as an independent kingdom, offered the office of king (the 
crown) to the King of Hungary in 1102.2  The King of Hungary thus was also the King of 
Croatia.  In the political turmoil and civil war that followed the Hungarian defeat by the Ottoman 
                                                 
1 The motto published at the beginning of the first issue of Danica, Ljudevit Gaj’s Literary Supplement to the first 
Croatian Language news paper in 1835.  Cited in Elinor Murray Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian 
Movement (Boulder, New York  Eastern European monographs: no. 12, East European Quarterly, distributed by 
Columbia University Press, 1975). @ 81.  
2 Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2003). @ 61. 
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Empire at the Battle of Mohac in 1526,3 the Emperor of Austria became the King of Hungary, 
and thus, also, the King of Croatia. As a result, a unified Kingdom was, in principle, established 
across the entire terrain.  Yet, there still existed three separate governments, creating an 
ambiguous political reality that become important to political processes existent in 1850.  The 
ambiguities within this political geometry were the foundation for much of Croatian politics until 
1918 as the political actors within Austria, Hungary, and Croatia continually renegotiated their 
relationships to one another.   
 Complicating the political interaction between Austria, Hungary, and Croatia was the 
diminishing Ottoman threat to the region and the rise of nationalism as a central factor in 
political life throughout Central Europe in the late 18th century.  Within Hungary, the issue of 
national identity became contentious.   Hungary was a multi-ethnic entity, with Magyars 
(Hungarians) dominating economic and political life, but significant non-Magyar populations of 
Croats, Slovaks, and Romanians concentrated in peripheral areas on the Kingdom’s borders, and 
the main urban centers were essentially German in character.  The emergence of the Hungarian 
national project at the end of the 18th century presented a political dilemma to the various non-
Hungarian populations of the Kingdom.  In Croatia, the dilemma of the elite was whether to 
actively participate in the Hungarian national project and reap some of its benefits, or to resist 
the Hungarian project and claim a national distinction for themselves.4   
 This debate was propelled within Croatia by the actions of the Hungarian government in 
Pest (Budapest).  Language became a significant focus of the national question in Croatia.  
Because of the Kingdom of Hungary’s multi-ethnic character, Magyar, the Hungarian language, 
was not initially the state language.  Latin was used for official state purposes including debates 
                                                 
3 R. Ernest Dupuy, Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. To the Present 2nd rev. 
ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1986). @ 491 
4 Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement  @ Chapter II. 
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in the Hungarian Parliament.  In the 1820s, Hungarian law was changed to make Magyar the 
official state language including for parliamentary debate, effectively silencing the Croatian 
members of the Hungarian Parliament unless they spoke in Magyar.5  The issue of language was 
not the only factor in the Croatian political community’s debate over how to respond to the 
Hungarian national project.  The economic reform agenda of the Hungarian national project, as 
manifested in a series of laws passed between 1832 and 1836, threatened the position of the 
landholding aristocracy in Croatia.6 
  Within a decade, the Hungarian national project had alienated two potential allies in 
Croatia.  By pushing the supremacy of Magyar over the other languages within Hungary, they 
alienated the newly developing urban groups of educated professionals and commercial interests 
which were sympathetic both ideologically and pragmatically to the liberalizing agenda of 
changes proposed by Hungarian nationalists.   At the same time, the liberalizing agenda had 
alienated Croatia’s hereditary landed elite, who saw no real threat from Magyar linguistic 
hegemony; they were typically related to Hungarians by birth or marriage and were often at least 
bilingual.   This is not to imply that the Magyarone party in Croatia was not a significant factor 
or that there were not members of these identified groups that belonged to it.  There were many 
members of the urban elite that saw Magyarization as a path to liberalization and modernization, 
and many landed aristocrats that saw it as enhancing their positions politically, even if it did 
threaten their economic status, a fact evidenced by the Magyarone party’s ability to strongly 
contest local elections between 1832 and 1847.7  But, these issues did put the Magyarone party 
                                                 
5 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983). @ 305. 
6 Ibid. @ 304-308. 
7 Branka Magaš, Croatia through History (London, San Francisco, Beirut: SAQI, 2007). @ 222-227. 
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in Croatia somewhat on the defensive and sparked a vigorous indigenous cultural movement in 
response.8 
 The Croatian cultural response to Magyarization was a movement that identified itself as 
Illyrian.  This project was pan-Slavic in character, but its progenitors were also very public in 
their sentiment for Croatia as a Homeland, distinctly separate from Hungary.  Though primarily 
cultural in origin, the Illyrian movement quickly developed a political character as well, 
eventually with an Illyrian political party to carry the banner of the cause.  But even before the 
formal politicizing of the project, it would be impossible to separate the cultural issues from the 
political, as is clearly illustrated by the process through which the first Croatian language 
periodicals began publication.  Ljudevit Gaj, a driving force behind the Illyrian movement in its 
initial stages, applied for permission to publish a newspaper and a literary gazette in Croatian.  
The Hungarian authorities denied his request.  Gaj then appealed directly to the Emperor in 
Vienna, in his role as King of Croatia, to overturn the Hungarian government’s position, which 
the Emperor did with the comment: “Yes, yes, the Hungarians.  They make a lot of trouble.  
They write too much and don’t want the Croats to write anything.”9 
 The Imperial Government in Vienna at the time was willing to tolerate, and even support 
to some extent, local resistance within Hungary to the Hungarian national project.  But that 
support had limits, and the Illyrian movement was at the edge of those limits.  In 1843 the word 
Illyrian was banned and the movement forced to transform itself into the National10 movement, 
because the Illyrian movement’s pan-Slavic character was seen as potentially subversive to the 
                                                 
8 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 306-308. 
9 Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement  @ 74 
10 The word narod has two distinct meaning in Croatian, which can often lead to disputes over the proper translation.  
The first definition is people, but not as a plural, but as a collective, analogous to the German word volk.  The 
second meaning of the word is that of nation.  In the case of the Narodna stranka, historians have used the meaning 
of nation when translating, while literary scholars have sometimes used the meaning of peoples.  In this project I 
will use the historians’ translation of National and National Party, as it is the one used in every English language 
historical source for this project. 
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political order of the Empire.11  This constraint limited one of the Illyrian movement’s stronger 
arguments; that though the Croatian community was much smaller than the Hungarian 
community, Croatia could draw on the cultural capital of the entire South Slavic community for a 
nation building project.   
 Ultimately though, it was not the relative strength of the arguments that settled the issue 
of how to respond to the Hungarian national project in Croatia.  The issue was settled by events 
outside of the elites’ control.  In 1848, Hungary rebelled against the Imperial Government.  Over 
the following year, the Hungarian rebellion was suppressed (with significant assistance from 
Croatia), and with it any argument the Magyarone party may have had about benefits to Croatia 
for joining the Hungarian national project.  Also, during intense political maneuvering at the 
early stages of the Hungarian uprising, Ljudevit Gaj was personally discredited and significant 
doubt was cast on the Illyrian movement.   Given the events of 1848 to 1849, the two major 
movements contesting the Croatian elite suffered fatal blows.   
 In terms of territorial definition, Croatia was recognized as the region around the city of 
Zagreb which had not fallen under Ottoman control (including a small coastal area on the 
Adriatic Sea). Eventually this area became known official as Civil Croatia.  Over time, two 
additional South Slavic territories came under Hapsburg control; Dalmatia, acquired from the 
Republic of Venice, and Slavonia, which had been acquired from the Ottoman Empire.  Slavonia 
was politically attached to Croatia through Hungary.  Dalmatia was part of the German portion 
of the Empire, and as such was governed separately.  A fourth group of areas physically 
separated these three regions; the Voijna krajina, or Military Border, was a separate entity, with 
significant rights of self governance.  Despite the physical and political separation of the three 
territories of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia, they were grouped together in the imagination of 
                                                 
11 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 307 
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many people as the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia (or Dalmatia, Croatia, 
and Slavonia) based on historical associations.12   
 For a brief period of time during the Napoleonic Wars, Dalmatia and the southwestern 
half of Croatia were combined with the Croatian portion of the Military Border, Istria and four 
other areas to form the Illyrian Provinces of the French Empire.13  But after Napoleon’s defeat in 
central Europe in 1813 the territories reverted back to Hapsburg control and their previous 
administrative divisions were restored.  Though the integration with the French Empire was 
brief, it did open up the region to new ways of imagining themselves.  In the same way that 
interaction with nationalized French soldiers and administrators help to expose Germans to the 
ideas of nationalism, so too did it begin a new set of intellectual and political processes in 
Croatia.  But the boundary of the Illyrian Provinces was the Sava River, so Zagreb remained 
within the Hapsburg Empire throughout the period, if just on the border. 
 The political turmoil of 1848 briefly, but significantly, altered the political structure of 
the region.  The events of 1848 and 1849 will be dealt with in more detail later in this chapter.  
For the purposes of this overview, what is significant is that through a series of events, the Ban 
of Croatia was also given responsibility for the Military Border, Dalmatia, and the independent 
city of Rijeka.  As a result, Zagreb briefly became the effective capital of all of the Hapsburg 
territory south of Hungary proper.  Though this situation effectively ended by 1850, the fact that 
it had existed created an historical territorial reality and future goal for the Croatian national 
project of making this temporary geo-spatial political unity permanent in the future. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ Chapter Two. 




Zagreb lies at the confluence of several natural lines of drift at the most western edge of 
the Slavonian Plane where the Sava River turns south before turning east again.  This position 
afforded good access to the city, which is advantageous in times of peace, but disadvantageous in 
times of war.  The vulnerability of the city’s position is evidenced by the events of the Mongol 
invasion of Europe, when the town was sacked by Mongol forces moving along the natural line 
of drift of the Sava River.   Zagreb was not the only city in the region with positional advantages.  
During the Roman period, the administrative center for the region was located at the town of 
Sisak southeast of Zagreb, where the Sava River becomes navigable year round, and was thus a 
natural interface point between the land and water transportation networks servicing the area.    
 Zagreb’s situation as an urban community was also somewhat distinctive within the 
territory of the Triune Kingdom.  It was not a single urban community, but actually two separate 
towns each with its own particular interests and fortifications.  On the west side of a small 
stream, on the highest local hill adjacent to the Sava River flood plain was Gradec, and across 
the stream, on a lower hill to the east was Kaptol.   Kaptol was probably established to act as a 
counter- balance to the semi-autonomous Gradec.  Kaptol was granted extensive land holdings to 
support itself.  Gradec, lacking extensive land resources to support itself, turned to industry and 
became a center of “hand crafts” (mainly wood and metal working).  Competition between the 
two communities was not always peaceful, and the small bridge linking the two towns became 
known as Krvavni most (Bloody Bridge).  The Hungarian civil war which followed the battle of 
Mohacs led to open warfare between the cities, and Kaptol briefly laid siege to Gradec in 1529.14   
                                                 
14 Josip Bilić, Hrvoje Ivanković, ed., Zagrebački Leksikon A-Lj, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod 




Gradec and Kaptol in the late 16th Century15 
By the end of the 16th Century though, the two communities were viewed as a single urban 
complex by outsiders, and referred to as Agram on map produced by German cartographers.16  
Despite the chartering of Gradec as a Free and Royal City, and the growth of Kaptol as a 
center of ecclesiastic activity, the Hapsburg Empire paid little attention to the towns in the 16th, 
17th, and 18th centuries.  Despite a specific request from the Croatian Sabor (Parliament) for 
improved fortifications, none were ever built around the towns by the Imperial government, as 
they were around Karlovac and Slavonski Brod.17  Gradec briefly lost its role as the home of the 
                                                 
15 Miljenko Lapaine Drago Novak, Dubravka Mlinarić, ed., Five Centuries of Maps and Charts of Croatia Pet 
Stoljeća Geografskih i Pomorskih Karata Hrvatske (Zagreb: školska knjiga, 2005). @ Fig. / Sl. 1.    
16 The name Agram first appears in historical documents in 1134, and became the official name for the community 
in German once the Hapsburg dynasty became established in the region.  Josip Bilić, ed., Zagrebački Leksikon A-Lj. 
@ 2-3. 
17 Mirela Slukan Altić, Povijesna Kartografija Katrografski Izvori U Povijesnim Znanstima (Samobor: Meridijani, 
2003). @ 423, 426. 
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Sabor in 1756, when the Hungarian Ban of Croatia at the time relocated the capital to Varaždin, 
a town closer to Hungary proper, until fire severally damaged that community in 1776 and the 
civil government returned to Gradec.18  By the end of the 18th Century, the Hapsburg military 
administration for the area moved to Zagreb from Karlovac, thus consolidating the political and 
security authorities for the region in the city. 
 
 
“Haller” Map of Agram (Zagreb) circa 181719 
Thus, at the end of the 18th Century the community had accumulated all the formal 
attributes of a capital city.  Within Gradec was the seat of legislative and executive power for the 
region.  Kaptol was the Bishopric for the entire region and had several monasteries located 
within its walls, one of which had been chartered as a Royal Academy to award degrees in 
                                                 
18 Rudolf Horvat, Zagreb - Povijest Hrvatskoga Glavnog Grada (Zagreb: 1942). @ 118 
19 Nada Premeri, Muzej Grada Zagreba: Guide, trans. Graham McMaster, 2nd Enlarged ed. (Zagreb: Zagreb City 
Museum, 2002). @ 87. 
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Theology and Philosophy by the Imperial government.   The towns had also expanded outside 
their earlier fortifications onto the flatter ground of the Sava River valley floor.  These areas, 
now a recognized continuous urban complex, consisted of 4 distinct, but interconnected towns.20 
 
The Square 
Before discussing the significance of the main square in Zagreb, a discussion of the role 
of the public square in local society is essential.  The Croatian word for square is Trg.21  As a 
monosyllabic word, Trg also forms the root of a family of words which give a clear indication of 
the symbolically central role of the town square in local society.  As the table indicates, this 
family of words deals with commerce and those who engage in commercial activity.  
Trg Square, Market 
Trgovac Shopkeeper, Dealer, Business Man 
Trgovački Commercial, Business, Merchant, Mercantile 
Trgovački Centar Shopping Center, Mall 
Trgovački Putnik Traveling Salesman 
 
The square then was seen as a place of commerce in Croatian society, and the main square in 
Zagreb was not an exception.   
The square itself was formally created in the 17th Century by transforming private 
gardens into public space.  There was urgency to this project; historical records indicate it was 
done in one to two days, and the private gardens were physically uprooted immediately.   The 
urgency may have actually been the result of local political rather than physical concerns, as 
Kaptol had been resisting the new square’s development for approximately a century given its 
ability to siphon off trade.22  Initially the square was referred to as a Sajam or Sajamništa 
(fairground).  Annual fairs were a significant part of the routine of the community.  The creation 
                                                 
20 Ivo Perić, Zagreb Od 1850. Do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). @ 16. 
21 In the Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian language group the letter r functions as a semi-vowel. 
22 Branko Šeringer, "Iz Pvijest Trgova Staroga Zagreba," Zagreb : Revija Društva Zagrepčana II (1934). 
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of the new fairground indicates that St. Mark’s square in Gradec was no longer large enough to 
accommodate the event.  It appears though, that merchants had been using the area during the 
fair even before the beginning of the 17th Century.23  
The formalizing of the square was significant because it indicates several important 
changes in the situation of the communities of Gradec and Kaptol.  First, it points to a significant 
and continuing increase in population size in both communities.  The new fairground was 
necessary because existing market space within both communities was no longer sufficient to 
support the needs of the community.  The location of the square outside both communities 
indicates that neither community had sufficient space for a new market square within their 
respective town walls.  Also, and perhaps most significantly, the creation of the new, shared 
fairgrounds indicates a willingness on the part of both communities to work together to solve 
mutual problems and an end to competing fairs that had been the source of much conflict 
between the two communities.  The new market square therefore was both a political and a 
practical foundation upon which to begin the process of integration between these two separate 
urban communities.     
Originally, the area of the square was known as Manduševac sajam because of the stream 
of the same name which ran along the northern and eastern edges of the area.24  By the 19th 
Century the square was known to the population of the area as Harmica.  This name derived 
from the Harmicad, the Hungarian term for the 3% user fee charged to merchants on the square 
to pay for its maintenance.25  As the main market, the square was central in the daily life of every 
household in the community.  But the square’s centrality to daily life did not equate to a central 
position in the political life of the city.  Saint Mark’s square, in Gradec, was seen as the political 
                                                 
23 Olga Maruševski, Od Manduševca do Trga Republike (Zagreb: 1987). @ 7 
24 Ibid. @ 7-8. 
25 Peter Haller map of Zagreb, circa 1817 MGZ, inv. br. 3165 
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center of the city where locations for both the Sabor (Parliament) and Banski dvor (The Ban’s 
Castle, which was the center for executive authority) were eventually established. 
By the beginning of the 19th century the square had developed an important symbolic role 
for the city, that of gateway.  As Maruševski states of the square at the time:  
The fairground of Harmica is not representative [of the city], but it is the most 
important space upon entry into the city which can be used for various 
manifestations [symbolic events].  It was that threshold of the city through which 
must cross all soldiers, all dignitaries, kings and viceroys and their formal retinue, 




The Arrival of Count Nugent in Zagreb with his Yeomanry27 
There is only one significant representation of the square related to any political events prior to 
1850; a lithograph produced in 1843 commemorating the installation of a new Ban in 1842.  This 
                                                 
26 Maruševski, Od Manduševca do Trga Republike. @ 26. 




image is the first indication of the idea of the square as resonant space for national meaning.  The 
image in question does not actually depict the Ban’s instillation though, which was not 
performed on the square, but rather the arrival of a Croatian nobleman and his retinue of infantry 
and cavalry engaging in exactly the type of ceremonial arrival described by Maruševski and 
being greeted by the population of the city on the square.  The particular incident was of so little 
note that it is not even mentioned in histories of the city.  But the image, done by an “Illyrian” 
artist, is clearly meant as a statement of national distinction (separate from the Ban being 
installed) and has continued to be included in nearly every illustrated history of the city of 
Zagreb and of Croatia.   
 
The Illyrian Period 
 To understand the genesis of the Croatian National Project and the Croatian Metropolis 
project in Zagreb beginning in the second half of the 19th century it is necessary to understand 
the impact of the events of 1848 and 1849 on the Croatian National Project.  The broader events 
of 1848 were a transformative moment within the Croatian elite.  Until 1848 the Croatian project 
was a component of a pan-South Slavic movement that identified itself as Illyrian and later 
National (after the term Illyrian was banned by Hapsburg authorities).28  This movement was a 
local manifestation of Romanticism and embedded in the broader context of the Romantic milieu 
as well as the cultural, political, and economic conditions of Central Europe at that time.   
To the Romantics language was a manifestation of national spirit which inspired national 
sentiment within a people.  This element of inspiration was a key part of how people became 
aware of their true identity in the Romantic world view.  Romantics did not see nation as strictly 
                                                 
28 It is impossible to do real justice to the history of the Illyrian movement in the space available here.  See 
Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement for a more complete history of the movement. 
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or even necessarily an ethnic category.  The implications of these attitudes to the Hungarian-
Croatian political dynamic were significant.  Hungarians argued that by freely joining into a 
political union with Hungary, Croatia had chosen to become part of the Hungarian national 
project.  Croats rejected this argument, claiming that Croatia had never surrendered its statehood, 
but was an equal kingdom which shared the same king with Hungary.  Croats further argued that 
they had retained a key element of national identity though the persistence of a Croatian political 
state in the form of the Sabor (Parliament).  
The degree to which the Illyrian project was driven by Croatian national sentiment can be 
seen in the writings of the movement’s intellectual driving force, Ljudevit Gaj.  Gaj became 
enamored with the idea of Croatia as a child growing up in the highlands north of Zagreb.29  Gaj 
came of age as the Hungarian national project was accelerating its program of Magyarization.  
To Gaj and many others of his generation this program of Magyarization was a direct threat to 
the Croatian identity.  By transforming the language of Croatia into Hungarian, the 
Magyarization project was an effort to transform Croats into Hungarians.30 
 By the 1830s The Hungarian national project was already an established movement with 
a literary language and institutions of cultural production in place by the time the Illyrians began 
formulating a response.  Gaj’s view of the situation can be seen in one of his most famous pieces 
of writing, Još Hrvatska ni Propala (Still Croatia Has Not Perished):   
Još Horvatska ni prepala   No Croatia has not perished, 
Jošče živi narod naš    Still living is our nation 
Ako jest i dugo spala,    But now and long has she slept 
Ni još mertva, nije baš! 31   Still not dead, not at all! 
 
                                                 
29 Gaj was the product of a mixed family.  His father was German and his mother was Slovak.  Thus Croatian was 
the third language Gaj learned.  Ibid. @ Chapter III.   
30 Ibid. @ Chapters IV, V, & VI. 
31 Nikša Stančić, Gajeva "Još Hrvatska ni Propala" iz 1832-33. Ideologia Ljudevita Gaja u Pripremnom Razdoblju 
Hrvatskog Narodnog Preporoda (Zagreb: Globus, 1988). @ 150. 
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This poem, originally drafted in 1831, embodied the Illyrian perspective that Croatia was at once 
both a strong nation that had endured tremendous challenges, yet it appeared dead, and was 
poised at the brink of extinction if strenuous efforts were not made to save it.  Given the energy 
behind the Hungarian national project, and the diligence with which it was pursuing the 
Magyarazation campaign, Gaj’s assessment was understandable.  
 In contrast, this new Illyrian movement started without any institutions to promote, 
develop, or even sustain an Illyrian culture.32  At the time the movement began what actually 
constituted Croatian33 as a language was still an issue of academic dispute.34  The language had 
no specified literary form and its Latin alphabet was borrowed from other languages, which did 
not fit the distinctive features of Croatian’s South Slavic linguistic characteristics.  Gaj made it 
his task to resolve these issues, and in a matter of a few years completely transformed the 
situation.  Gaj personally developed a new Latin orthography for Croatian that resolved the 
issues created by the borrowed system in use at the time.35  Gaj also convinced the emerging 
Croatian literary cadre to adopt Štokavian, the same dialect adopted by the members of the 
Serbian National Project, as the formal literary form of Croatian as well, rather than the 
Kajkavian dialect spoken in Croatia “proper.”36  The acceptance of Štokavian accomplished two 
key goals.  First, it re-enforced the argument that, as a language, Croatian was broader than 
                                                 
32 The one exception to this situation was the Catholic Church in Croatia.  Croatia had been granted a unique 
privilege by the Vatican to give mass in the vernacular. 
33 From this point forward the term Croatian will be used to identify those specifically national elements of the 
Illyrian movement to avoid later confusion.  Until 1948 the movement used Illyrian to describe all the elements of 
their project because the term Horvat (Croat) was used by the Magarone party in Civil Croatia to identify 
themselves. Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement @ 136. 
34 One early scholar of Slavic languages had specifically identified Kajkavian, one of the three dialects of modern 
Croatian and the dialect spoken in and around Zagreb, as “Croatian.”  This was an understandable interpretation 
given that this was the only area formally identified as Croatia in a territorial sense. For a more complete discussion 
of this dispute see Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984). @ 80 
35 @ Chapter IV 




Kajkavian, but rather was a language of three dialects of which Kajkavian was one.  Second, 
adopting Štokavian created an intellectual bridge with the more firmly established Serbian 
national project, providing geographic depth and cultural capital to counter the demographically 
larger and programmatically more advanced Hungarian national project. 
 It was through this process of linguistic transformation that Zagreb as a city became 
central to the efforts of the Illyrian project.  Gaj was neither from Zagreb nor had he spent a 
significant amount of time there.  He had completed his orthographic work by 1831, but even 
though his efforts were praised by those who came in contact with him, it was not being used by 
Croatian writers.  In 1832 Gaj moved to Zagreb to begin his professional career as a lawyer at 
the urging of a fellow founder of the Illyrian movement because, as Elinor Despalatovic states: 
“Although Gaj could have served his legal apprenticeship in any major town of the Triune 
Kingdom, Zagreb provided him with a fertile environment for his other, and more important, 
work.”37  Unlike the other major towns of the region, Zagreb had a large concentration of literate 
individuals who were trying to develop a response to the Magyarzation program.  The city had 
become a collecting point for this group because of the Royal Academy (the theology, 
philosophy and law faculties) that had developed out of the complex of monasteries in Kaptol.38 
This concentration was further spurred by the need for literate individuals to service the growing 
bureaucratic apparatus in Zagreb as it grew into Civil Croatia’s functional capital city.  
 Zagreb was therefore a community with a large enough population of like minded 
individuals to allow Gaj to transform intellectual capital into financial capital which would 
support the building of cultural institutions and sustain a national project.  The vehicle for this 
transformation was a pair of Croatian language publications, one a newspaper and the other a 
                                                 
37 Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement @ 63. 
38 Gaj himself had not attended any schooling in Zagreb.  He had attended Gimnazium (high school) in Varaždin and 
university in Vienna, Graz, and Pest (Budapest). Ibid. @ Chapter III. 
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literary gazette.  These were the first publications of their kind in Croatian, and it was only in 
Zagreb that evidence of a sufficient readership was available to sustain them economically, as 
shown by the establishment of a successful German language newspaper in 1826.39  It was also 
through these publications that Gaj implemented his orthographic changes and popularized his 
use of Štokavian as the Croatian literary language. 
 Though the Illyrian movement faced many challenges, is also had a significant ally in the 
Imperial government in Vienna.  The Imperial government was very suspicious of the political 
implications of the Hungarian national project and was supportive of the Illyrian movement as a 
way of challenging the Hungarian project without direct confrontation.  To this end the Imperial 
government overruled Hungarian officials and allowed Gaj to begin publishing his two 
periodicals in Croatian in 1835.40  But this support from Vienna was not unlimited.   The 
Imperial government in Vienna was just as suspicious of the political implications of the pan-
Slavic Illyrian concept as it was of the Hungarian national project, and not without reason.  Gaj 
sent a representative of the Illyrian movement on several trips to Belgrade to establish contacts 
and obtain financial support for the movement from Serbia in the late 1830s.41   
As a political project, Illyrianism was focused on “capturing Zagreb” as a means to gain 
control of the institutions necessary for nation building.42   By 1842 the political situation 
between the Illyrians and the Magyarones was so strained in Zagreb that the meeting of the 
“county assembly” (the body of those eligible to vote for country officers and Sabor delegates) 
erupted into fatal violence, and the Illyrian supporting head of the county used the incident to 
                                                 
39 The first efforts at periodical publishing in Zagreb can be traced back as far as the 16th century, but the German 
language Agramer Zeitung, first published in 1826, was the first newspaper to succeed and remain in publication for 
more than a short period of time. Josip Bilić, Hrvoje Ivanković, ed., Zagrebački Leksikon M-Ž, 2 vols., vol. 2 
(Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2006). @ 131. 
40 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 203. 
41 Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement  @ 148-149. 
42 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 221-222. 
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exclude the Magyarones from the assembly.43  When Hungarian authorities complained that the 
newly formed Illyrian political party had stolen the 1842 elections and was creating political 
unrest in Civil Croatia, Vienna responded by banning the word Illyrian from public use and 
charging many of the local leaders in Zagreb with criminal offenses stemming from the disputed 
elections.44  The Illyrians dealt with the new circumstances by renaming themselves the Narodna 
stranka (National Party), but the movement was effectively put on the defensive politically for 
several years and suffering a significant defeat in the Zagreb region in the elections of 1845, 
which were also marred by fatal violence.45   
 The setbacks of the 1845 elections blocked the Illyrians’ political aspirations.  In 
response, the group turned to fulfilling other projects that had become secondary with the 
group’s political successes.  In 1841 Gaj had proposed the creation of a National Center, a 
building that would house all the cultural institutions of the movement.46  There was both a 
symbolic and a practical need for such a structure.  On the symbolic level, even though the 
Illyrian movement had developed a significant following within Zagreb, it was, with the 
exception of the few Croatian language periodicals being published, essentially invisible to the 
public.  Though “reading rooms” (small private libraries) had been established, they were simply 
spaces in private houses or apartments with no visible presence.  The National Center, therefore, 
would create a dedicated physical presence for the movement.  On a practical level, two 
institutions that Gaj wanted to permanently establish needed dedicated spaces, the National 
Museum and the National Theatre.  The National Theater could operate using private spaces to 
                                                 
43 It is important here to note that the franchise was very limited in the Hapsburg Empire in the first half of the 19th 
century, and based on older feudal privileges.  As a result, many members of the Illyrian movement were not 
eligible to vote.  This established an electoral dynamic in which the region of Zagreb was at once both the center of 
the Illyrian project and, at the same time, the most reliable voting district for the Magyarone party.  Ibid. @ 224. 
44 Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement  @ 153. 
45 Ibid.@ 164-165. 
46 Ibid. @ 130. 
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present performances, but having its own dedicated auditorium would greatly enhance the 
organization’s prestige.  The National Museum definitely required a permanent space to display 
exhibits.  Despite the clear logic behind Gaj’s concept of the National Center, little practical 
action besides the collection of funds was taken towards the project.  In the aftermath of the 1845 
elections though the movement purchased a building which was under construction in Gradec 
and various National institutions began setting up their offices in the structure before work was 
even completed on it in February of 1847.47 
 
1848 
 The trajectory of politics in Croatia was significantly altered in the early months of 1848 
when a series of urban revolts swept through the capitals of Europe.  The arrival of this general 
unrest in the Hapsburg Empire brought the triadic political struggles between Vienna, Budapest, 
and Zagreb to a crisis point which the Illyrian movement seized upon to advance their fortunes.  
Part of the Illyrians’ aggressiveness in exploiting the situation can be explained by the dire 
situation the movement faced at the time.  In January 1848 the Hungarian parliament was 
moving towards enacting legal measures that would have formally fulfilled the Magyarization 
program, including the prohibition of the use of Croatian in any government documents and 
correspondence, mandating the use of Magyar instead of Latin in Croatia for state business, and 
mandating the teaching of Magyar in all schools in Croatia.48  Thus, when word of the 
revolutions sweeping across Europe arrived in Zagreb in March of 1848 the Illyrians were facing 
total defeat on the issue of Magyarization, and upheavals in Vienna and Budapest appeared to 
present an opportunity to reverse this setback. 
                                                 
47 Ibid. @ 177. 
48 Ibid. @ 185. 
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Gaj attempted to take advantage of the situation by immediately traveling to Graz in 
order to lobby for the appointment of his preferred candidate for the vacant office of Ban 
(Governor or Viceroy) of Croatia.  Gaj’s proposed candidate was a Croatian nobleman named 
Josip Jelačić.  Jelačić was a reasonable choice for the Hapsburg government because he was part 
of a prominent Croatian noble family, had been educated at the elite school for nobles outside of 
Vienna as a young man, and spent his entire adult life as a career soldier in the service of the 
Empire.  Gaj’s motivation’s for pushing Jelačić’s appointment was different; Jelačić was also an 
ardent, if quiet, supporter of the Illyrian movement.  But that was not the reason Gaj gave to the 
representatives of the Imperial government he lobbied.  To them, Gaj argued that a popular local 
Ban would be necessary to push through the types of reforms that appeared to be resulting from 
the political turmoil.  Unbeknownst to Gaj, the Imperial officials he was meeting with had 
already chosen Jelačić as their recommendation before his arrival.49   
Gaj did not stay absent from Zagreb long.  After a brief trip to Vienna to meet with other 
Slavic representatives within the Empire he returned to Zagreb to take charge of the 
revolutionary moment.  Once back in town Gaj took charge of a meeting of an ad-hoc National 
Assembly which had been organized while he was absent.  The Assembly was held in the 
National Center, and Gaj push through several proposals, including the election of Jelačić as 
Ban.50  Thus, when Jelačić arrived in Zagreb in late March from his military post in the garrison 
town of Glina in the Military Border he was Ban by both Imperial appointment and election. 
Jelačić immediately set about wresting control of the political situation from the leaders 
in Zagreb.  He called for immediate elections for a new Sabor which he asked to convene in 
June.  Jelačić ruled by decree until the new Sabor could convene, thus rejecting the authority of 
                                                 
49 Ibid. @ 186. 




the National Assembly set up before his arrival, but he made clear his decrees would be purely 
administrative in nature and any decisions of a political nature about the state relationships 
between the Kingdom and the other political units in the Empire would be in the hands of the 
new Sabor.  He also set about setting up a formal Bansko vijeće (Ban’s Council) to govern the 
Triune Kingdom.51  This council was necessary for several reasons.  First, on a very practical 
level, governance in the Hapsburg Empire was in a state of collapse until political order could be 
re-established.  Therefore, any governance in the Triune Kingdom was going to have to be done 
by locals until the political crisis was resolved.  A second significant consequence of the 
breakdown of governance was that Dalmatia came under the political control of the newly 
forming government in Zagreb for the first time.  The second reason for the need of the Bansko 
vijeće was that Jelačić had not only been appointed Ban, but simultaneously had been promoted 
from Colonel to General and appointed commander of the Croatian Military Border (roughly half 
of the entire military border region).52  This meant that if the revolution transformed from a 
political uprising to a military rebellion, the Ban was going to have to leave his role as civilian 
governor and take the field as a military commander.  To that end, Jelačić also continued efforts 
to organize a National Guard, which had originated with the organizers of the National Assembly 
before his appointment, but which was continued because he felt additional soldiers might be 
necessary.53 
The political situation developed rapidly in the spring of 1848.  By mid April, Hungary 
had declared independence from the Empire and abolished the monarchy.  In response, Jelačić 
suspended all political relations with Hungary to prevent the Triune Kingdom from formally 
                                                 
51 Jelena Borošak-Marijanović, ed., 1848 u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: Hrvatski Povijestni Muzej, 1998). @ 34. 
52 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 316. 
53 Borošak-Marijanović, ed., 1848 U Hrvatskoj. @ 34-35. 
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rebelling by association while he waited for the new Sabor to convene.54  When they Sabor did 
convene they attempted a rapprochement with the Hungarian government, but the overtures 
failed due to incompatible visions of how the Hungarian state should be organized and the 
degree to which the non-Hungarian peoples would have self rule.55  The negotiations were also 
complicated by cross negotiations by both parties with the Imperial government in Vienna.  At 
the same time the Croats were negotiating with Hungary for reconciliation, they were also 
sending a delegation to Vienna to demand recognition that the Triune Kingdom had “always 
been independent from Hungary” and also that Dalmatia be united with Croatia.56  Similarly, the 
government in Budapest, despite having formally eliminated the office of King for Hungary, 
wrote to the Emperor to demand the Imperial government declare Croatia in illegal rebellion, 
dismiss Jelačić as Ban, and dissolve the new Sabor.57  Negotiations dragged on throughout the 
summer, and by September Croatia had declared war on Hungary.   The collapse of 
diplomatic/political efforts to resolve the situation led to Jelačić being appointed the military 
commander of all Imperial forces in Hungary, though in fact, this promotion did little but grant 
him authority over the rest of the Military Border, as the entire Hungarian portion of the Imperial 
Army in Hungary was supporting the new Hungarian government.58  Jelačić spent the summer 
away from Zagreb to focus on preparing as best as possible for an invasion of Hungary, which 
commenced on 11 September, 1848.59 
Jelačić’s forces were small by the standards of the time, just over 50,000 infantry, less 
than 2,000 cavalry, and 48 cannon,60 because the bulk of the Imperial Army was tied down in 
                                                 
54 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 232. 
55 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.@ 317. 
56 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 236. 
57 Ibid. @ 238. 
58 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 317. 




northern Italy suppressing what had become perennial rebellions and wars among the Empire’s 
client states there and other Italian polities.61  Jelačić took his army north into Hungary, where he 
was met by a Hungarian military force blocking his advance.  The resulting battle has been 
described as a draw, a Hungarian victory, and a Croatian victory by various commentators at 
various times.  What is clear is that Jelačić’s advance was halted, but rather than falling back into 
Croatia or Slavonia, he turned west and joined up with another Imperial force that had arrived 
recently after suppressing a revolt in Prague.  The Hungarians followed Jelačić to the west, 
while, simultaneously, the population of Vienna rebelled again.  The now combined Imperial 
force under the command of a German officer, Marshal Alfred zu Windischgratz, focused on 
suppressing the new revolt in Vienna before turning back east and invading Hungary again.62   
This second invasion of Hungary was more successful, resulting in the storming of the 
Hungarian capital Budapest in January 1849 and driving the Hungarian forces into the rugged 
terrain north of the city.63  But the fortunes of war turned once more in the spring of 1849 with 
the arrival of a Polish contingent from Silesia in the service of the Hungarian rebel government, 
and the Imperial forces were driven out of Budapest and put on the defensive again.64  It was at 
this point that Russia could not longer remain passive in the face of the threat to dynastic order 
that the Hungarian rebellion represented.  The threat of rebel victory prompted the Russians to 
send an army of their own in to Hungary with the permission of the Hapsburg government, and 
after some initial success, the Emperor personally asked the Russians to mount a larger 
intervention.  By the end of the summer of 1849 the main rebel army was defeated and on the 
defensive, withdrawing into Transylvania, where it was defeated again and finally surrendered to 
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the Russians.65  Through the end of the war in late 1849 Jelačić remained a key battlefield 
commander for the Imperial forces in Hungary and participated in the political negotiations 
which formally ended the rebellion and established the new political order within the Empire.66 
 
The Impact of 1848 
Though 1848 is often thought of as one of those turning points in history when history 
did not turn, it would be hard to overstate the significance of these events within Croatia on 
many levels.  In the space of six months Civil Croatia had gone from a peripheral community 
within Hungary on the verge of being forced to use only a foreign language in state business to 
the heart of a self governing state.  Zagreb, which had served as a functional capital city was the 
home of not only the Sabor, but a fully functional government, the Bansko vijeće, responsible to 
the Ban and the Sabor rather than the ministers in Budapest or the government in Vienna.   
To appreciate the significance of this transformation one need only look at the map of “Jelačić’s 
Croatia” (image bellow).  The Triune Kingdom, which previously had been a collective unity in 
rhetoric only, was actually a united geo-political space.  In January 1848 Zagreb was the 
functional capital of Civil Croatia consisted of only the two territories of Croatia and Slavonia.  
By the summer of 1848 the entire colored portion of the map was governed from Zagreb. 
 As important as this political transformation was, its implications for the geo-spatial 
imagining of Croatia were even greater.  This consolidation of governance allowed the very 
concept of the Triune Kingdom to be re-imagined as a unitary whole.  At the core of this re-
imagination was a fundamentally Zagrebite vision of the Triune Kingdom.  Outside of “rump” 
Croatia the Triune Kingdom was understood to be Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia.  This 
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formulation was visually represented on the grb (coat of arms) with the coat of arms of Dalmatia 
in the in the upper left position of honor,68 Croatia, represented by the red and white Šakovnica 
(little chess board) in the upper right, and Slavonia on the bottom third of the shield.  But, in 
Zagreb the grb was reversed, with the Croatian Šakovnica in the position of honor, reflecting that 
in Zagreb the Triune Kingdom was referred to as Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia.  Given that 
Croatia was a territory with two distinct definitions, one contemporary and the other historic, the 
                                                 
67 Zemljovid 10, Jelačićecva Hrvatska  (Hrvatski informativni centar); available from 
http://www.hic.hr/books/pavlicev/images/s10.gif. 
68 This is the “position of honor” in heraldic terms because when held by the left arm this is the portion of the shield 
that covers the heart. 
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establishment of Zagreb as capital allowed for a reformulation of the Triune Kingdom from 
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia, to the “Triune Kingdom of Croatia” alone by referencing the 
historic medieval Croatia, which had encompassed Dalmatia and Slavonia, rather than the 
territory of “rump” Croatia, that local area recognized as a separate Croatian region because it 
was the territory which had not fallen to Ottoman expansion in the region as Slavonia had, or had 
fallen under Venetian control, as most of Dalmatia had.  
This re-imagining was legally recognized by “the conclusions of the Croatian Parliament 
of 1848 regarding the restoration of the Triune Kingdom under the authority of the Banus 
grounded on the historical, national, and natural rights of the Croatian nation.”69  Combining this 
unitary Triune Kingdom with Croatia’s political separation from Hungary creates a new geo-




But 1848 was not just a political or military exercise.  It was a lived experience and in 
many ways a defining historical moment for an entire generation of Croats.  Tens of thousands of 
Croats had participated in the military campaigns of 1848-49, including a student regiment 
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formed from young men enrolled in the Theology, Philosophy, and Law faculties of Zagreb.  
During that time these soldiers had seen Vienna and Budapest, though not under the most 
enjoyable of circumstances.  But even under these circumstances, seeing these cities, especially 
Vienna, meant that a great city was no longer something that could only be imagined, but 
something that was a real, lived experience in the memories of the veterans of 1848. 
It is also important to note that while the Illyrian movement was very successful in 
exploiting the events of 1848 to halt the Magyarazation project in Croatia, the movement itself 
effectively dissipated rapidly after 1849.  Three main causes can be identified for the fading of 
Illyrianism.  First, the Illyrian movement was closely associated with Ljudevit Gaj, and his 
downfall at the beginning of the revolution of 1848 must be viewed as a significant event in the 
history of the movement.70  A second issue was that the Illyrian perspective was not fully 
embraced in the newly unified Triune Kingdom of 1848-49.  Though widely championed by 
intellectuals within Civil Croatia, Gaj had difficulty convincing intellectuals from outside this 
region.  Serb intellectuals were very willing to work with the Illyrians on issues of language once 
the Štokavian dialect was adopted as the shared literary language, but they showed little interest 
in other elements of Illyrianism.  Even in Dalmatia, Gaj had received a cool reception to his 
ideas when he traveled there to win over local intellectuals in the early 1840s.71  A final issue 
that undermined the logic of Illyrianism was the actual outcome of the events of 1848.  A driving 
force behind the Illyrians was the sense of Croatian vulnerability.  To the Illyrians, Croatia was 
weak in the face of a strong and predatory Hungarian national project.  But in 1848 Croatia, as an 
                                                 
70 For a complete discussion of the events leading to Gaj’s personal downfall see Despalatović, Ljudevit Gaj and the 
Illyrian Movement @ 195-198. 
71 Ibid. @ 132. 
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autonomous nation, had gone to war with Hungary and emerged victorious.72  The events of 
1848, therefore, had inverted the Illyrian worldview.  This combination of factors meant that the 
Illyrian movement lost its internal momentum.  The institutions the movement created did not 
disappear though.  In fact, they grew and thrived over time, but they became the institutional 
foundation for the Croatian national project. 
Perhaps the most significant result of 1848 was what it provided the Croatian national 
project which allowed it to move forward after shedding the Illyrian elements.  As with all such 
national projects, a key problem was defining national distinctiveness.  This was clearly a 
problematic endeavor with the Illyrian project which was both Croatian and pan-Slavic 
simultaneously.  Language, which was a key Romantic indicator of national distinctiveness, had 
become problematic since the adoption of Štokavian, the predominant Serbian form of the 
language, as the Croatian literary language.  Illyrianism had also complicated other issues of 
distinctiveness due to its pan-Slavic character; territory, people, and history were as much shared 
as language in many cases.  The issue of an Illyrian state was also problematic and had forced 
the movement to abandon the word Illyrian in place of National.  But 1848 had resulted in a 
Croatian state on a clearly defined territory and a distinctive historic experience (the Croatian-
Hungarian War) not shared with the other Slavs of the Balkan Peninsula.  Thus 1848 became a 
defining element of Croatian national distinctiveness.  The fact that the word Illyrian itself had 
been banned for a period of time, and replaced by the term National in most cases, made the 
transition from the Illyrian project to the Croatian national project appear seamless, as no “name 
change” was required, and the institutions of the project could re-orient themselves without any 
need for a public transformation. 
                                                 
72 This is the Croatian interpretation of events, which focused on their own participation, and minimized the 




 The pre 1850 history of Zagreb provides a powerful example of spatiality across time.  
Zagreb’s rise as a unified community was the product of a transformation of imagined space 
through lived space.  This process was set in motion by a key change in real space, the creation 
of the new market square in the 17th century.  This new square became central to the daily lives 
of the inhabitants, and as a lived space tied the two competing communities together into a single 
urban space in the geographic imaginations of the inhabitants.  By the beginning of the 19th 
century, the community defined itself as Zagreb, a single urban space, despite the area’s 
continued formal political division.   This community unification created a city with a unique set 
of attributes, particularly the coalescence of political and cultural centers, perfectly suited for the 
intellectual and political environment of the region that emerged in the first half of the 19th 
century.  Zagreb as a city became central to the Croatian response to the emergence of nation as 
a central organizing principle of the political order of Europe in the 19th century.  The city’s 
position as a center of administration and learning drew people to it, especially those interested 
in advancing the new Illyrian movement after the 1820s.  Zagreb became central to the Illyrian 
movement, a location where ideas were collected, refined, and then redistributed to the broader 
Illyrian community.   
 Even before the city’s unification into a single city, Zagreb played a key role in the 
successful development of the foundation of the Croatian national project.  An urban center was 
critical because it provided an opportunity for the development of critical masses of both 
intellectual and financial capital essential for the successful manifestation of the Illyrian project 
in concrete ways.  This is not to say that the Illyrian project was purely a product of Zagreb.  As 
pointed out previously, Ljudevit Gaj collected materials from around the Triune Kingdom, but 
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without an urban center that provided both a critical mass of individuals who could both produce 
and consume the physical manifestations of this intellectual effort (newspapers and books), the 
project could not have become self sustaining.  This production and consumption was not merely 
a product of individuals working on their own.  A key part of this process was the Synekism of 
urban space, embodied by the “reading rooms” and cafes of Zagreb, where these individuals 
could interact directly and inspire new production from each other and encourage new 
consumption by each other.  This informal system was then re-enforced and embedded in Zagreb 
specifically with the creation of a physical embodiment, the National Center, for the cultural 
institutions which were being organized to form the core of the project.   
Though the Illyrian movement was culturally successful it was generally a political 
failure until the crisis of 1848 provided an opportunity for the Illyrians to achieve unchallenged 
power and establish an autonomous, unified Croatian government across the entire Triune 
Kingdom and the Military Border regions.  This allowed the elite of Zagreb to re-align the 
Triune Kingdom of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia with its local interpretation of the Triune 
Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Slavonia.  Once this was successfully accomplished, the 
second two elements were truncated in common usage, so that it became the Triune Kingdom of 
Croatia with the territorial definition of all of the older Triune Kingdom and the Military Border. 
 The leaders of the emergent Croatian national project found several key elements at their 
disposal in 1850.  Croatia’s history provided an important narrative and legal foundation for the 
project, in particular, the recognition of the Triune Kingdom as a legal entity and a territorial 
space distinct, if not fully separate, from Hungary and an indigenous political institution, the 
Sabor, through which their program could be advanced.  The Croatian national project also 
inherited a functional capital city.  This urban complex, though locally referred to as Zagreb, was 
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not a unified entity, and though it had significant potential for development, was far from the 
definition of a modern city by the standards of the period. The Illyrian period and 1848 provided 
two key elements for a national movement; cultural institutions and national distinctiveness.  The 
Illyrian movement had created a complex of cultural institutions that were embedded in the 
social fabric of Zagreb which had survived the transition from “Illyrian” to “National” and could 
be further built upon and mobilized.  1848 had produced a Croatian “historical moment” which 
had as a key part a unified, autonomous Croatia with Zagreb as its capital city, “Jelačić’s 
Croatia.”  This created a reality that would fuel the Croatian geographic imagination for the next 
150 years as a goal to be re-achieved. 
 In 1850 the Croatian national project inherited three key spaces; one important imagined 
spaces, one important real space, and one important complex space significant to this study.73  
The significant imagined space was “Jelačić’s Croatia”, which established a specific geo-spatial 
order in the minds of the movement’s participants which they could refer to as the “proper” or 
“correct” understanding of Croatia as a political reality.  “Jelačić’s Croatia” was not just a 
territorial definition, it was a specific geo-political order, which not only redefined Croatia as the 
Triune Kingdom unified with the Military Border, but also established Zagreb as the political 
center of this united territory.  But “Jelačić’s Croatia” went further than a geo-spatial “right” that 
needed to be maintained or re-established, it was also a specific historic experience that firmly 
separated the Croatian national project from the other national projects in the region, an historic 
moment that, in the view of the Croatian elite, belonged solely to the Croats.  It gave Croatia a 
national distinctiveness that the national project had struggled to articulate up until that point.   
                                                 
73 This discussion of key spaces which focuses on one aspect of the spatial trialectic is not intended to imply that 
these spaces were monolithic in character.  Each of the spaces possessed all the elements of the spatial trialectic 
relationship, but where one is specified here, it is to show the specific significance of a specific element of the 
spatial trialectic for this particular space. 
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The real space was the city of Zagreb which was already a functional political and 
cultural center.  As the core city of the Illyrian/National movement, Zagreb had become central 
to the production of the cultural products of the movement; the very ideas that drove the project 
forward.  These ideas were not just a product of, nor consumed only in, Zagreb.  But Zagreb was 
central to the collection and dissemination of these ideas as Zagreb was the productive center of 
the movement, and ideas form the rest of Croatia were consolidated, discussed, debated, and 
finally reproduced in print in Zagreb for redistribution to the rest of Croatia.  Much of the key 
leadership of the Croatian national project was not, in fact, from Zagreb.  They were drawn to the 
city because of its developing role as the center of Croatian culture in the 1830s and 40s.  During 
that time the Illyrian/National project built the institution infrastructure that would become the 
foundation of the Croatian national project after 1848.  
The complex space74 was Zagreb’s main square.  As an imagined space, the square was 
Zagreb’s “gateway,” embedded in the city’s urban rituals as the place of passage from outside to 
inside the city, the symbolic gateway of Zagreb.  As a lived space, the city’s main square was 
mundane as a market place, but was completely embedded in the daily lives of every resident of 
the city because it was a central element of the perpetuation of life in the city through the 
distribution of food to the population.  Beyond these roles though, the square also served a key 
real space with the spatial function of linkage point between the various communities of Zagreb, 
because of its centralizing location between the two older urban communities.  This position as 
linkage point meant that many people would pass through the square even if they had no market 
business, or even if the market was not in operation on a given day, simply to get from one part 
of town to another.   
                                                 
74 The term “complex space” is simply meant that more than one aspect of the spatial trialectic for this space is 
significant for the purposes of this study. 
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 Central to the spatial dynamic that would emerge over the next 90 years in Zagreb was a 
fundamental logic which was already established by 1850 -- the main square as the center of 















Being and Becoming the Croatian Metropolis: 1850 – 1895 
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     The period from 1850 until 1895 was crucial in the development of Zagreb as a 
modern city.  Up until 1850 the towns of Zagreb had grown organically, developing in response 
to the needs of the communities with little deliberate planning.  After their political unification, 
the communities of Zagreb began to develop in a more ordered and systemic way with a new 
organizing vision: Zagreb as the capital of a unified Croatia.  Beyond this vision though was a 
further role for the city, Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis.   
 As demonstrated previously, neither of these ideas, Zagreb as Capital City nor Zagreb as 
Croatian Metropolis, was dramatically new.  They were, rather, evolutions of the existing roles 
of the city.  This dualistic concept became a central element in the city’s sense of identity; that it 
was both being and becoming simultaneously.  In this regard, the community of Zagreb, as a 
city, imagined itself in the same situation they imagined Croatia as a nation; to exist in spirit 
while simultaneously becoming in reality.  The new element of these concepts for the city was 
the idea that the components of Zagreb’s role as Croatian Metropolis should be embodied in their 
own spaces, deliberately designed and constructed.  The city could be deliberately transformed to 
physically embody a modern city and fulfill the role of Croatian Metropolis. 
 
Imagining the Metropolis 
By 1850 the Croatian national project was a firmly established part of Croatian society.  
The Illyrian movement had established Zagreb as its major intellectual hub.  1848 had further 
established Zagreb as the political center for the entire Triune Kingdom.  But the community of 
Zagreb itself was little more than two medieval hilltop towns with small communities adjacent to 
them on the valley floor below.  The total population of all the communities in the immediate 
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vicinity was estimated at “something greater than 15,000 residents.”1  Zagreb therefore had 
some, but not all, of the characteristics of a national metropolis, which is to say a single city that 
was the political, administrative, cultural, and economic center for the nation, and which would 
be the driving force for national development towards the fulfillment of the national project.   
In 1850 Zagreb was formally unified under a single city government.2  This was both a 
recognition of the reality that the four communities had grown together and become a single 
urban complex, as well as a practical necessity to effectively govern this integrated urban space.  
Despite the local political situation which had maintained the divisions between Gradec and 
Kaptol, foreign cartographers, mainly Germans, had been referencing the community as a single 
city with the name Agram for over 200 years.  By 1848, Croats themselves were referring to the 
city as a single urban space named Zagreb in public statements and declarations.3  Unifying the 
city was therefore recognition that the division of the area into separate political spaces was an 
historical anachronism.  As a practical matter, unified governance was necessary to effectively 
manage the city’s future growth.  Zagreb had grown in an unplanned manner from two towns 
into four due to increasing population further spurred by the consolidation of governing 
functions there at the end of the 18th Century and the expansion of the educational faculties at the 
beginning of the 19th Century. 
The new unified city government faced two significant challenges.  First was a very 
limited amount of revenue. The lack of an industrial economic base combined with a small urban 
population, and the abolition of feudal obligations (which until 1848 had shifted wealth from 
                                                 
1 Actual population figures are difficult for this period, as various sources provide significantly different population 
numbers ranging from 15,000 to 20,000 due to various communities being included or excluded from specific 
estimates before the unification of the city in 1850.  The first official census of the united city was not conducted 
until 1857.  Ivo Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). @ 25.   
2 Ibid. 
3 The name Zagreb derived from the wooden palisade which had been the original fortifications for the Bishopric.  
Jack C. Fisher, "Urban Analysis: A Case Study of Zagreb, Yugoslavia," Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 53, no. 3 (1963). @ 269 
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rural areas to the city) meant the city’s revenues were small.  The city’s final source of income, 
trade and commerce, were also dramatically diminished, as the entire Hapsburg Empire fell into 
a deep economic stagnation as a result of the economic disruptions caused by the 1848 rebellion, 
which were then compounded by the reforms imposed to modernize the economy.4   
The second issue facing the new municipal government in Zagreb was the imposition of a 
new administrative regime across the Hapsburg Empire to deal with the issues of 
decentralization and liberalization of the political system which, in the view of the leadership in 
Vienna, had led to the uprisings of 1848.   Based on the principles of absolutism, which argued 
that the most effective way to produce economic and social modernization was centralized 
authoritarian governmental structure which would effectively direct the modernization project, 
neo-absolutism established direct rule of the Empire from Vienna.5  To that end, all national 
parliaments within the Empire, including the Croatian Sabor, were suspended.6   
Civil Croatia and Dalmatia were each divided into administrative districts governed by 
German speaking officials appointed by, and reporting directly to, Vienna.  Even under this neo-
absolutist regime, the Empire was a fusion of feudal relationships, upon which the legal 
legitimacy of the system rested, and modern administrative practices.  Thus, the office of Ban 
remained, but the Bansko vijeće (Ban’s Council) government was abolished, and as the neo-
absolutist regime was implemented the actual powers of the Ban were more and more 
constrained.7  Though the goal of this regime was to modernize the system of governance within 
the Empire, initially, rather than improving the political situation, neo-absolutism simply added a 
                                                 
4 Branka Magaš, Croatia through History (London, San Francisco, Beirut: SAQI, 2007). @ 255-256. 
5 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983). @ 311.  
6 Ibid. @ 318. 
7 Dunja Rihtman-Aguštin, "The Monument in the Main City Square: Constructing and Erasing Memory in 
Contemporary Croatia," in Balkan Identities : Nation and Memory, ed. Maria Todorova (New York: New York 
University Press, 2004). @ 183. 
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new element of complexity to an already complex internal dynamic of modern bureaucratic 
government merged with older feudal rights and obligations.   
But the neo-absolutist direct rule did not extend to municipal governments.8  The newly 
unified city of Zagreb therefore governed itself.  This circumstance meant that municipal 
government was the only political venue where open political contestation was permitted, 
resulting an extremely contentious local political environment as all local political energy 
became focused on the city government.  By 1857 the political situation in Zagreb was so 
contentious that the new office of Mayor of Zagreb, created in 1851, was left vacant and was not 
filled again until 1861.9  As a result of these constraints the leaders of the Croatian national 
project were forced to either work outside of the Imperial political structures or settle for 
essentially symbolic acts. 
To that end the efforts at building the Croatian Metropolis were limited to the religious 
sphere and acts of imagining and proposing rather than enacting.  One goal that was quickly 
achieved was the establishment of an autonomous Croatian Catholic Church.  Beginning in the 
1840s the Bishop of Zagreb, Josip Haulik, with the support of the Ban and the Sabor lobbied the 
Catholic Church to elevate Kaptol’s Bishopric to the status of an Archdiocese.  These efforts had 
been unsuccessful because the issue was closely related to the entire Illyrian project.  Up to that 
point the Bishoprics of the Triune Kingdom had reported to an Archdiocese in Hungary as an 
extension of the Hungarian Church.10  Elevating a Croatian Bishopric to an Archdiocese was the 
equivalent of creating a separate Croatian national Church distinct from the Hungarian Church.  
This amounted essentially to a Vatican recognition of Croatia as an independent nation, a 
prospect that the government of Hungary had vetoed.  In the wake of the defeat of the 1848 
                                                 
8 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 244. 
9 Zvonimir Milčec, Zagrebački Gradonačelnici (Zagreb: ALFA, 1993). @ 28. 
10 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 27-29. 
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uprising, the Hungarian veto lost its force.  In 1850 the Imperial government formally approved 
the creation of a separate Croatian Church and opened discussions with the Vatican.11  In 1852 
the Vatican formally elevated Zagreb to the rank of Archdiocese.12  The newly promoted 
Archbishop Haulik saw this as not only as recognition of Croatia’s right to a national Church, but 
also as significant in that it “had transformed Zagreb ‘into the metropolis of the homeland.’”13  
In the view of the Catholic Church this was true, because now the entire Church apparatus in 
Croatia would look to Zagreb for leadership and guidance.  In broader terms the elevation of 
Zagreb had significance beyond the Church, as it was yet another consolidation of authority, 
adding to the political consolidation accomplished in 1848. 
In 1854 the Mayor of Zagreb proposed another step in transforming the city.  Mayor 
Kamuaf wrote to the City Representatives of Zagreb during his trip to Vienna as part of the city’s 
delegation attending the royal wedding of Emperor Franz Joseph and stated: 
Our ban has received the rank of Count, therefore it is necessary that this good 
fortune be given some visible sign in Zagreb.  There should, on the square of 
celebration of the ban, be placed his statue, which he is due already for his 
previous worthy service for the croatian [sic] nation.14 
 
Though this may not seem a transformative act by contemporary standards, it was very much an 
effort to transform Zagreb into both a modern city and re-enforce the city’s claim to the role of 
Croatian Metropolis.  By 1854 monuments to prominent figures of the regime were becoming a 
key element of the public spaces of Vienna.  Thus, the proposal of the statue was an effort to 
raise Zagreb up to the urban standard of the modern Imperial metropolis.  The relationship 
between Vienna and the inspiration for concept for the statue of Ban Jelačić is supported by the 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Tomislav J. Šagi-Bunić, Katolička Crkva i Hrvatski Narod (Zagreb: Kršćanska Sadaršnjost, 1983). @ 61. 
13 Ivan Rogić, "What Has Happened in Zagreb," in Zagreb Modernity and the City, ed. Fedja Vukić (Zagreb: AGM, 
2003). @ 19. 
14 Vladimir Maleković, ed., Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću (Zagreb: Muzej za 
Umjetnost i Obrt, 1990). @ 61. 
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way in which the proposal originated.  The mayor of Zagreb mentioned the idea for the statue as 
part of a report he provided on his stay in Vienna as the leader of a delegation representing the 
city at the wedding of the Emperor.15   
In 1854, Zagreb had only one public monument in the entire city, and it was religious in 
nature; a statue to the Virgin Mary which was in St. Mark’s Square in Gradec.  In contrast, the 
proposed monument to Ban Jelačić was focused on a contemporary man who had served one 
particular political order and one particular national cause, rather than a religious symbol.  The 
proposed statue of the Ban would also add to the basic function of the square as it had been 
understood, from a mainly commercial space with some symbolic function, into a monumental 
space.  The transformation of Harmica into Ban Jelačić Square and the idea to place a statue 
there combined a key space for the reproduction of daily life, the city’s main market square, into 
a memorial space of the defining historic moment of contemporary Croatia, 1848.  The new 
name of the square itself was a product of the events of 1848, with the Hungarian sounding 
Harmica being replaced by the distinctively Croatian Ban Josip Jelačić.  Therefore the idea of 
placing the statue in the square would finalize the transformation of the square and forestall the 
return of the old name in the future.16 
The concept for the statue was quickly approved in principle by the city counsel, but the 
city did not have the money to fully fund the statue, so the project was deferred.17  Progress on 
the project was very slow until 1859 when Jelačić died and his passing spurred community 
leaders and wealthy members of society to make the statue a reality.18  By the end of 1860, 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 There is a phenomenon of older place names persisting in Zagreb.  For example “flower square” which was 
formally named Preradović square, re-named Brotherhood and Unity Square, and then re-re-named Preradović 
square, yet remains “flower square” in the public imagining of the city’s population. 
17 Maleković, ed., Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću. @ 7. 
18 Zvonimir Milčec, Povratak Bana (Zagreb: BOOKOVAC, 1990). @ 9. 
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efforts were underway to find a sculptor to create the monument.19  As the monument project 
moved forward it became part of a broader project to create the new, modern city that the city’s 
leaders were imagining. 
 
Zagreb and surroundings 1853/5420 
As the 1853/54 map of Zagreb shows, urban development beyond the immediate are of 
the two walled communities was scattered, but focused on the two main access routes to the city, 
one from the west and the other to the south both of which led into the main square.  Beyond this 
the area was mostly open fields and farmsteads.  This meant the ground south of the existing city 
                                                 
19 Ibid. @ 15. 




to the Sava River was essentially open to development; a blank canvas for the new city’s 
architects.  By the early 1860s this vision of the new city was taking a very specific form. In an 
1862 document discussing issues for the 1863 city budget a specific reference is made to the area 
“between Jelačić square and Savska street, which is known to be the future center of the new 
lower town (city).”21  This concept was further developed in the 1865 building regulations which 
described this area as “an interior city” between two large squares on the east and  west side and 
gardens to the south.22  This eastern square referenced here was not Jelačić square, but Novi Trg 
(New Square) that was located one city block south of Jelačić square.  But as the first statement 
indicates, Jelačić square was still a significant reference point for defining the new, modern 
lower town. 
This concept of Jelačić square being at the corner of the new part of the city fits with the 
role the square had played as a linkage point from its creation in the 17th Century.  The square 
was located at the southeast corner of Gradec and the south-southwest corner of Kaptol.  In this 
new city plan it would also be at the northeast corner of the “lower town.”  Thus the square’s role 
as linkage point was preserved in this new concept of the urban space of Zagreb.  The 
transformation of the square into a monumental space further extended this role as a linkage 
point beyond space and into time.  Focusing on the Croatian hero of 1848 froze the square in a 
specific historic moment.  That moment was the point in time when Zagreb also transformed into 
a unified city.  The square then would be a temporal link between the pre-1848 older medieval 
city and the new, post-1848 modern lower city.  This is not to say that there were not other 
considerations in the planner’s minds.  In fact, there were very practical reasons for placing the 
new “lower town” in this area, but the specific reference to Jelačić square as a reference point for 
                                                 
21 Ibid.  




Map of Zagreb circa 186423 
                                                 




City Plan from 186524 
                                                 
24 Base image from Knežević, "Mjesto Zrinjskog Trga u Genezi Zagrebačke "Zelene Potkove"." @ 70. 
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the plan indicates a specific sensitivity to the role of the square and its relationship to the new 
lower town project. 
The extent to which the concept of metropolis was also part of this new concept for the 
city is clear in the regulatorna osnova (regulatory plan) created in 186525 to supplement new 
building regulations enacted in 1857.  This map was published in two parts.  The northern half 
was a modification of a map produced in 1864, which laid out the general future road grid for the 
city.  This shows the desire of the planners to create a modern city of large, square blocks along 
wide boulevards, in contrast to the smaller, irregular blocks with narrow streets that 
characterized the older, medieval parts of the city.  This portion of the map also showed that, 
while the planners had identified the area to the south and west of Jelačić square as the new 
“center” of the lower town, they had laid out a grid much wider than that, which was roughly 
centered east to west on the square.  The southern portion of the map was less detailed, having 
been created specifically for this project, a fact that in itself shows that the city planners were 
imagining beyond what was considered the space of Zagreb at the time.  The main future 
features represented on this map were not residential, but commercial in nature.  They focused 
on a new, massive rail yard centered on, but south of, the planned “center” of the new lower 
town and an artificial harbor south of the rail yard. 
Taken as a whole, this regulatorna osnova was a bold vision of the future for the city. 
The idea of Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis was at the center of this vision of the city’s future.  
This plan called for the fulfillment of Zagreb in the role of Croatian Metropolis, by overcoming 
the city’s shortcomings in fulfilling that role --namely the city’s small population, its archaic 
character, and the fact that it was not a central force in the national economy.  The first of these, 
                                                 
25 Ibid. @ 70. 
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population was self evident.  By 1857, the city’s official population was approximately 27,000.26  
This was a significant increase from the previous decade, but still the community was not much 









The new regulatorna osnova was a plan for a city ten times the size of Zagreb in 1865, and if the 
city grew to that size it would overshadow any other town in the Triune Kingdom.  The issue of 
modernization would also be dealt with primarily though growth.  Though acts such a placing the 
statue of Ban Jelačić in the main square would symbolically modernize the city, it would not 
change the medieval character of Gradec and Kaptol.  But as the city grew in the new lower 
town, the new building regulations insured that the architecture would be in the form of a 
modern Central European city, with intersections at right angles and building built on the street 
and connecting, forming a continuous front along broad boulevards.28  Once the city had grown 
to where it filled the regulatorna osnova, ninety percent of the population would be living in the 
new, modern part of the city. 
This new plan also shows an effort to establish Zagreb at the center of a Croatian national 
economy.  The issue of Zagreb’s role in the national economy was not an easy issue to solve, 
particularly because Croatia did not have an integrated national economy to speak of.  What 
                                                 
26 Numerous unofficial sources estimate the population as still fewer than 20,000 into the 1860s. 
27 Data taken from table GRADOVI U HRVATSKOJ in Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 
2003). @ 466-467.  See also caveat in footnote 26, which would drop Zagreb into the position of the second largest 
city behind Rijeka.  
28 Olga Maruševski, od Manduševca do Trga Republike (Zagreb: 1987). @ 34-35. 
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significant trade activity that did exist in the Triune Kingdom was based on water networks; in 
Civil Croatia trade was based on rivers and in Dalmatia on the Adriatic Sea.  Zagreb was at a 
particular disadvantage in this trade network because, though it was located near the Sava River, 
the river was not navigable year-round until much further down river where the town of Sisak 
was located.  This problem was partially solved in 1862 when a rail line was completed from 
Sisak to Zidani Most which passed close to Zagreb.  This line linked the water network of Civil 
Croatia with the rail network connecting Vienna to the Adriatic Sea at Trieste.  This rail line did 
not make Zagreb a transportation hub though, merely a stop between the new water-rail network 
interface at Sisak and the new rail to rail interface at Zidani Most.29  In fact, the initial plan for 
the railway did not even consider Zagreb a significant enough community for the added expense 
of the line to pass through it, and the city had to petition Vienna to have the proposed rail line 
moved eastward so that Zagreb could have a station close enough to the city to use the line 
effectively.30  The new regulatorna osnova envisioned changing this network dynamic by 
creating a large rail hub adjacent to a new river port, thus moving the water-rail interface from 
Sisak to Zagreb and making the city the central point for Croatian trade, at least inland.  The 
completion of this plan would therefore be an important step in creating a true national economy 
with Zagreb as its central hub. 
This new regulatorna osnova, was a very practical effort to ensure the development of 
the city conformed to a very specific image.  The new plan laid out clearly where building could, 
and could not be built.  In doing so, it also established a logic by which all new building in the 
city would have to be approved by the city government to ensure it conformed to the regulatorna 
                                                 
29 Fisher, "Urban Analysis: A Case Study of Zagreb, Yugoslavia." @ 275. 




osnova.  This level of control would ensure the city grew into the modern Croatian Metropolis its 
designers were envisioning. 
The plan was also as much a statement of the present legal and financial constraints the 
city government faced, as it was a bold plan for the future.  The legal structures at the time 
significantly limited the ability of the city government to take property for public use.  The city 
therefore had to purchase the land it intended to use for roads and public parks as well as pay for 
the physical construction of the roads.  The large blocks in the regulatorna osnova were the 
product of the limits on city finances to actually build the road network to support the new 
“Lower Town.”31  The addition of the plan for the new rail yard and Sava River port were as 
much about establishing Zagreb as the center of a new national economy, as they were about 
establishing a national economy.  The financial benefits that would befall Zagreb from this 
transformation would provide the revenues necessary to transform the city into the Croatian 
Metropolis and stabilize the city’s financial condition. 
 
Building the Metropolis 
By 1864, roughly the same time the regulatorna osnova was published, practical steps 
were being taken in the Ban Jelačić monument project.  In 1860, a committee of prominent 
citizens was formed to manage the statue project, and by 1864, they had chosen a sculptor, 
Anton Fernkorn, an Austrian sculptor from Vienna.32  On 2 December 1864, Fernkorn was 
formally commissioned to create a statue:  
                                                 
31 Ibid. @ 45. 
32 There was some controversy of this selection, as the committee commissioned and paid Fernkorn to create a 
model of his concept of the monument before formally announcing the open competition for the monument project.  
When a Croatian sculptor expressed interest in entering the competition, he was told that Fernkorn had already 
submitted a full model.   See Milčec, Povratak Bana. @ 15-18.  
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…of Ban Jelačić, on a horse, as were presented Archduke Karl and Prince Eugene 
in Vienna.  The Ban must be dressed as he was on the occasion of his 
“instillation” on 5 June, 1848.  In his hand he must be holding a naked [drawn] 
saber with which he once led Croats into battle.  The statue will be in a 
supernatural [larger than life] size, and made from metal (bronze).  The pedestal 
of the monument must be made from granite from Moslavina, and must carry two 
bronze tablets: a dedication with the writing: BAN JELAČIĆ, 1848, and an honor 
guard with the coat of arms of the family Jelačić.33 
 
The reference to both of Fernkorn’s previous equestrian statues in Vienna indicates the desire for 
the statue to reflect the level of artistic achievement present in the Imperial capital.  If a simple 
reference point were required, then only one would have been needed to be mentioned.  The 
reference to both of them indicates that Jelačić’s statue should be the equal of all such similar 
statues in Vienna. 
These very specific requirements codified what the statue was intended to represent.  
Two specific and separate roles were to be embodied, Jelačić as Ban and Jelačić as military 
commander.  In this regard, the statue was a monument to both the political and military 
accomplishments of the Ban.  These specific instructions insured that the Ban would be 
memorialized as neither just a politician nor just a general, but as both.  The simplicity of the 
dedication is also significant.  Fernkorn’s first model had included a dedication tablet with a 
significant amount of verbiage, but the model was too small to include any actual verbiage.34  
But final commission for the statue abandoned any direct verbal expression of Ban Jelačić’s 
achievements.   
The statue was a reflection of the complex political situation the Croatian elite found 
themselves in at the time.  The situation was even more complex in 1864 with the re-emergence 
of the triadic politics of Vienna, Budapest, and Zagreb due to the failure of the neo-absolutist 
regime to fulfill the promises of its architects.  By 1859, the continued economic stagnation 
                                                 
33 Maleković, ed., Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću. @ 62 
34 See picture. Ibid. @ 5. 
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within the Empire combined with continued failure in Northern Italy had so damaged the neo-
absolutist model that it was under intense pressure to loosen direct rule.35  In 1861 the 
suspension of national parliaments within the Hapsburg Empire was lifted, and the Sabor 
convened in Zagreb, though without much real power, and much of its time was spent debating 
and negotiating with Vienna, Budapest, Dalmatia, and other parts of “Jelačić’s Croatia” over 
who would or could sit as deputies.36  The statue itself therefore became a physical 
representation of the ambivalence and complexity of the era in which it was being crafted.  
In this situation then, producing a narrative for the commemorative tablet faced two 
significant issues.  First was the challenge of achieving some form of consensus within the 
Croatian elite as to what specific actions the narrative would valorize.  One thing noticeably 
absent from the commissioning of the statue is any direct reference to defeating the Hungarians.  
Throughout the 1850s some of the leadership of the National Party had become tacit allies of the 
Hungarians in their mutual efforts to loosen the grip of neo-absolutism on the political structures 
of their territories.37  Thus, it was important to remind Vienna of Croatia’s loyalty and 
trustworthiness, while at the same time maintaining good relations with Budapest.  This need for 
good relations with Hungary became more important after Vienna began to formally dismantle 
the neo-absolutist regime in the early 1860s.  After a decade long hiatus in the national political 
discourse of Croatia, the process resumed in a very similar place as where it had left off.   
The two main parties in the debate were the National Party and the Unionists, with the 
general positions of the two parties were essentially updated versions of where the debate had 
been in the 1840s.  The National Party was a continuation of the party which had been founded 
after the Illyrian Party had been banned in the 1840s, and sought to maximize Croatian political 
                                                 
35 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 312. 
36 Magaš, Croatia through History. @ 269-275. 
37 Ibid. @ 312. 
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autonomy from Hungary and re-establish the territorial unity of the Triune Kingdom established 
in 1848, though the party itself was now split into feuding branches.   One branch looked to 
Vienna as a protector from potential domination by Budapest.  The Other branch of the party 
looked to Budapest to help dismantle neo-absolutism, believing that co-operation in this effort 
would lead to Hungarian support for Croatian interests once this struggle was won.38  The 
Unionists, as the former Magyarone “Horvati” were now referring to themselves sought greater 
political and economic integration with Hungary. 39  Thus, even within the Croatian political elite 
it would have been hard to produce a narrative that would be acceptable to both parties, as the 
Unionists would have objected to the celebration of the defeat of Hungary, which was clearly 
part of the intent of the statue.  It is even questionable if a compromise on which languages 
would be used for such an inscription was possible, as the inclusion or exclusion of Hungarian 
would have made a key political statement in the context of the time. 
The second issue was that a specific narrative would have removed the ambiguity 
embedded in the statue project from its inception. The initial suggestion for the statue by Mayor 
Kamuaf in 1854 perfectly encapsulated this ambivalent circumstance.  It starts by suggesting that 
the statue should be built to recognize Jelačić’s promotion to the rank of Count in the Imperial 
nobility, yet in the very next sentence, Mayor Kamuaf states that the real justification for the 
statue is Jelačić’s “previous worthy service” to Croatia.  The drawn sword was clearly a 
menacing gesture, as stated, to signifying Jelačić leading Croats into battle.  But even in this, the 
enemy in battle was unidentified.  In this way, the statue committee avoided expressly stating the 
statue commemorated any specific military achievement.  Thus, the statue could refer to either 
the fact that Jelačić had stormed Vienna in 1848 or Budapest in 1849, or to both.  Therefore, 
                                                 
38 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country 2nd ed. ed. (Cambridge, New York 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). @ 62. 
39 Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. @ 319 
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even in the design of the statue the monument committee was navigating the complex internal 
and external political environment they found themselves in and avoided conflict by cultivating 
ambiguity. 
It is at this point cliché to say that people interpret art from their own perspective and that 
it is impossible to separate the artist from interpretation of their artwork.  In this case, Fernkorn’s 
origins and previous works helped to protect the monument project from criticisms that it was 
inciting Croatian separatism.  Though there are no clear statements by anyone involved with the 
monument project suggesting that this was an important reason why Fernkorn was recruited for 
this project, the fact that he was a German from Vienna worked to insulate the statue from such 
attacks.  Even with as simple a dedication as BAN JELAČIĆ, 1848, the statue could be 
interpreted, depending on its presentation, as an exhortation to a possibly subversive Croatian 
separatism.  By selecting Fernkorn, the monument project was protected from such attacks which 
could easily have been leveled against a Croatian sculptor.  Beyond this though, the statue was, 
as commissioned, intended to be multi-interpretable.  To the German Imperial authorities in 
Vienna it was to be seen as an expression of Croatian loyalty, while at the same time being a 
celebration of Croatian national success in self government and military prowess on the 
battlefield.   
Fernkorn produced a work that precisely matched the task assigned to him.  But the statue 
itself was only a component of the monument.  The placement of the statue was also a central 
element of what the monument was intended to achieve.  The general location of the statue in the 
main square was suggested in the initial proposal of 1854.  The monument committee had 
decided, in conjunction with representatives of the city government, to place the statue in the 
center of the square, but the question of what direction the statue would face was decided by 
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Fernkorn himself.  He informed the monument committee that the statue should face ‘the 
liveliest and largest’ part of the city, and thus should point to the north-northeast. 40  In making 
the judgment that ‘the liveliest and largest’ part of the city lay north of the square, Fernkorn 
seems to have been relying on his memories of Zagreb from a stay in the city in 1842, when 
there was little development south of the main square.41  He was also apparently unaware of the 
new city being imagined south of the square.  He further seems to have been unaware of how 
people might interpret this particular orientation.  The committee accepted Fernkorn’s 
recommendation, and the statue was installed perpendicular to the southern edge of the square 
facing north.42  The statue was formally unveiled in Zagreb in December of 1866 in a large 
ceremony attended by dignitaries from across Civil Croatia and members of the Sabor.43 
 
Unveiling of the Monument of Jelačić-Ban in Zagreb44 
                                                 
40 Maleković, ed., Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću. @ 6. 
41 Ibid. @ 13. 
42 Ibid. @ 8-13. 
43 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 61 
44 Josip Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska (Zagreb: Binoza-Svjetski Pisci, 1936). Photo plate between 208-209. 
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While the statue of Ban Jelačić was a significant act of nation building, and a defining 
one because it created a physical reminder of the national moment of 1848 in the center of 
Zagreb, it was not the only such act of nation building undertaken at the time.  The 1860s was a 
period of energetic cultural institution building in Zagreb.  It was during this period that 
initiatives for the founding of the Academy of Arts and Sciences and the establishment of an 
expanded University to replace the Royal Academy began.45  Both of these projects were clearly 
designed to dramatically enhance the Croatian national project.  The university would allow 
Croatian scholars to train in Zagreb, rather than having to leave Croatia to advance their 
educations beyond the high school level in subjects other than theology and philosophy.  The 
Academy of Arts and Sciences would establish an institution that would facilitate the production 
of knowledge on a wide range of subjects by Croatian scholars in Croatian. 
One of the most significant effects of the statue was how it transformed the role and 
image of the square.  The square was Zagreb’s main daily market place and therefore was central 
to the very existence of the city on a daily basis.  The installation of the statue did not change 
that fact.  In fact, one contemporary observer has argued that the decision to place the statue in 
the market square would lead to it being forgotten because it was embedded in the mundane.46  
But, in fact, the reverse occurred.  The placement of the statue actually elevated the square in the 
mind of the Croatian elite and transformed the scalar interpretation of the square as a place from 
one of local significance, as Zagreb’s symbolic gateway, to one of national significance as well.  
This is demonstrated by the debate which emerged over development on the north side of the 
square and how the orientation of the statue came to be interpreted by the population of Zagreb. 
                                                 
45 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 71. 
46 Maruševski, od Manduševca do Trga Republike. @ 42.  Cited by Rihtman-Aguštin, "The Monument in the Main 
City Square: Constructing and Erasing Memory in Contemporary Croatia." @ 184. 
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The general image of the square before 1848 was of “an empty and cheerless place” with 
only 11 houses on the north side of the square, and the south side completely undeveloped, with 
only a few houses built, and the square only active during the market; “architectural reports of 
that time speak of a dirty square, requesting development and regulations from the City 
Magistrates…”47  This issue was addressed by the city in 1857 and 1865 when the new city 
building regulations created specific requirements for future building on the square, ensuring that 
it would develop in a more urban and modern way.  The 1865 regulations had called for the 
square to resemble the central squares of medieval and renaissance ‘private’ European cities, 
with shops on the first floor of buildings facing the square.48  To that end, the plan envisioned 
private houses on the northern side of the square, but the newly built homes would have to be 
built in the modern urban style with flush façades and they would be allowed to have private 
shops of the ground floor of the buildings.   
In 1875, the director of the City Planning Office, Rupert Melkus, offered a new proposal 
for the north side of the square which “would be a palace truly representing the ambitions of the 
new city.” 49  His concept was for a unifying façade four stories tall that would join all of the 
private parcels of land.  The property behind the façade would still be privately owned, but the 
visual impression would be that of a massive public edifice.  That same year Iso Kršnjavi wrote a 
private critique of both of these approaches to the space of the north side of the square.50  
Kršnjavi imagined the square in terms of an ancient Roman forum, surrounded by public 
                                                 
47 Maleković, ed., Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću. @ 6. 
48 Olga Maruševski, Iso Kršnjavi Kao Graditelj (Zagreb: Društvo Povjetničara Umjetnosti SR Hrvatska, 1986). @ 
228. 
49 Maruševski, od Manduševca do Trga Republike. @ 45. 
50 Kršnjavi's ideas on the square were never published, but he did become one of the most significant architectual 
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buildings, private mansions, monuments, and public and official meeting halls.  He further stated 
his belief that Jelačić Square would: 
…become, at this time, in the new era of the city, the main point [place] – 
carrying the city this way would be a further beautiful project, but I do not believe 
that it would be quickly possible to realize it… creating itself now little by little 
we begin to adorn and arrange our forum gilded with false gold [presumably a 
reference to the ‘false front’/façade proposal by Melkus]…51  
 
This perspective caused Kršnjavi to reject both the private development and the unified façade 
proposal. 
Kršnjavi saw the purely private development of the land on the north side of the square as 
“immensely meaningless” and felt it would make the square look like a “krezuba baba” (a 
toothless old woman)52 because it would allow houses of various height, and even empty plots of 
land depending on the wishes of individual owners.  His choice of this particular image, the 
toothless old woman, was a powerful one because it evokes an image common in ‘the village’ 
and thus implied that the collection of private houses making up the north side of the square 
would diminish the image of Zagreb as a modern city, reducing it to the level of not even a small 
town but a peasant village.  Kršnjavi rejected Melkus’ concept as well because it was merely a 
façade over private buildings, and not a true public structure.  What Kršnjavi believed belonged 
on the north side of the square was “a model of such a public building as the Academy, the Ban’s 
Palace, or maybe even the University building such that the surroundings cause Jelačić’s statue 
to stand in eternal glory.”53  Therefore, the north side of the square should not just look like a 
public building; it should be the physical embodiment of a significant national institution.  
Kršnjavi saw the square as a place that needed to be developed to physically rise up to the level 
the Ban's statue had symbolically elevated it. 
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But as the architects and city planners of Zagreb were re-imaging Ban Jelačić Square in 
response to the monument, the population of the city was re-imaging the meaning of the 
monument itself.  In the decades after the monument was put in place, the idea took hold that the 
statue was installed to face Hungary, 'with the sword pointing at Budapest' among the population 
of Zagreb.54   This view was, on a factual level, hard to explain.  As stated before, it was the 
sculptor, Anton Fernkorn, a German from Vienna, who had specifically requested the statue’s 
orientation be turned to the North because of his desire for the statue to face the ‘liveliest’ part of 
the city.55  But even with this orientation, the statue actually faces more towards Vienna than 
Budapest, as Zagreb itself sits to the west longitudinally of Vienna and the statue faced north, 
with a slight inclination to the east.   
The most basic explanation for this popular interpretation of the placement of the statue is 
based on the configuration of the square itself before the statue arrived.  Up to the 1840s an 
Hungarian custom's office had been located on the north side of the square where the 3% 
Harmicad tax on merchants had been collected.56  But in 1848, all ties to the Hungarian 
administration had been severed and never reestablished.  In a sense then, the statue of Ban 
Jelačić was directly confronting a symbol of Hungarian power, but only in the memories of those 
who had been on the square before 1848.   
The geo-political situation was more complex and dynamic.  The statue was already a 
concretization of the geo-political order of 1848, with Zagreb as the capital of a self governing 
Triune Kingdom.  At the time the statue was being transformed from idea to reality, there were 
signs that those specific relationships might be re-achieved.   In 1866, the Empire was decisively 
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defeated in a war with Prussia, and the last of the Empire’s client states in Northern Italy were 
integrated into the new Kingdom of Italy, ending the Empire’s centuries long effort to maintain 
control of the area.57  This final failure of neo-absolutism resulted in its final dismantlement.  
Initially, the Croatian political elite were hopeful that the end of neo-absolutism would lead to 
the re-establishment of “Jelačić’s Croatia.”58  But by 1866, the year the statue was actually 
installed in Ban Jelačić Square, there were strong indications that the dismantling of neo-
absolutism would result in Dalmatia once again being split off from the rest of the Triune 
Kingdom.59  One Croatian politician, Ante Starčević, argued on the floor of the Sabor that seeing 
Croatia as a Triune Kingdom was endangering Croatia’s political unity, and that the kingdom be 
understood and referred to as simply the unitary Kingdom of Croatia.60  In 1867, the agreement 
between Vienna and Budapest to re-establish Hungary’s position as a self governing state within 
the Empire stripped Dalmatia from Zagreb and put it back under the authority of the German 
portion of the Dual Monarchy.61  In 1868, Zagreb negotiated a new formal relationship with 
Budapest, achieving for Croatia a similar status as that which Hungary had achieved for itself in 
1867.62   
The Nagodba (agreement) between the Hungarian and Croatian governments was 
negotiated by the newly appointed Ban Levin Rauch, the leader of the Unionist Party, and, in 
many ways, took the minimum levels of autonomy that the Croatian elite would accept; an 
independent civil administration, police force, and court system. 63  And though the Ban would 
officially be appointed by the Emperor, in his role as King of Hungary, the Hungarian 
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58 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 258. 
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government was given the power to nominate, thus limiting candidates to those acceptable to 
Budapest.  All real power would rest with the office of Ban, who could directly appoint as many 
members of the Sabor as he wanted, and if that failed to secure a compliant parliament, could 
simply prorogue the Sabor and rule by decree.64  Also, this self governing status only applied to 
Civil Croatia, a fact which denied Zagreb authority over the Military Border as well.65  Thus, 
within two years of the installation of the Ban Jelačić monument the leadership of the Croatian 
national project had suffered a significant setback to their goals of re-achieving the 
circumstances of 1848, but these setbacks could not be put solely on the Hungarians, as the 
Imperial government in Vienna was as much to blame.66   
The response to the Nagodba, in Croatia was very negative.  In 1871, new elections were 
called.  These resulted in a significant victory for the National Party, with the Unionist Party so 
badly defeated it dissolved as a political force.67  The Sabor sent a new delegation to Budapest to 
renegotiate the Nagodba, but no substantive changes were made.68  Later that same year, an 
armed rebellion against the Nagodba erupted in the Military Border, and had to be violently 
suppressed.69 
It was at this time that the idea first emerged that the statue should be seen as 
representing the present political circumstances rather than just the historic moment of 1848.70  
As the architectural historian Olga Maruševski describes the situation: 
Thus, the political passions of the elite, in discussions about the statue, found an 
outlet, relating the events from 1870, in daily fierce anti-nagodba fever.  To 
supporters of the National party the statue symbolized opposition against the 
Rauch nagodba government, and with rightists, for whom their motto was, 
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“neither Vienna nor Budapest,” Jelačić was a symbol of betrayal to the 
homeland…71 
 
Both of these outlooks are intriguing for their inherent contradictions.  The interpretation of the 
Nationalist party’s supporters was understandable.  Jelačić had been a member of the Illyrian 
movement, and the National parties were direct descendants of the Illyrian party.  Yet, while the 
National Party was espousing a Yugoslav perspective on Croatia’s future, a logical extension of 
their Illyrian roots, Jelačić’s loyalty to the Hapsburg dynasty seemed to contradict the parties’ 
viewpoint.  Yet Jelačić’s loyalty to the Empire made him a valuable symbolic asset to the 
Nationalists as well, protecting them from the charges of separatism that the evolving Yugoslav 
idea made very possible. 
The “rightists” were a new element in Croatian politics.  Ante Starčević had founded the 
Stranka prava (Party of Right)72 in 1861, as the political environment was loosening, because of 
disagreements he had with the National Party leadership.73 The name Stranka prava was derived 
from their core philosophy that Croatia should be recognized as a separate kingdom within the 
Empire; this was the “right” which the party stood for, the right to statehood.74  The motto 
“neither Vienna nor Budapest” reflected the party’s view that Croatia should recognize neither of 
these cities as its capital.  Given this outlook, the rejection of the monument of 1848 and Jelačić 
personally seems odd, given that 1848 was the closest Croatia had come to realize the goals of 
the new party.  The party members’ anger seems to have stemmed more from Jelačić’s continued 
support for the Empire once the neo-Absolutist regime was implemented, and the statue 
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celebrating 1848 was, to them, a reminder of all that had been lost, in terms of Croatian 
autonomy, since that time. 
Though the logics supporting each group’s interpretation of the Jelačić monument were 
somewhat contradictory, the emotions that these interpretations produced were intense.   The 
statue became a favored venue for the smotra (exhibition) of traditional folk songs by various 
folk performance groups because it amplified the patriotic character of their choral festivals.  On 
one occasion this provoked a violent response from the pravaši.  During a musical exhibition by 
the groups, Zora (Dawn) and Kolo (Circle) a group of high school students who were followers 
of the Stranka prava that had gathered at one of the cafés on the square became so incensed they 
left the café and disrupted the performance.  This led to a physical altercation in front of the 
statue that required the police to restore order.75  The incident was significant enough that Ban 
Rauch fired two prominent high school teachers who were seen as the leading protagonists of the 
anti-unionist political parties in the schools.76 
Neither of these interpretations of the statue actually reflected any interest in its specific 
orientation.  But in 1874, the new leader of the National party, and recently appointed Ban, Ivan 
Mažuranić, stated that “Jelačić shows the way towards Vienna, extending horizontally his hand 
armed with a Turkish saber…”77  In this statement, Mažuranić was using the statue of the Ban to 
support his personal view that the most advantageous way forward for Croatia was a closer 
association with the German part of the Empire as a way to overcome Hungarian domination.78  
He was presenting Jelačić not as attacking Vienna, but leading Croatia forward towards 
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Vienna.79  But Mažuranić’s views, despite the fact that he was the leader of the National Party at 
the time, were a distinct minority view within the National Party ranks.  His interpretation of the 
statue fit with the physical orientation of the statue’s facing north, towards Vienna, and used it to 
support the political argument he wanted to make.  The fact that Jelačić had in fact led his troops 
in the storming of Vienna and the suppression of a liberalizing uprising which shared many of 
Mažuranić’s own views and goals was simply ignored. 
The setbacks of the Nagodba were partially reversed a decade later when the Hapsburg 
Empire occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to administer the province for the Ottoman 
Empire, and as a result, the justification for the special privileges of the Military Border was 
eliminated; in 1881, authority for the region was returned to Zagreb.80  Shortly after this success 
though, a new challenge emerged to the political aspirations of the Croatian national project.  In 
1883 Count Khuen-Herdervary was appointed Ban.  Khuen-Herdervary was the first Hungarian81 
to hold the office of Ban in many decades, and was appointed as part of a renewed effort on the 
part of the Hungarian government to regain more control over Croatia.82  Khuen-Herdervary’s 
tenure as Ban was a very politically contentious period, and therefore it is not surprising that the 
residents of Zagreb would see their geo-political relationship between Zagreb and Budapest 
displayed in the orientation of Ban Jelačić’s monument during that period of time.  As, Henri 
Napoleon Begouen, a Frenchman who had been in Zagreb in 1887 and 1888 observed of the 
statue:  
“The Ban’s hand lifts the sword and shows his fellow citizens that it is not yet 
time to put it in its sheath for Ban Khuen-Herdervary, the struggle between Croats 
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and Hungarians continues.  This is not like the first bloody battles.  The nation is 
disarmed.  These are political battles.”83 
 
Khuen-Herdervary’s 20 year tenure as Ban combined with the universal unpopularity of the 
Unionist position he represented gave this interpretation time to settle in with the entire 
population of the city, regardless of their specific political affiliation as Nationalists or Rightists.  
Over time this interpretation of the sword as a challenge to Ban Khuen-Herdervary, the agent of 
Budapest’s interests, became conflated with Budapest itself, so that the image in the public 
imagination of ‘the sword pointed at Budapest’ persisted into the twentieth century, and long 
after Ban Khuen-Herdervary had left the city.   
 
Growing into the Metropolis  
Despite these political conflicts, Zagreb as a city prospered in the three decades following 
the installation of Ban Jelačić’s statue.  This growth was significantly assisted by the Hungarian 
government which funded the construction of a rail line from Zagreb to Budapest in1870,84 
which allowed goods from Trieste (Vienna’s main port on the Adriatic) to move to Hungary 
without going through Graz or Vienna.  In 1873 the Hungarian government built a rail line from 
Rijeka to Zagreb,85 thus allowing goods to flow from the Adriatic to Budapest without ever 
passing through the German portion of the Empire.  This rail link created the exact situation the 
Zagreb city planners had been imagining in the early 1860s; it transformed the city into a central 
transportation hub, only not in as complete a way as the planners had envisioned.  Rather than 
Zagreb becoming the hub of the rail-water network interface, it became the connection point for 
two major rail lines.   
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The establishment of the city as a major rail hub, combined with the idea of Zagreb as the 
Croatian Metropolis, amplified an economic cycle of growth for the city.  Capital was attracted 
to the city because of the potential for growth and profit, which was invested to produce 
economic development.  The development created a draw for people seeking to relocate from the 
countryside.  These new arrivals to the city provided both a large labor pool and a demand for 
goods, which made the city an attractive place for further investment by the owners of capital 
looking to generate greater profits.  This cycle of growth was assisted by the emergence of a new 
economic institution in Zagreb at this time; the Štedionica (Thrift or Savings Bank), the first of 
which was opened in Zagreb on Ban Jelačić Square in 1870.86  These new banks catered to the 
general population, rather than the hereditary wealth of the noble class, and meant that the city 
itself could produce and agglomerate capital that would then be re-invested in the city.  The 
result was a dramatic grown, with population of Zagreb expanding from approximately 27,000 in 
1857 to almost 80,000 by the end of the century.87  
This economic growth dynamic also produced enough excess capital to fund the cultural 
development of Zagreb.  As mentioned previously, one of the first new institutions proposed was 
a modern university to replace the Royal Academy.  In addition to the university, an Academy of 
Arts and Sciences was also proposed.  A key protagonist of the realization of both of these 
proposals was Bishop Strossmayer of Đakovo.   Bishop Strossmayer became leader of the 
National Party after Ljudevit Gaj’s departure from politics, and under his leadership the party 
transformed from an Illyrian outlook to a Yugoslav perspective, but he abandoned formal politics 
after he was unable to obtain any significant concessions from the Hungarian government over 
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the Nagodba.88  His departure from formal politics did not stop his efforts at national institutions 
building though.  He continued to work diligently at turning the institutions he was central in 
creating in the 1860s into formal places of learning and academic work in the 1870s. 
Bishop Strossmayer is an important indicator of how deeply the idea of Zagreb as the 
Croatian Metropolis became embedded with the Croatian elite of the time.  He was neither born 
nor raised in Zagreb nor did he reside there permanently later in life.  He had been born in 
Osijek, in Eastern Slavonia, and then resettled in Đakovo after completing his seminary studies 
there, as well as advanced studies in Vienna and Budapest.89  He quickly gained prominence in 
the teaching ranks at the seminary in Đakovo but was also recognized for his organizational 
talents and was chosen to serve in positions of the Church administration in both Vienna and 
Rome before returning to Đakovo as the Bishop.  Strossmayer’s focus on science and learning as 
an important element of the Croatian national project grew out of his own intellectual prowess as 
a renowned theologian, but his efforts at founding the university and the Academy of Arts and 
Sciences show his appreciation for learning beyond theology.  Bishop Strossmayer not only 
worked to see the institutions formally established, but raised a significant amount of the funds 
for the projects, especially the building of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, 
indicating his belief that it was not enough to have these institutions, but that they needed a 
significant physical presence in Zagreb as well. 
In addition to Bishop Strossmayer’s efforts, many other private individuals and groups 
worked to build cultural institutions and javne zgrade (public buildings) to house these 
institutions.  The contrast between these structures and the private houses of the city was 
striking.  The 1857 building code had required that all new buildings in the new part of the city 
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be at least two stories tall, with the capacity to be expanded up to three stories tall.90  Most of the 
new private housing was built specifically to this standard of two stories.  Strossmayer’s 
Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences building, built in 1880, was technically only three 
stories tall, but stood five stories above the ground.  The Museum of Arts and Crafts, built in 
1888 was nearly six stories tall.  These structures dwarfed all but a few of the most lavish private 
residences of the city being built at that time. 
Most of this building was not financed by either the city government or the national 
government, but by private funding.  The city’s main contribution was often just the approval to 
build upon the land on which the buildings would sit, often out of compliance with the building 
code as it applied to private citizens, or transforming the large public squares into physical 
monuments to national institutions.  This public land was part of the fulfillment of the concept 
laid out in the original concept for the new center of the Lower Town.  By 1888, the “two large 
squares” initially envisioned in the 1850s had formally become Zagreb’s “Green Horseshoe;” 
two large multi-block long parks upon which the new physical representations of these cultural 
institutions were located, connected by a large public ‘garden’ at their southern end.91  The result 
was a striking contrast between the private buildings and shops of the city, which were required 
to connect seamlessly in unified fronts directly on the street, and these privately funded javne 
zgrade (public buildings), which sat individually on large blocks of public parkland.92   
On a practical level, these massive public buildings were an extravagance.  Many of the 
organizations that would occupy these institutional palaces had venues already or were 
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functional without the existence of a separate structure. The National Theater did performances 
in a theater in Gornji grad, on St. Mark’s Square.93  The Academy of Arts and Sciences had 
functioned as an institution since its founding in 1866 without a dedicated building.  But the 
construction of the Academy of Arts and Sciences building in Donji grad established a precedent 
for the use of the space, and over time, the city encouraged other institutions to migrate to Donji 
grad as well.94  The result was the nationalization of the new part of the city as the institutions of 
national culture relocated there. 
At the same time these grand public buildings were being constructed in Donji grad, 
another dynamic of city building was underway.  The new building regulations had resulted in 
large hollow blocks, with buildings on the street, but large open spaces known as a dvorište, or 
courtyard behind them.  Within these private and semi private courtyard spaces people could 
build without regard for the regulations.  In 1882 the city enacted new regulations allowing 
temporary buildings but prohibiting permanent construction more than 14 meters deep from the 
front of the main buildings on the street.  As Blau and Rupnik state “The center of the block was 
to remain open green space.”95  But the city’s land owners never considered this a binding 
regulation.  “This specification was generally interpreted as a recommendation rather than a legal 
prescription of the code, and largely ignored.”96  This perception that the courtyard aspects of the 
code were voluntary was reinforced by the fact that this aspect of the building regulations was 
never enforced by the city government.  But, the land owners’ characterization of the courtyard 
restrictions on building as purely voluntary is contradicted by the fact that in 1887 they were 
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officially waived for many civic and religious institutions,97 an act that would have been 
unnecessary had the codes been truly voluntary.  The result was the development of “parallel 
cities,” 98 one uniform and orderly in appearance on displayed for the public, and the other, much 
more individualistic and disorderly, concealed from public view.   
The process of establishing the uniform nature of Donji grad was not only accomplished 
through the establishment of the building regulations and the regulatory plan.  The city 
government took a significant action to ensure that sacred ground did not disrupt the pattern of 
urban development.  Established cemeteries had been a significant issue challenging urban 
development in many European cities.  These places of consecrated ground could not simply be 
built over without offending community sensibilities.  A second and more immediate issue was 
that of the need for more burial space in the city as the population grew rapidly.99  As early as 
1860 the city government sought to solve both of these problems by initiating efforts to establish 
a multi-confessional city cemetery outside of the planned new Donji grad.100  The city also 
passed an ordinance requiring all existing cemeteries be closed and emptied, with their graves 
moved the new location.101  To accomplish this though, the city government needed to find a 
location that would be sufficiently symbolic to justify the efforts involved.   
The location they chose was Ljudevit Gaj’s estate, named Mirogoj, which he had 
established on a hill north of Kaptol.  This estate included a large vineyard and English garden.  
Gaj lived at this estate until his death in 1872.  In 1873 the city bought the land and developed it 
into the city’s new cemetery, opening it in 1876 with the transfer of the graves from other parts 
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of the city.102  There was a certain poetic propriety to the idea that all the people of Zagreb would 
be buried in the very soil that Ljudevit Gaj had cultivated.  But there was also an additional 
outcome to the location of the city cemetery.  For the majority of the city (all the neighborhoods 
except for Kaptol), the most expedient routes to the new location passed through Ban Jelačić 
Square.  The square therefore became a new symbolic gateway; a gateway between life and 
death, which most inhabitants of the city would pass through on their way to their final resting 
place in Mirogoj. 
During this period the city of Zagreb also transformed the city’s fairs into expressions of 
the national project as well.  The annual fairs had diminished as an economic institution as the 
economic situation in Croatia had modernized.  In the nineteenth century the fair was 
transformed into an exhibition, more cultural than economic in character.  Beginning in 1852, 
Zagreb organized trade fairs for Croatia and Slavonia.103  In 1864, the city organized the “first 
Dalmatian-Croatian-Slavonian exhibition,” which was intended to showcase both the economic 
and cultural characteristics of the various parts of the Triune Kingdom.104  This exhibition 
formally established Dalmatian participation in the exhibitions held in Zagreb, and also 
reinforced the city’s claim to the role of cultural center of the entire Triune Kingdom.  The 
participation of Dalmatia in the exhibition also supported Zagreb’s political claims on Dalmatia 
just as it was becoming clear the neo-absolutist order would soon end.    
Despite the success of the first Dalmatian-Croatian-Slavonian exhibition, it was almost 
30 years before another large scale exhibition could be organized in Zagreb.105  In 1891 the 
Croatian-Slavonian Economic Society planned a significant exhibition.  The official reason for 
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the exhibition was the 50th anniversary of the founding of the society.106  But underlying this 
reason was a desire to present a symbol of public dissent against Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s 
Unionist policies with Hungary.  This subtext was demonstrated by the participation of many 
delegations from Dalmatia and Istria in the exhibition, thus challenging the formal political 
separation of those territories.  The point was displayed at the formal opening of the exhibition as 
well, when the song Ljepa naša domovina (Our Beautiful Homeland) was sung for the first time 
as the Croatian National Anthem,107 thus reinforcing Croatia’s status as an independent state 
within the Empire.   
 
New National Theater Building Completed in 1895108 
In 1895 the city built a huge new theatre building to be the permanent home for the 
Croatian National Theatre on the square where the 1891 exhibition had been held across from the 
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new university.109  The building was massive, filling an entire park block by itself.  It was the 
culmination of 50 years of imagining and practical effort dating back to Gaj’s proposal for the 
National Center in the 1840s.  To celebrate the opening of the Croatian National Theater the 
Emperor was invited to formally christen the building and attend the inaugural performance in 
his role as King of Croatia.  Though the trip centered on a significant cultural achievement for 
the Croatian capital city, the Hungarian government in Budapest and their local agent, Ban 
Khuen-Herdervary, planned to use the trip to impress upon the Emperor the extent to which 
Croatia had been integrated into Hungary.110 
For the weeks prior to the visit the planning and preparations for the Emperor’s arrival 
was at the top of every front page of Narodne novine (National News), which was also the 
Službeni list (Official Newspaper) of the Croatian government.111  On the day of the Emperor’s 
arrival in Zagreb Narodne novine published a special front page with blue and red highlighting 
(an exceptional extravagance for the paper) which was dedicated to an open letter of welcome to 
Franz Josef I entitled Živio kralj! (Long live the King!)112.  The first paragraph of this letter was 
an homage to the Emperor and his entourage.  The second paragraph was an homage to Zagreb: 
Zagreb is not just the capital city of the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia; it is 
much more, it is the heart of our nation; it is the origin of all of our national and 
cultural efforts.  That is why every worthy son of [the] ancestors always with love 
thinks, with pride looks on the city of Zagreb;…113 
 
The letter goes on to argue that because of this special role for Zagreb in the national life of 
Croatia, all of the “happiness and glory” bestowed by the visiting delegation on the city and its 
inhabitants was also bestowed on “all of the nation, Croats and Serbs.”  The paragraph 
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concludes: “And those, who have the circumstances of that fortune, with us as one, directly 
bestowed in warm line of this ruler’s blessing, all shall, in these days, in spirit and heart before 
us, in our white Zagreb.”114  Thus, it was in Zagreb and through Zagreb that the glory of the 
Emperors praise would be bestowed on everyone in Croatia.  Croatia had become Zagreb writ 
large.  
 
Conclusions: Nation Building as City Building: City Building as Nation Building 
The first half century of Zagreb as a unified city is a fascinating narrative on many levels, 
but it also provides significant points for illuminating theoretical issues relating to space and the 
constitution, transmission, and contestation of national identity.  Two specific issues are clear 
from the narrative.  The first is how significant the urban center of Zagreb, and its transformation 
into the Croatian Metropolis, was to the Croatian National Project.  The second is the degree to 
which the space of the city of Zagreb itself, and the main square in particular, became important 
spaces which both reflected and informed residents’ understanding of the trajectory of the 
Croatian national project. 
 It is also important to note the extent to which the transformation of Zagreb into the 
Croatian Metropolis was a recursive one.  Bishop Strossmayer’s decision to focus his institution 
building efforts in Zagreb is a significant example of how the deliberate effort to create the 
Croatian Metropolis in Zagreb was central to the nation building project.  Strossmayer was 
neither from Zagreb, nor did he spend the majority of his professional life in the city.  As both 
the head of the seminary and the Bishop of Đakovo, he had distinct personal and professional 
interests in that historic city.  He could have used his position as the leader of the National Party 
to try to shift institutions and resources to his adopted city of Đakovo, but instead, he was 




instrumental in the project that expanded the Royal Academy into a modern University in 
Zagreb, and he was the driving force behind establishing the Academy of Arts and Sciences in 
Zagreb. 
 The institution building efforts of the Croatian national project in Zagreb were supported 
by the effort to symbolically establish the circumstances of 1848 as the natural order of Croatian 
geo-politics.  The city’s main square was already a unique and distinctive space because of its 
size and being a shared space between the two communities of Kaptol and Gradec.  But up until 
this point its symbolic function was only that of a ‘gateway’ into the city; the space though 
which everyone who wished to enter must pass.  Functionally, the square had only been used as a 
market place and occasionally used for public spectacles.  The decision to place a statue of Ban 
Jelačić in the square was a deliberate effort to transform Zagreb into a modern city with modern 
symbolic public monuments, as were present in Vienna.  The decision to monumentalize Ban 
Jelačić and dedicate the statue specifically to his efforts in 1848 clearly was an effort to 
“concretize” that historical moment which was a key element of Croatian national 
distinctiveness. 
The transformation of Zagreb into the Croatian Metropolis was very much a physical as 
well as an institution building and symbolic endeavor.  Beyond Stosmayer’s organization efforts 
as a leader of the National Party in politics, he worked very hard and contributed enormous sums 
of money to the physical building of both the new University and the Academy of Arts and 
Sciences in Zagreb.  The idea of metropolis extended beyond the cultural significance of Zagreb.  
The new urban plan of 1865 was as significant as these physical symbols of national culture.  
This was a deliberate design for a modern Croatian Metropolis, which imagined not just a 
cultural and political role for the city, but a central economic one as well, as evidenced by the 
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new, large rail yard and Sava River port the plan included.  The urban plan of 1865 gave form to 
the modern building regulations promulgated previously and imagined a massive new urban 
space, built in a modern style.  But this modern city was to be connected to the older city through 
Ban Jelačić Square, thus maintaining a continuity of the city in time and space while 
simultaneously transforming it.   
The centrality of the square to the Croatian Metropolis project is evidenced at both the 
imaginary and physical level.  First, the renaming of the square was an important act of 
separation from the Hungarian influence in Zagreb, an act of claiming the square, the center of 
daily life in the city, for Croatia.  The placement of the statue of Ban Jelačić solidified this 
transformation.  These acts did not change the functional role of the square as means of daily 
social reproduction as main market place, but it did elevate the space from a “dirty square” to a 
space that needed to “cause Jelačić’s Statue to stand in eternal glory.”  This ‘nationalization’ of 
the square did not diminish its symbolic function of gateway either, rather it announced to those 
who were ritually obligated to pass through the square upon entry to the city that they were 
entering clearly Croatian place.  The Ban Jelačić monument project was about more that just the 
square; it was also about modernizing Zagreb, even if this modernization was only symbolic.  
The square as linkage point between the two existing elements of the city, Gradec and Kaptol, 
and the imagined new, modern city to be built to the south, embedded the national at the center 
of Zagreb.  Simultaneously, the national square as main market place embedded the nation in the 
practice of daily life in the city and ensured that even as the city grew further and further and 
further from the square, the population would still be drawn to it on a daily basis.   
It is clear that what was understood by the population using the square was not 
necessarily what those who had placed the statue there had intended.  The statue, with its 
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dedication to BAN JELAČIĆ, 1848 was intended to make the statue a permanent reminder of the 
specific geo-spatial order of an autonomous, unified Croatia with Zagreb as its capital.  But the 
population of the city re-interpreted the statue and added to its meaning, transforming it into a 
physical manifestation of not the past, but their present geo-political reality.  The understanding 
of ‘the sword pointed at Budapest’ became embedded in the local understanding of the statue’s 
meaning, despite the fact that the sward did not, in fact, point towards Budapest nor was it ever 
intended that it should be viewed that way by those who created and erected it.  But the 
continued political tensions with Hungary combined with the absence of “official” resistance as a 
result of the political agreement between Croatia and Hungary created a social need for a symbol 
of resistance.  The re-interpretation of the Ban Jelačić monument became a community response 
to the ongoing political friction.   
 
Urban Space as Productive of and a Product of Social Understanding 
 The development of the urban landscape of Zagreb during the period from 1850 to 1895 
clearly illustrates spatiality in action over time.  At the core of this process were two overarching 
efforts to convert an imagined space into a real space.  At the macro level, this was the effort to 
transform the new city of Zagreb into a true Croatian Metropolis.  At the micro scale this was an 
effort to transform the city’s main square into a space that would concretize the historic moment 
of 1848.  But this project resulted in a drive to then raise the physical presence of the square up 
to meet the significance of the monument.  This micro project was an embedded part of the 
greater macro project in that the emplacement of the monument to Ban Jelačić was clearly 
intended to create a physical improvement that would assist in bringing Zagreb up to the cultural 
level of the Imperial metropolis of Vienna.   
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 On a macro scale, the entire Donji grad project was about producing not just a larger city 
but a particular kind of new city.  This was accomplished through the promulgation of the 
regulatronia osnova, which created a regular, modern urban pattern, and the building 
regulations, which forced a particular modern style of architecture to be built within this new 
urban pattern.  As Ivan Rogić has pointed out, this was urban space deliberately designed not to 
reflect Croatian society as it was, but as it should be, and in doing so transform the society 
through the space it inhabited.115  The flush façades of the buildings created an impression of 
both bourgeois equality and uniformity, but with individual distinctiveness.  Yet the regulations 
were also reflective of the bourgeois society which exempted religious institutions and national 
institutions from the requirements imposed on the rest of the society.  But as a lived space, the 
city came to reflect the dualistic nature of bourgeois society as well.  The emergence of the 
‘parallel cities,’ the building of illegal buildings within the courtyards of the city blocks, formally 
prohibited, but also tolerated if it did not breach the façade, was reflective of bourgeois society 
which prized public conformity yet tolerated private deviation provided it remained private.  In 
this way then, Donji grad was a successful transformation of imagined space into a real space 
which did reflect the values imagined by the designers, a modern Central European urban space. 
And yet Donji grad also became an example of re-imagined space enabling the creation of real 
space as well, the illegal courtyard buildings, which reflected a reality that was outside the 
imagined conformity the designers envisioned.   
 All of this new urban space was tied to the national project through Ban Jelačić Square.  
The emplacement of the Ban Jelačić monument had established a prominent physical reminder 
of 1848 at the center of daily life for the city, the main market.  The statue was intended to not 
just transform Zagreb into a modern city, but into a national city as well, one firmly defined as 
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Croatian, by embedding the national moment of 1848 in the routine of daily life.  This marker 
was placed at the center of daily life in the city, so that it became a marker to the population that 
they used to explain their own political circumstances.  Even though the statue was clearly 
defined as a memorial specifically to 1848, the population re-interpreted the statue to reflect the 
continued contentious relationship with Hungary.   
The Ban Jelačić monument once again also illustrates the transformation of imagined 
space, the square as monumental space, into real space, the monument to 1848.  It also shows 
how that real space, once experienced as lived space is redefined by those who experience it.  
The monument, which was envisioned by its advocates as a symbol of the historic moment of 
1848 came to be seen as the symbol of the daily political struggle with the Hungarian 
government.  Though this new understanding of the statue did not result in a change in the real 
space of the square in the same way that the re-imagining of “Lower Town” resulted in the 
“parallel city,” it did transform the imagined space of the square, making it a place reflecting 
popular understanding of the present as well as the past.  This new understanding of the statue 
did change people’s physical understanding of the statue, turning it from Vienna to face 
Budapest, but without physically moving the monument. 
During the period of 1850 to 1895 a key change to the previously established dynamic of 
Zagreb at the center of Croatia took place.  By placing the monument of Ban Jelačić in the main 
square, the leaders of Zagreb had put Croatia at the center of the city.  The central position of the 
square was not just a physical reality, it was a lived reality.  The square was the center of daily 
life in the city, and the presence of the Ban Jelačić monument ensured that Croatia would be 















Contesting the Urban Character of the Croatian National Project:  
Stjepan Radić 1895 - 1935 
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The four decades from 1895 until 1935 saw the emergence of significant contestation 
within the Croatian national project.  This contestation was taking place in a now well chronicled 
context of significant social, economic, and political change in Croatia.  One movement in 
particular became central to this process: the Peasantists.  This movement built up over decades, 
eventually becoming the dominant political party in Croatia and challenging the urban and 
modernizing focus of the Croatian national project. This contestation is an important element in 
this study; it was instrumental in shaping the semiotic qualities of the statue, its encompassing 
square, and other key icons in the city.   What emerges from applying the lens of spatiality to the 
events of this period is how the symbolic power of the square and the Ban Jelačić statue became 
important.  Political acts (i.e., organizing a constituency and structuring a rhetoric) pivoted 
around the use of the square and statue as a central resource.        
 
October 16th, 1895: The Beginning of a New Politics 
The Imperial state visit of October 1895 was intended to be a coming of age for Zagreb; a 
recognition of the city’s development into a modern, Central European metropolis.1  This visit 
was a significant moment for Croatian political development, but for reasons that were not 
anticipated by the organizers of the Emperor’s visit.  In fact, the visit itself progressed as 
planned, beginning with a traditional honored procession from point of arrival, in this case the 
new Main Train Station, at the south end of the eastern portion of the “Green Horseshoe,” then 
through Ban Jelačić Square on to St. Mark’s Square in Gradec.2  On his first evening in the city, 
the Emperor formally opened the new National Theater, helping the Croatian national project 
                                                 
1 See chapter Chapter 4. 
2 "Naputak," Narodne novine, 12 Listopad (October) 1895. 
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realize a five decade-long goal.3  The bulk of the stay was taken up with visiting the many 
cultural monuments that had been built during the development of Zagreb since the 1864 urban 
plan had sketched out the new, modern Lower Town.4 
But the organizers of the visit had also inadvertently created a situation that enabled some 
opponents of Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s regime to stage a dramatic protest.  The government had 
cleared Ban Jelačić Square of market activity.  This action was necessary on a practical level,  
 
Jelačić Square Prepared for the Arrival of Franz Josif 1895 5 
because market activity on the square would have impeded the movement of the Emperor and his 
retinue as it traveled from event to event in different parts of the city.  In addition to the closing 
of the main market, the university was also closed during the visit, to accommodate a planned 
                                                 
3 "Njegovo Veličanstvo Kralj u Zagrebu," Narodne novine, 15 Listopad (October) 1895. 
4 "Naputak." 




event with the Emperor at the university building.6  This meant that one of the most agitated anti-
regime groups, the students of Zagreb University, were free of obligations to be in class.  On the 
15th of October the university students shouted anti-Hungarian slogans along the routes that the 
Emperor was scheduled to travel along escorted by Ban Khuen-Herdervary.7  These efforts, to 
embarrass Ban Khuen-Herdervary, failed to spark any significant response from the government, 
and no action was taken by the police against the students.  
At some point the university students, under the leadership of a former student Stjepan 
Radić, who had previously been expelled for anti-government activity, decided they needed to do 
something more significant to draw attention to their opposition to Ban Khuen-Herdervary and 
his policies of more firmly integrating Croatia into Hungary.  In this desire, the students were 
aided by the fact that the Emperor’s visit was scheduled to extend over the anniversary of Ban 
Jelačić’s birth on 16 October.  The students decided that Ban Jelačić’s birthday presented a 
particular opportunity for action.  Ban Jelačić Square also provided an excellent venue for a 
public demonstration.  Ban Jelačić’s monument was already being interpreted by the city’s 
population as an expression of confrontation with Ban Khuen-Herdervary and the Hungarian 
government in general.8  In addition to this, if the demonstration were properly timed, there 
would be a significant audience who would be present in the square to catch a final glimpse of 
the Emperor in his visit.9  The square and the statue, then, were not innocent sites to conduct the 
rally. Rather, this selection was strategic; seizing upon this space’s recently modified 
                                                 
6 During their trial all the students stated that their reason for being at the university building that day was to attend 
classes, but they discovered on arrival that the doors to the building had been locked. Mirko Mađor, ed., Hrvatski 
Djaci Pred Sudom: Stenografski  Izvještaj o Glavnoj Razpravi Proti Hrvatskim Sveučilištnim Djacima Održanoj 
Pred Kr. Sudbenim Stolom u Zagrebu Dne 11 – 16.  Studenoga 1895. (Zagreb: Dom i svjet; reprint, 1995). 
7 Misha Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 (New York Viking, 2000). @ 
260. 
8 Milica Stilinović, "Tri Francuza o Zagrebu u Devetnaecetom Stoljeću," IZ STAROG I NOVOG ZAGREBA IV 
(1968). cited in Olga Maruševski, Iz Zagrebačke Sponeničke Baštine (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2006). @ 163. 
9 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 @ 260. 
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iconography. Here, it was believed, the most stalwart of nationalist symbols could be used to 
challenge the Hungarian vision of the assimilation of Croatia.   
On the morning of October 16, the students took the flag of the “Student Legion,” the 
regiment of mobilized university students who had fought under Jelačić’s command in the 1848 
campaign, from the university building and marched to Ban Jelačić Square. They arrived there at 
approximately 10:30 in the morning.  Once on the square, which was completely empty of 
merchants due to the holiday declared for the Imperial visit, the students converged at the front 
of the Ban Jelačić monument.  Stjepan Radić then stepped forward and made three short, 
declarative statements: Živo Franz Josip Kralj Hrvatske! (Long live Franz Joseph, King of 
Croatia!)  Slava Jelačiću! (Glory to Jelačić!)  Abcug Mđari! (Hungarians get out!)  Once Radić 
had finished his brief statements, the leaders of the groups raised a Hungarian flag up on the 
points of their swords and set it on fire.  “The entire demonstration lasted no longer than a pair of 
minutes.”10 
This was not a particularly extreme demonstration by Croatian standards, as it was non-
violent.  It was not uncommon for small groups of people to throw stones at police and court 
houses to protest the arrest or trial of friends and family.  Stjepan Radić himself had previously 
done things much more disruptive.  In 1888, he had interrupted a performance of the National 
Theater by shouting an anti Ban Khuen-Herdervary statement in the third act of an opera, an act 
for which Radić was arrested but never charged.11  In 1893, Radić had disrupted a ceremony 
commemorating the 300th anniversary of the Croatian victory at Sisak by shouting down a 
speaker who had spoken positively of Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s tenure, an act for which he was 
charged and sentenced to 4 months in prison as well as being expelled from the university in 
                                                 
10 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 298 
11 Mark Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928 
(Toronto, Buffalo University of Toronto Press, 2000). @ 31. 
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Zagreb.12  This act of political theater in Ban Jelačić Square, by contrast, was relatively non-
provocative, being both non-violent and not having directly disrupted the Emperor’s visit.   
But the political atmosphere during the Imperial visit was “explosive.”13  The 
powerlessness of the Sabor to effectively challenge the new Hungarian program of political 
integration and the degree to which even the governing Narodna stranka (National Part) felt 
compelled to co-operate with Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s regime were key issues frustrating many 
of the university students.14  This drove a large number of the university students to support the 
Stranka prava (Party of Right).15  These longstanding issues were accented by Ban Khuen-
Herdervary’s government, which had taken several symbolic actions that exacerbated the 
situation and elevated tensions as the visit approached.  These actions served to add insult to the 
perceived injury of Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s program of greater integration with Hungary.  One 
of these decisions was to use the Hungarian national colors of Red, White, and Green, and the 
Hungarian national coat of arms, rather than the Croatian tri-color of Red, White, and Blue and 
the coat of arms of the Triune Kingdom to decorate the Main Railway Station and the public 
buildings in the city.16  This decision was compounded by allowing institutions that were 
identified with the local Serbian population in the city to use the Serbian national colors on their 
buildings.17 
The demonstration itself was carefully planned to send a very specific message; one that 
was at once both pro-Imperial and anti-Hungarian, while at the same time touching on the 
immediate controversy surrounding the Emperor’s visit.  To accomplish this, the leaders of the 
                                                 
12 Ibid. @ 35. 
13 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 309. 
14 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 @ 256-258. 
15 Ivo Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). @ 160. 
16 Ivo Perić, Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928. (Zagreb: Dom i Svijet, 2003). @ 96. 
17 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 311. 
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demonstration had chosen the site of the demonstration, their words, and their actions very 
carefully.  Choosing the Ban Jelačić statue and marching under the banner of the Student Legion 
of 1848 were clearly meant to display loyalty to the ruling dynasty, just as Ban Jelačić and the 
students who had served in the Legion had in 1848.  But the flag was also in the tri-color red, 
white, and blue pattern that Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s government had suppressed.  The 
declaration of long life to the Emperor as King of Croatia re-enforced that point in unambiguous 
terms.  The celebratory “Glory to Jelačić!” legitimized the gathering as a celebration of the 
anniversary of his birth, but could also have been taken as a reference to his service to the 
dynasty and his participation in the conquest of Budapest.  It was the final statement that left no 
doubt as to the demonstrators’ purpose.  “Abcug Mđari!” was directed at the idea of Hungarian 
power and influence as it was at any individual Hungarian, but it was also a reference to Ban 
Khuen-Herdervary personally.  The choice of the word abcug was also significant, as it was not a 
Croatian word, but rather German, thus re-enforcing the Croatian loyalty to the German 
Hapsburg dynasty and leveraging Croatia’s past service in an effort to impart an Imperial 
authority to the command “Get out!”18  The burning of the Hungarian flag addressed the issues 
of the day, national colors, as the Hungarian flag was a tri-color of red, white, and green.  
Though the demonstration was well timed for a large audience and well choreographed to make 
a powerful symbolic point, two elements of it diminished its power locally.   
Paradoxically, the choice of venue (ie., the recognizing of its recently ascendant symbolic 
prowess)  also  worked as much against the demonstration as for it.  The circumstances made the 
Ban Jelačić monument a logical choice for the demonstration, both because the demonstrators 
wanted to make a clearly pro-Imperial and anti-Hungarian statement of which Ban Jelačić was 
                                                 
18 The word abcug is not used in Croatian, and contemporary Croatian histories of the incident feel required to 




the perfect embodiment, and because it was the anniversary of Jelačić’s birth.  The statue, ‘with 
the sword pointing at Budapest,’ was already seen as a physical representation of the current 
political situation between Croatia and Hungary.  Yet, that is very possibly why the residents of 
Zagreb saw little remarkable in the student’s actions.  To burn the Hungarian flag at the Ban 
Jelačić monument was to merely bring the popularly understood meaning of the statue briefly to 
life.  In the spatial context of Zagreb it would have been much more shocking to have performed 
the same action in St. Mark’s Square in front of the Sabor and the Banski dvor, the seats of 
legislative and executive power and the city’s traditional site of political demonstrations both in 
support and opposition of the government.   
Additionally, there was nothing shocking about the views of the participants of the 
demonstration.  It was general knowledge at the time that many university students were 
supporters of the Stranka prava and deeply opposed Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s goals of 
integrating Croatia into Hungary.  The students’ efforts at provoking the authorities of the 
previous day may have worked against them as well, further diminishing the shock effect of the 
demonstration.  Consequently, the initial Croatian response was very matter of fact, rather than 
sensationalistic.  The demonstration was reported on the 17th in Narodne novine but on page 5 in 
a small two paragraph news item in the “non-official” portion of the paper.19   A partial reason 
for this restraint may have been the government censors, who refused to let the main opposition 
newspaper, Obzor, publish any word on the incident until after the Emperor had left the city.20  
But it is also important to note that the university students’ actions were as much a demonstration 
against the ineffectual Croatian political elite, which had been unable to get the Croatian national 
colors displayed for the Emperor’s visit, as it was against Ban Khuen-Herdervary. 
                                                 
19 "Spaljena Magjarska Zastava," Narodne novine, 17 Listopad (October) 1895. 
20 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 312. 
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Reaction in Vienna, Budapest, and across Europe was much less subdued.  Hungarian 
reaction was understandable; the demonstration was a clear challenge to their program and an 
effort to embarrass the Hungarian government during the Imperial visit.  Consequently, the 
Hungarian press was outraged by the insult.  But the Hungarians portrayed the demonstration as 
not simply anti-Hungarian, but also as an insult to the Imperial state in the person of the 
Emperor.21  Papers in Vienna adopted a similar attitude, but were much more supportive of the 
Croatian government view of the incident as an aberration and not reflective of general Croatian 
sentiment.22  This was somewhat surprising because, to some extent, the demonstration 
supported elements within the Imperial government who were concerned that Hungarian efforts 
at greater political integration of Croatia into Hungary would lead to unrest and destabilize the 
fragile Hapsburg political structure.23  By the same token though, any toleration of this type of 
symbolic defiance, even if it confirmed concerns the government in Vienna might have about 
Hungarian policy, was dangerous to the regime and could not be taken lightly.  The disparate 
responses between local and outside observers also indicate how different audiences understood 
Ban Jelačić square.  To outside observers, the burning of the Hungarian flag in the city’s main 
square seemed a much more significant act than it did to the local population in Zagreb. 
As a result of the external reaction, the demonstration became front page news in Zagreb 
as well on the 19th of October, when Narodne novine reported on the local and European press 
response.24  Narodne novine then became a major part of the government’s efforts at damage 
control once it became apparent that ignoring the protest would not be effective.  This put the 
paper in an uncomfortable position because as Croatia’s Službeni list the paper was constrained 
                                                 
21 "Demonstracija," Narodne novine, 18 Listopad (October) 1895. 
22 "Ustavan Kralj," Narodne novine, 21 Listopad (October) 1895. 
23 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999  @ 261. 
24 "Opet Demonstratcije," Narodne novine, 19 Listopad (October) 1895. 
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in the editorial positions it could take.  Any strong expression of opinion which contradicted the 
government’s positions put the paper’s role as Službeni list (and its government subsidy which 
went along with that status) in jeopardy.  Yet, as a commercial enterprise, Narodne novine 
needed to cover stories that were of interest to the public, or lose its readership.  As a result of 
this dilemma Narodne novine published nearly daily stories on the political fallout of the 
demonstration, while as the same time arguing editorially that the event was of limited 
consequence.   
Within a matter of days, the local authorities had identified and arrested 54 university 
students who had participated in the demonstration.25  This put Ban Khuen-Herdervary’s 
government in a very inconvenient situation.  The local circumstances called for leniency, as the 
students’ actions were really no more provocative than the general public understanding of the 
Ban Jelačić statue, and there was no real need to cow the Croatian political establishment which 
was already essentially compliant in the Hungarian government’s integration project.  Ban 
Khuen-Herdervary had no desire to make political martyrs out of the students, and yet, failure to 
deal harshly with them might produce the very outcome the students had been striving for; a 
diminishing of his power and prestige within the Imperial hierarchy and possibly even pressure 
to remove him from office.  The Ban chose the concerns of Budapest and Vienna over the local 
situation in Zagreb. 
A month after the demonstration, the students were put on trial for their actions, charged 
with having “committed malfeasance disturbing the public peace and order” by shouting “Abcug 
Mđari!” and burning the Hungarian flag.26  Radić was a lead defendant, listed second in the bill 
                                                 
25 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada.  @ 161. 
26Mirko Mađor, ed., Hrvatski Djaci Pred Sudom: Stenografski  Izvještaj o Glavnoj Razpravi Proti Hrvatskim 
Sveučilištnim Djacima Održanoj Pred Kr. Sudbenim Stolom u Zagrebu Dne 11 – 16.  Studenoga 1895. (Zagreb: 
Dom i svjet, 1995). @ 11. 
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of indictment behind the student who had carried the flag of the Student Legion.   Radić stood 
accused of organizing and leading the demonstrations as well as participating in it.27  He 
confessed to many of the details of the allegations, but denied being the ringleader of the plan 
and burning the flag.28  Radić also strenuously  objected to the phrasing of the charges, 
complaining that they took his statement “Abcug Mđari!” out of context, because his adjoining 
statements of “Živo Franz Josip Kralj Hrvatske! (Long live Franz Joseph, King of Croatia!) and 
Slava Jelačiću! (Glory to Jelačić!)” had not been included, thus leading to a false impression of 
the purpose of the demonstration.29  The trial also presented Radić with an opportunity to make a 
public political declaration, which the court indulged up to a point.  The court was not persuaded 
by Radić’s protestations of innocence and convicted him and almost all of the other students.30  
Radić, as the leader, was given the harshest sentence of 6 months in prison.  Most of the students 
received sentences of 2 to 3 months, but a few of them, including the two sons of one of the 
leaders of the Stranka prava, received more prison time.31 
The trial of the students was of particular interest to the population of Zagreb.  Narodne 
novine published extensive daily accounts of the court proceedings32 and Obzor printed daily 
transcripts of the trial, a unique treatment of court activity at the time.33  Within a month of the 
trial’s conclusion, Obzor, the press of the Narodna straka (National Party) published a detailed 
                                                 
27 Ibid. (reprint, 1995).  @ 13. 
28 Ibid. @ 31-32. 
29 Ibid. @ 34-35. 
30 Ibid. @ 277-285. 
31 Ibid. @ 278. 
32 The daily issues of Narodne novine following each day of the trial (November 11-16 & 21, 1895) carried an 
extensive narrative of the events of the trial. 
33 Obzor published daily transcripts of the trial, which became the source for the subsequent complete transcript that 
was published in Zagreb.Hrvatski Djaci Pred Sudom: Stenografski  Izvještaj o Glavnoj Razpravi Proti Hrvatskim 
Sveučilištnim Djacima Održanoj Pred Kr. Sudbenim Stolom u Zagrebu Dne 11 – 16.  Studenoga 1895. ,  (Zagreb: 
Dionička Tiskara u Zagrebu, 1895). @ Title Page. 
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transcript of the entire trial in Zagreb in book form.34  Despite this intense public interest in the 
trial of the student demonstrators, the Croatian political establishment showed little interest in 
their fate, and generally expressed no support.  This indifference led to a split within the Stranka 
prava, the party most associated with the students before the demonstration, with Dr. Josip 
Frank, the father of two of the students convicted and sent to prison over the demonstration, 
establishing a more radical, dissident branch of the party.35  This split in the Stranka prava, 
though it did not have much immediate practical significance on Croatian politics, did indicated 
the beginning of a significant shift towards a much more contentious political environment in 
Zagreb.  This new, confrontational approach espoused by the Prava strakna prava (True Party of 
Right) eventually led to violent nationalist riots in 1902 and 1903.36  It was in retrospect then, 
that this demonstration took on its significance as a watershed moment in Croatian political 
history, rather than its immediate outcome. 
Despite the interest in the outcome of the events of the demonstration of 16 October, 
1895, public attitude in Zagreb about the social function of Jelačić square did not change 
drastically.  Clear evidence of this is the fact that the violent riots that swept Zagreb in the 
summers of 1902 and 1903 ignored the square as a site because the targets of the riots were 
mainly the city’s small Serb population, and rioters focused on their shops and offices.37  Only 
one group would use the square for overtly political purposes before the end of World War I.  
This group was clearly associated with the events of the first demonstration in the square in 
1895; students and supporters of Radić’s political views.  The student association was natural, 
                                                 
34 Mađor, ed., Hrvatski Djaci Pred Sudom: Stenografski  Izvještaj o Glavnoj Razpravi Proti Hrvatskim Sveučilištnim 
Djacima Održanoj Pred Kr. Sudbenim Stolom u Zagrebu Dne 11 – 16.  Studenoga 1895. . 
35 Branka Magaš, Croatia through History (London, San Francisco, Beirut: SAQI, 2007). @ 362. 
36 Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 @ 263-265. 
37 The 1902 riots had been deliberately instigated by Ban Khuen-Herdervary to enable him to dramatically reduce 
civil government power and enhance his own authority.  The riots in 1903 were calculated to embarrass the Ban by 
showing the government in Budapest that his claims to have calmed the situation by direct rule had failed and were 
intended to lead to his removal from office. 
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but it did not include the square alone, but also the university and was only mobilized once, in 
the summer of 1912 when tensions over the first Balkan War inflamed the already tense situation 
in Zagreb.  The political situation in Hapsburg Empire was already at a high pitch due to very 
deep divisions over social, economic, and political reform.  Despite the persistently tense 
relationship in Zagreb between Croatian and Serb politicians,38 there was a strong sympathy for 
the idea of a Balkan federation which would unite the South Slavic populations once the 
Ottoman presence in the region had been expelled.  One key incident in the string of public 
actions taken during 1912 to pressure the Habsburg government was a middle school student 
strike.  In Zagreb one group of students assembled in front of the university building and then 
marched to Jelačić square to demonstrate thus re-enacting in part the university student protest of 
1895.39  
Stjepan Radić’s relationship to the square was complex.  The burning of the Hungarian 
flag is now viewed as significant because it launched Radić’s political career.  But in his 
autobiography, Radić, makes no mention of the specific location of the incident.  Instead, he 
refers solely to the burning of the flag, and claims he did it “before the eyes of Franz Josef 
I….”40   During the riots of 1902, the incident would be important to saving Radić from an angry 
mob when he sought to protect his Serbian neighbor from violence.  The mob tuned on Radić as 
well until one young man spoke up, saying: “Calm down, this is the Radić who six years ago 
burned the Hungarian flag…”41  This indicates that to Radić, and to the general population as 
                                                 
38 The Hungarian government in Budapest and Ban Khuen-Herdervary had exploited this situation very effectively 
during his 20 years in office. Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 @ 262. 
39 Horvat, Politička Povijest Hrvatska. @ 417-418 & photographic in insert between pages 408-409. 
40 Stjepan Radić, "Moj Politički Životopis," in Stjepan Radić  Politički Spisi  Autobiografija / Članci / Govori 
Rasprave, ed. Zvonimir Kulundžić (Zagreb: Znanje, 1971). @ 61-62. 
41 Stjepan Radić, Politički Spisi  Autobiografija/Članci/Govori Rasprave, ed. Dubravko Jelčić, Hrvatska Politička 
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well, it was the act of publicly burning the flag that mattered, and the location was not 
significant.   
 
Stjepan Radić and the Emergence of a Peasant Based Politics 
In the three decades following the demonstration on Ban Jelačić Square, Stjepan Radić 
would become a pivotal and transformative figure in Croatian politics.  Radić was both a clear 
product of Croatian society and at the same time a rejection of the intensely urban focus of the 
Croatian elite.  He was born in a peasant village, but came to Zagreb to attend Gimnazium (high 
school) in 1883 at the age of 12.  Radić clearly had natural talent in both persuasion and 
leadership.  This is evident from his ability to simultaneously become a protégé of both Ante 
Starčević and Bishop Strossmayer, the two leading nationalists in Croatia, who were at the time 
bitter political rivals.   
Radić was an intense Croatian patriot, but his vision of Croatia was dramatically at odds 
with the image of Croatian national identity that dominated at the time.42  As discussed 
previously, the Croatian national project was intensely focused in, and on, the urban space of 
Zagreb.  Radić, having grown up a peasant, found this focus misplaced.  This is not to say that he 
completely rejected Zagreb.  The city was certainly a critical part of his own awakening sense of 
national identity.  There is no indication that Radić had a particularly strong sense of Croatian 
identity when he arrived in Zagreb as a young boy to attend school in 1883, but by 1888 he was 
willing to risk jail to agitate for the Croatian national cause.  Attending Gimnazium certainly 
contributed to this national awakening, but Radić was attending school at precisely the time 
when Ban Khuen-Herdervary was assuming office, and the Ban’s education policies were not 
                                                 
42 Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928. @ Chapters 
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designed to impart a strong sense of Croatian identity.  Radić’s arrival in Zagreb also coincided 
with a period of intense national institutional monument building.  The Yugoslav Academy of 
Arts and Sciences, the newly established university in Donji grad, and the Hrvatski Sokol 
(Croatian Falcon) gymnasium were all intended to transmit a sense of Croatian national 
achievement and greatness.   
Radić was educated from more sources than his coursework, which is evident by his 
relentless traveling.  During his summer breaks from school in Zagreb, Radić would travel the 
rural regions of Croatia, including Dalmatia, meeting and learning from local people about their 
conditions and circumstances.43  Through his travels Radić came to understand that rural poverty 
was not simply a local condition where he grew up, but was endemic throughout the Croatian 
countryside.  He also concluded that the real strength and power of Croatia was not in the 
metropolis of Zagreb, but in the rural countryside and population, whose customs and traditions 
provided the means to persevere through this privation.  This is where Radić broke with Croatian 
politics and politicians of the time.  Other peasants had risen to public prominence in Croatian 
society, but all had abandoned the countryside in the process.  Radić’s break with one of his 
mentors, Ante Starčević, who was born a peasant as well, had been specifically over this point.  
Radić had asked Starčević ‘who will politically educate the peasants?’ To which, Starčević had 
responded that all the education they needed was in the party newspaper.  When Radić responded 
that this was insufficient because most peasants were illiterate and simply could not read the 
paper, Starčević had responded “Let the peasants go to the Devil or God, I will not teach 
them.”44  This attitude fit the political context of Croatia at the time, where peasants had no vote 
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44 Stjepan Radić, "Najjača Stranka u Hrvatskoj," in Stjepan Radić  Politički Spisi  Autobiografija / Članci / Govori 
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and, in the view of the Croatian elite in Zagreb, contributed little of value either culturally or 
economically to the Croatian national project. 
Radić clearly disagreed with this attitude, but was faced with two significant challenges.  
First was the limited franchise in Croatia, which excluded the vast majority of the peasantry 
though they comprised approximately 80 percent of the population.45  The second challenge was 
that even if the peasants could vote, the vast majority of them had no real political or national 
consciousness.  Thus, as Radić had pointed out to Starčević, the common practice of political 
mobilization in Croatia at the time, through published materials, would have limited effect due to 
wide spread illiteracy among the peasant population.  Radić would have to develop a new form 
of politics to mobilize the peasantry. 
But all of this effort would not begin until years after the demonstration in Jelačić square 
in October 1895.  In the wake of his trial, Radić would spend the next 6 months in jail and then 
begin several years as an expatriate trying to finish his university education, which he finally 
accomplished in Paris in 1899.   He then lived in Prague until the summer of 1900 before 
retuning to Croatia, but not Zagreb.  Radić finally returned to Zagreb just in time to be swept up 
in the anti-Serb riots of September 1902, which resulted in his earning another 4 month prison 
sentence for redirecting an angry mob form attacking his Serbian neighbor to marching on the 
main train station to tear down Hungarian language signs there.46  Despite all these setbacks, 
Radić was able to begin a successful political career after Ban Khuen-Herdervary left Zagreb to 
become President of the Government (Prime Minister) of Hungary in 1903.  Ban Khuen-
Herdervary’s departure resulted in a significant opening up of the political process in Croatia 
with new parties and coalitions developing.  By the end of 1904 Radić was able to found an open 
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political party, the Hrvatska pučka seljačka stranka (Croatian People’s Peasant Party) and 
become an active member of the political process.47  By 1908 the HPSS was able to win seats 
and was present in the Sabor after every election leading up to World War I.48  Even though the 
number of HPSS seats was small, their presence at all was significant given that peasants still 
could not vote.  Therefore, these victories represented members of the elite which Radić, with the 
help of his older brother Antun, who ran the party newspaper, had persuaded to support their 
populist cause. 49 
 It was during this decade before the First World War that Radić and the other leaders of 
the new party, especially his brother Antun, developed the bulk of the Peasantist program.  This 
program was focused on social and economic issues in the countryside, but embedded in the 
fundamental justification of this program was an implicit critique of the overall trajectory of the 
Croatian national project.  Radić’s views on nationalism can be divided into two broad areas; 
Croatia’s place in the community of nations, and the nature of Croatia as a nation.  In both of 
these areas Radić’s views were distinctly at odds with the Croatian national elite of the time. 
 Radić’s view of Croatia within the community of nations was drawn from the views of 
both of his mentors as a young man, Ante Starčević and Bishop Strossmayer, which were 
diametrically opposed to each other.  Starčević had argued strongly for the historic right of 
Croatia to separate statehood.  Conversely, Bishop Strossmayer had been an advocate of the 
concept of Yugoslavianism, which called for a broader, South Slavic state in which Croatia 
would play a key role.  Within the Croatian elite, Yugoslavianism was justified under a principle 
termed narodno jedinstvo (national unity), which was generally agreed to mean that the Slavs of 
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Croatia and Serbia were all part of the same larger Narod (nation or people), but had become 
culturally differentiated through their more recent political histories.50  Radić’s approach to the 
issue was to make both arguments simultaneously.  He accepted the concept of narodno 
jedinstvo.  But he also argued that this situation did not call for a unitary South Slavic state, but 
the exact opposite.  Radić argued that the recent historical experiences had created a separate 
živo pravo (living law) for the Croats and the Serbs.51  Radić argued that Croats, having lived 
within the Hapsburg Empire had developed a European political culture, which differed 
significantly from the Serbs, who had been under Ottoman rule for 500 years, then achieved their 
independence through armed rebellion and created their own political institutions.  To Radić, 
these differences were irreconcilable, and as a result, though Serbs and Croats were one nation, 
they would require two state structures to accommodate this fundamental difference in political 
culture between them.52  This did not preclude a Yugoslav state in Radić’s view, but rather 
required that any Yugoslav state recognize and accommodate these fundamental differences.  
But Radić was very skeptical that such a Yugoslav state could be organized, and therefore 
supported Croatia’s continued association with Austria-Hungary, though under a completely 
reorganized structure where Croatia would become one of five equal state members within a 
federal structure based on democratic governing principles.53 
 Radić’s views on Croatia as a nation were more central to the Peasantist program.  
Though Peasantism clearly had a social justice foundation in the desire to improve the social and 
economic condition of the peasants of Croatia, that social justice goal was in pursuit of a 
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nationalist one.  This fact was a reflection of how Radić came to politics as a student in Zagreb, 
inspired by nationalist fervor and anger over the failure of Croatia’s political elite to effectively 
defend the national project from Hungarian efforts to constrain it.  Peasantism emerged therefore 
as a solution not just to the poverty of the countryside, but as a solution to the weakness of the 
Croatian national political establishment as well.  As Radić stated in an early essay, “Our 
present-day misfortune is truly a national misfortune.”54  
 The first challenge for Stjepan Radić was arguing for the existence of a relationship 
between the peasantry and the national project in Croatia.  It would be hard to overstate the 
extent to which Croatian society of the pre-World War I period was bifurcated between the rural 
and urban.  As Radić himself stated: “In Croatia even a foreigner notices at first glance that there 
are two peoples here: the gentlemen and the common people.”55  By gentlemen, Radić was not 
referring to a status of birth, but rather “Everyone who wears a black coat…”56 or essentially, the 
educated urban population of Croatia.   The key to becoming a ‘gentleman’ in Croatia at the time 
was education.  Men of peasant birth, such as Ante Starčević, could rise to the highest levels of 
Croatian society if they could become educated and find a place for themselves within the urban 
economy, the imperial bureaucracy, or the artists and wordsmiths of Croatia, especially in 
Zagreb. 
Urban centers in Croatia, Zagreb in particular, were experiencing a period of significant 
growth and expansion, along with the integration of new technologies, which created the sense of 
an ever improving standard of living.  In contrast, the effects of economic and social 
modernization were causing intense hardship in the countryside.  This economic hardship was 
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evidenced in the large numbers of Croatian young men who left the countryside looking for 
work.  The low level of industrialization within Croatia limited the jobs available within Croatian 
towns and cities, so many of these men were forced to travel all the way to the United States to 
find urban employment.  Between 1880 and 1914, an estimated 400,000 Croats emigrated to the 
United States.57   This number is somewhat staggering given the total population of Croatia at 
the time was approximately two to two and a half million.58  The vast majority of these 
emigrants were young men, and over half may have returned to Croatia eventually, but the 
impact was still significant in the countryside.59  The result was general insulation of Croatian 
urban society from the economic hardship in the countryside.  Radić, though, was deeply aware 
of the economic circumstances in the countryside which were driving emigration, having both 
seen it personally in his traveling as a student, and having written his doctoral dissertation in 
Paris on the phenomenon of Slavic emigration to North and South America.60 
By 1895 Zagreb was seen by the Croatian elite as “the heart of our nation” and “the 
origin of all of our national and cultural efforts.”61  The Peasantists rejected this view and argued 
the exact opposite.  To the Peasantists, it was the peasantry who were “the only true 
representatives of Croatdom”62 and the true bearers of Croatian national culture.63  This culture 
was embodied in a “village society” which bound all the people of the countryside, regardless of 
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their actual economic status, into a single peasant community.64  The Peasantists based their 
argument on the very simple reality of numbers.  The peasantry was over 80 percent of the 
population of Croatia.  It was impossible to have a true national project that failed to recognize 
the culture of the vast majority of the population.65  Radić went so far as to argue that because of 
this disparity, “we Croats still are not a real nation.”66 
But Radić’s Peasantist program was not a class war against the “gentlemen” of Croatia.   
In the Peasantist view, the Croatian nation would not be fully realized until the gulf between the 
urban “gentlemen” and the peasantry had been bridged, and the two groups merged, or as his 
brother Antun stated: “that from the gentlemen and the peasants we finally form a nation.”67  To 
accomplish this did not mean tearing down the urban class of “gentlemen,” but socially raising 
up the peasantry and transforming the countryside into an area as economically viable as 
Croatia’s urban centers.  Radić blamed the current situation not on the urban elite, but rather on 
capitalism, 68 and a specific segment of the urban elite, the Jewish population.69  This approach 
allowed Radić to absolve the vast majority of Croatia’s urban population of responsibility for the 
economic and social conditions of the time.  This allowed for an ideology that called for 
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embracing the elite, without compromising with those he viewed as responsible for the current 
conditions.   
In making this argument for unity with the urban population the Radić brothers faced 
some resistance from many of the members of their own party who, understandably, resented the 
contempt for the peasantry the “gentlemen” of Croatia publicly expressed.  One incident in 
particular illustrated this tension.  In 1909 an HPSS delegate proposed that Zagreb should not be 
used as a venue for the party’s congress in the future because of the disrespect the urban 
population had had shown the Peasantist delegates.  Stjepan Radić acknowledged the legitimacy 
of the delegate’s complaint, but rejected the call to abandon the city.70   
Ultimately then, the Peasantist approach was one which sought to preserve the 
countryside and “village society,” but not in a reactionary sense.  There was no desire to see a 
return to the feudal structures that had existed previously, but preservation in the sense of 
protection from further harm.  In fact, some of the Peasantists’ goals, such as the extension of the 
franchise to the entire population, were considered very radical within the Empire.  The leaders 
of Croatian Peasantism did not make this argument on the basis of social justice, but on the basis 
of national necessity.  Without action, they argued, the economic privation in the countryside 
risked damaging the true foundation of Croatian national culture, the peasantry and their way of 
life.   
   
The Great War and the End of an Empire: 1914 to 1918 
 Despite the conflagration that engulfed Europe in the late summer of 1914, the period of 
the First World War was locally very peaceful in Zagreb.  Unlike the pro-Serbian agitation that 
had existed in 1912, prior to and during the First Balkan War, there was little reaction in Zagreb 
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to the events of the late summer of 1914.  The Croatian population accepted the Hapsburg 
government’s argument that this war was forced on the Empire by Serbia’s support for the 
assassination of the heir to the Imperial throne in Sarajevo by the Serbian nationalist group the 
Black Hand.  Radić himself argued in the HPSS newspaper Dom “that Serbia, Russia, and France 
had provoked the war and that the monarchy could not lose, for its peoples were united behind 
the war cause.”71  Those prominent Croatians who disagreed with Croatian support for the war 
effort left almost immediately after war was declared.72  In general the Croatian population 
supported willingly, and in some cases enthusiastically, the war effort, and Croatian units fought 
as reliably as any other soldiers in the Imperial Army, and often with distinction.73  As the war 
dragged on some students did stage demonstrations, but these were small and scattered around 
the city, and none produced significant or mass support for an anti-war moment.74   
 By 1917, though, some Croatian politicians, including Stjepan Radić, had abandoned 
support for Imperial victory, and were calling for an armistice to end the war, which appeared to 
promise only endless stalemate.75 In mid September of 1918 the political situation in the 
Hapsburg Empire entered a period of crisis. On the 14th of September the Imperial government 
had offered an armistice to end the fighting.76  One week later Allied forces, mostly Serbian and 
French, attacked north out of Salonika (Thessaloniki) in Greece and the Empire’s Bulgarian 
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allies defenses’ on the southern front failed to contain them.77 As the negotiations dragged on 
through the next few weeks the local governments within the Empire began staking out their 
positions for the post war period.  In the first week of October the politicians in Zagreb came to 
agreement on the formation of a Narodno vijeće (National Council) government, and a special 
session of representatives of the various parties was called to convene in the Sabor in Zagreb 
from the 17th to the 19th of October, to formalize the formation of the new government.78  On the 
19th of October, the final day of the meeting, this Sabor declared the formation of a Narodno 
vijeće for the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.79  This action was a response to the 
United States’ President Woodrow Wilson’s publicly espoused principles for ending the war, 
which included the principle of National Self-determination as a key element of a post war 
international order in Europe.80  Under such a settlement as President Wilson was proposing the 
Slavs of the Hapsburg Empire would have, at the least, significant self government, if not 
outright independence.81  A vigorous Yugoslav effort had been underway since early in the war, 
and the Allies had already committed to some form of Yugoslav state after the fighting ended.  
The political leadership in Zagreb was not party to these efforts, being part of the Central 
Powers.  Therefore, the effort to establish a new political reality in the form of their own 
Narodno vijeće was an effort by the government in Zagreb to have some meaningful input on the 
future political structure before the fighting ended.  
 The creation of the Narodno vijeće was not a declaration of independence from the 
Empire, or even a commitment to seek independence.  The Narodno vijeće was a declaration of 
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sovereignty, with Zagreb asserting the right to speak for all the Slavs of the southern part of the 
Empire.  By declaring the political community of the Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs 
the Sabor was speaking for peoples without reference to precise territory, which was an 
important vagueness, as Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, had consented to participate, and with 
it the “German” portions of the old Triune Kingdom.82 The new Narodno vijeće was also 
recognition of the reality that the process of governance within the Empire was failing, and that 
local governments were going to have to assume responsibility for their own day to day 
governance.83  The new Narodno vijeće changed little in the daily life of the population though. 
Given the somewhat modest degree of actual impact the declaration of the Narodno 
vijeće government made in the daily lives of the people of Zagreb, the population’s response was 
still dramatically supportive.  As word spread the on the 21st of the Sabor’s actions people 
gathered in St. Mark’s Square outside the Sabor to show support for their decision.  By evening 
approximately 20,000 people had gathered, packing the square and the streets approaching it.  
The crowed expressed their support for the Sabor’s actions by singing patriotic Croatian songs.84  
This expression of national sentiment was not limited to the crowd on the square.  At the café 
Corso, the Croatian patrons confronted a group of ‘German’ officers who refused to stand when 
the crowd began singing the unofficial Croatian national anthem.85   
Spurred on by events in Prague, where the Czechs had declared independence the 
previous day, the Sabor declared formal independence on the 29th of October, 1918.86  Once 
again, a huge crowd formed on St. Mark’s Square, but this gathering was not as spontaneous as 
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the gathering on the 21st.  The Sabor’s intentions to declare independence were reported by the 
Zagreb press the day prior.87  This declaration of intent was an extremely practical matter 
because there were a significant number of important issues that needed to be settled, such as the 
loyalty of the Hapsburg Army regiments stationed in the city, to ensure that the formal 
declaration of independence did not spark uncertainty or violence.   
 
 
The Proclamation of Liberation 29 October 1918 in Zagreb 88 
 
The Narodno vijeće’s efforts for a peaceful transition were generally successful in 
Zagreb, but the uncertainty about the future and meaning of current events produced widespread 
unrest in much of Slavonia and the Italian Navy began seizing coastal towns and raising the 
Italian flag to lay claim to the territory.  And despite the implications of the declaration of 
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statehood, the Narodno vijeće government in Zagreb was already in negotiations with the 
Serbian government in exile about unification and the formation of a Yugoslav state of some 
kind.  The delayed formal announcement of independence was barely in time to be meaningful, 
as the Hapsburg Empire collapse the next day, with Hungary engulfed in revolution.89 
In contrast to the strong support the urban population showed for the new government in 
Zagreb, peasants in the countryside demonstrated and in some cases rioted against local officials 
in communities throughout Zagorije, north of Zagreb, and Slavonia to the east.  These acts were 
not support for the new “revolutionary” national government, but were against the fact that the 
change in government had in fact resulted in no change in local policies.  The Narodno vijeće’s 
decision to continue the administrative practices of the old Imperial order temporarily until the 
political situation stabilized caused significant disappointment in peasant communities.90  By 
mid November the countryside was roiling, with provincial officials reporting that peasants 
“refuse to till their fields, because they are saying ‘we have enough for ourselves, let the 
gentlemen die.’”91  Despite these disturbances and specific requests for troops to help keep order, 
the Narodno vijeće keep their soldiers in their barracks and waited for the arrival of Serbian army 
units moving north through Belgrade and into Croatia to restore order if necessary.  
Political tensions rose in Zagreb as well in November as negotiations over the unification 
of the new Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs continued with the Royal government of 
Serbia (which had only been able to return itself from exile in early November).  The declaration 
of independence from Austro-Hungary had created political chaos in Zagreb as all the political 
parties in Croatia had spent decades developing programs and platforms for Croatia as part of the 
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Empire.  Independence had made almost every party’s political program obsolete overnight.  
Stjepan Radić came out against a quick unification, and called for Croatia to be organized as a 
sovereign republic.92  This attitude was at odds with most of the political class in Zagreb, who 
were willing for, and some even hopeful of, some form of unification provided the terms were 
reasonable.  Radić’s stand on unification also fueled suspicions that he was somehow involved in 
fomenting the peasant unrest.  On 20 November a large group of supporters of unification with 
Serbia and Montenegro demonstrated at Radić’s book store just off of Jelačić square93 while 
another group demonstrated in front of the Sabor on St. Mark’s Square demanding Radić’s 
arrest.94  Radić’s objections to the incorporation of Croatia into Yugoslavia were technical 
though, rather than ideological at this point.  The rush to unification and the unclear nature of the 
state structure that would emerge from the unification project were, in his view, a flawed process 
which would eventually lead to a fatally flawed state.95  He argued that Croatia should not join 
Yugoslavia without a clear agreement on basic issues before hand, including recognition of some 
form of Croatian state autonomy within the new ‘Yugoslav’ Kingdom. 
By the end of November, the negotiations between the Narodno vijeće in Zagreb and the 
Serbian royal government reached a level of resolution to allow for the declaration of a new 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes on the 1st of December, 1918.  In contrast to the 
previous declarations of sovereignty on the 21th of October and independence on the 29th, there 
were no mass gatherings to celebrate the announcement.   In practical matters the declaration in 
fact changed nothing locally; the Narodno vijeće in Zagreb continued to govern.96  Daily life did 
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not change at all.  The announcement of the new state did resolve the political uncertainty about 
the future, but it would be weeks, if not months, before the two states would be unified in 
practical ways.   
 
Jelačić Square as a Political Space in a Time of Crisis 
Jelačić square had evolved into a potent political space rife with nationalist meanings 
since the construction of the Ban Jelačić statue.  At the end of World War I the first overt use of 
the square for political purposes occurred on October 22, 1918 and involved Stjepan Radić.  
Despite the fact that it was a Tuesday, a normal work day, the population of Zagreb treated it as a 
holiday in the wake of the announcement of the new Narodno vijeće government, with many 
people not going to work or opening their offices and shops.  Approximately 30,000 people 
gathered in Jelačić square, where several politicians addressed the crowd, including Radić.  The 
gathering on the square was not the actual venue for the demonstration, but a staging area.  Once 
the leaders had spoken, the crowd marched to St. Mark’s Square carrying the flags of various 
South Slavic nations to show support for the new Narodno vijeće government and the Yugoslav 
project.97 
On the 24th and 25th of November, the HSS held a large meeting in Zagreb to deal with 
the pressing issues confronting the party.  At the meeting, Radić came out strongly against quick 
unification with Serbia and for the formation of a Croatian republic which could then later be 
integrated into some form of Yugoslav federation.  At the conclusion of the meeting, Radić led 
the 2,300 attendees in the singing of the national anthem, then Radić led a peaceful 
demonstration which consisted of marching from the meeting hall to Jelačić square shouting 
various slogans such as “long live the Yugoslav republic”, “long live out brother Serbs” and 
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similar calls of long life to the other Slavs of the former Hapsburg Empire.  Once on the square, 
the party leaders stood in front of Jelačić’s monument, where Radić and another leader gave brief 
speeches then led the party members in singing patriotic songs.98  The march and the gathering at 
the Jelačić monument were essentially a re-enactment of the events of 23 years earlier when 
Radić had led the university students to the same spot to challenge Hungarian dominance in 
Croatian politics.  That event was seen as the beginning of Radić’s political career.  This new 
gathering in front of the Jelačić monument was a symbolic re-launching of Radić’s career in a 
new political era which was devoid of the question of the relationship with Hungary. 
The final political use of the square occurred a week and a half later.  On December 3rd 
and 4th pro-unification activists staged small demonstrations around Zagreb to show support for 
the new Yugoslav state.99  These demonstrations provoked the only incident of direct combat in 
Zagreb during the entire period of World War I and its immediate aftermath.  On the afternoon of 
the 5th of December, soldiers from the former Hapsburg 25th and 53rd infantry regiments, which 
were now in the service of the Narodno vijeće government, marched out of their barracks in the 
western part of the city in uniform and under arms, including several heavy, crew served 
machine guns.100  As the soldiers moved east, into the center of the city, they were confronted by 
a group of “armed sailors” (possibly from a group of sailors who had arrived in Zagreb on the 3rd 
of December with a “Yugoslav” Admiral).101  The first confrontation took place at the 
intersection of Frankopan Street and Ilica, where the sailors attempted to block the soldiers from 
advancing further into the city.  After the soldiers fired into the air, the sailors withdrew and the 
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soldiers continued marching into the heart of the city.102  At this point, the soldiers had the 
option of moving north along Mesnička, which would have taken them directly to St. Marks 
Square and the seat of the Narodno vijeće government, or continuing down Ilica, which would 
take them to  Jelačić square.  The soldiers took the second option, arriving at Jelačić square 
shortly there after.103  Because of the time of day, the market had already closed and the square 
was open for them to gather, though there were still many people there at the tram stop and at the 
several cafés located on the edge of the square.    Before the soldiers arrived at the square 
though, the group of “armed sailors” had occupied two of the buildings on the square.  How 
gunfire erupted is not clear,104 but a gun battle ensued, resulting in 13 dead and 17 wounded 
among the Croatian soldiers and civilians, and the rest of the soldiers dispersed.105  At first the 
events were reported as a “Bolshevik uprising”106 but that claim quickly collapsed as more 
information was discovered.107  The more information that developed though, the less clear the 
actual cause of the events became.  The only clear consequences of these events were the 
disbanding of the former Hapsburg regiments in service of the Narodno vijeće government108 
and an increase of support for Radić and his idea of a sovereign Croatian republic.109   
Each of these three events on the square during the politically charged period at the end 
of World War I showed how it was transforming into not just a national space, but a political 
space as well.  Though Radić himself had essentially opened the square up as a political space 
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with the burning of the Hungarian flag, it was only mobilized once between 1895 and 1918.  Yet 
in the 6 weeks between the end of October and the beginning of December, 1918, the square was 
used three times for political mobilization.  Of the three efforts to mobilize it, two were directly 
connected with Radić as well.  The first efforts seems to have been based on the potential for the 
square as a political space, but due more to its centrality to daily life in the city.  The march on 
October 22nd appears to have been organized very hastily, and in such a situation setting Jelačić 
square as the gathering point would help ensure the largest possible crowd for the subsequent 
march to St. Mark’s Square. 
In contrast to the first effort, the second mobilization, the march to the square of the HSS 
delegates, led by Radić personally at the conclusion of the party congress, was a planned piece of 
political theater. It carried many symbolic messages.  By, in essence, reenacting the events of 
1895, Radić was reminding the population of Zagreb that he had risen to prominence as a young 
nationalist leader, not a Peasantist.   The changes to the previous demonstration on the square 
were also significant. By leading HSS delegates in the singing of nationalist songs in front of the 
Ban Jelačić monument, Radić informed the “gentlemen” that the Peasantist delegates were 
Croats first and Peasantists second.   
The event also struck at a fundamental inconsistency of the urban-centric nationalism of 
the Zagreb elite.  From the time of the Ban Jelačić monument’s instillation in the square, folk 
performance groups in traditional peasant dress had sung in front of the statue at their periodic 
smotra (exhibitions) of folk culture.  These performances had always been seen as expressions of 
patriotic fervor.  The Peasantists delegates’ performance implicitly asked how people dressed as 
peasants singing peasant songs could be part of national culture and inspire patriotism, yet, real 
peasants were not thought of as part of the nation.  But the event was also targeted to some extent 
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at the HSS delegates, many of whom had spent little, if any time in Zagreb.  The performance in 
Jelačić square introduced these delegates to the nationalist habitus of the city.  This was then an 
effort by Radić to bridge, though practice in space, the urban-rural divide in Croatian society, 
even if in a minor way. 
The final effort to mobilize the square, the march of the Narodno vijeće soldiers on 
December 5th, is the most curious.  It has never been clearly established what the goals of the 
Narodno vijeće soldiers were.  The leaders were later charged and convicted of planning a coup 
against the Narodno vijeće,110 yet if that was their intent, then the decision to go the square 
would seem to be based on something other than the logic of such an effort.  It is clear that the 
decision to gather in the square was meant as a political statement.  This would indicate that the 
choice of the square demonstrated a sympathy for Radić’s ideas, as he was the most significant 
political figure most directly associated with the square and had just re-established that 
association less than two weeks earlier.  It is also significant that even if the soldiers had been 
intent on staging a coup against the Narodno vijeće government they chose to go through Jelačić 
square first.  The square was not on any direct rout between the soldiers’ barracks and St. Mark’s 
Square where the government was located.  This indicates that the square had become a 
politically significant space that needed to be engaged for this political action to be successful. 
 
Croatia in Yugoslavia 
With the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Zagreb entered a 
new, and uncertain, set of political and economic relationships.  Politically, the new state was 
already organizing on a centralized structure around the Royal government in Belgrade.  As a 
result, Croatia lost many of the political privileges of self government that it had, at least 
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formally, possessed in the Hapsburg Empire.  The much broader franchise in the new Kingdom 
also put many of the Croatian political parties at a disadvantage, because they had little 
organization or experience in political organization or communication with the general public 
outside Croatia’s cities and towns.  This shifted a significant amount of political power out of the 
urban centers and into the countryside.  The result was a dramatic increase in political power for 
Radić’s HSS111 with the party wining 50 of the 93 seats for the constitutional assembly allocated 
to Croatian areas of the new Kingdom in the 1920 elections.112  The wake of the election victory, 
Radić formally changed the name of the party from the HPSS (Hrvatska pučka seljačka 
stranka/Croatian People’s Peasant Party) to the HRSS (Hrvatska republika seljačka 
stranka/Croatian Republic Peasant Party) in December of 1920.113  It did not pass unnoticed that 
the new name of the part, the HRSS, included the letter R, which many saw as not just a 
reference to Radić’s idea of republic, but to his own name as well, which brought the name of the 
party closer to the popular reference of the HSS as “the party of Radić.”114  
Radić’s new political success was initially limited mostly to the countryside.  The HSS 
received just under 7 percent of the vote in Zagreb.115  Radić’s initial resistance to unification 
clearly cost the party many votes in Zagreb in 1920, even though the idea of a Croatian republic 
within a larger Yugoslav state was not a total rejection of unification. The Croatian urban elite 
were very ambivalent about the Yugoslav project.  Croatian national thinkers going all the way 
back to Ljudevit Gaj had been pan-Slavic in their outlook.  As discussed previously, the Croatian 
urban elite in Zagreb was therefore both intensely patriotic for Croatia, and simultaneously very 
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pro-Yugoslav.  In contrast to the urban population, many of Radić’s peasant followers viewed 
support for Yugoslavia as a rejection of Croatia. One leader of the HSS lamented in 1920 “After 
the revolution [prevrata, 1 December 1918] everyone in the city of Zagreb became a Yugoslav.  
The peasant world has remained Croat.  The Croats have become for our gentlemen a tribe.”116    
The political growth of the HSS was nearly destroyed before it really started.  In 1920, a 
peasant revolt swept the Croatian countryside because of a disastrous miscommunication 
between the central government in Belgrade and the rural population of Croatia over the 
registration of draft animals for potential military service.  Many HSS party members were 
implicated in attempting to organize local spontaneous uprisings into a formal armed 
rebellion.117  Radić avoided being tied to the revolt because he had already been jailed for “anti-
unification” statements before the uprisings began.118  The uprising sowed deep doubts within 
the governing elite in Belgrade, the capital of the new Kingdom, as to the trustworthiness of not 
only the HSS and the Croatian peasantry, but of the Croatian political elite in general who some 
believed had “behaved disloyally during the crisis.”119   
This distrust was reciprocated by the Croatian elite towards the government in Belgrade 
because of the Kingdom’s response to Italian claims to Istria and the Dalmatian coast.   Italy had 
been promised all of Istria and most of Dalmatia by Britain and France in 1915 to enter the First 
World War on their side.120  At the end of the war, Italy had occupied much of the territory they 
had been promised, and the city of Rijeka (Fiume), the terminus for Croatia’s rail network with 
the Adriatic Sea.121   Over the next two years, Italy and the new Kingdom negotiated off and on 
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to resolve the dispute, but the advantage was distinctly with the Italians, as the Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes simply did not have the military capacity to use force to eject the 
Italian troops.122  The new government in Belgrade finally surrendered all of Istria, several 
Dalmatian islands, and the city of Zadar to Italy in December of 1920, but in exchange Rijeka, 
would become an independent international city.123   
Though this resolution appeared to be a compromise which restored most of Dalmatia 
and half the Dalmatian Islands to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, the loss of 
sovereignty over Rijeka held real economic peril for Croatia, and Zagreb in particular.  Rijeka 
was Zagreb’s only direct outlet to the Mediterranean, and thus represented the capability to 
export directly to any country with a harbor.  The loss of Rijeka meant that any exports from 
Zagreb to Central or Western Europe or the Americas would have to go through Austrian, 
Hungarian, or Italian territory, with each nation capable of putting tariffs on the goods and 
putting them at a distinct price disadvantage on the international market.  Croats feared this 
would dramatically slow industrial development.124  In practical terms the compromise was not 
as great as it seemed.  The Italian nationalist Gabriele D’Annunzio had seized the government of 
Rijeka by force in September of 1919, declaring Rijeka a free city state and establishing himself 
as dictator.125  As part of the agreement, Italy removed D’Annunzio’s government and replaced 
it with a regime less flamboyant, but even more compliant to Rome, so that Rijeka was 
technically independent, but for all practical purposes existed under Italian sovereignty.126 
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Map of the Treaty of London and Final Resolution of Dalmatian Territorial Boundaries127  
 
The process of writing a constitution for the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes began in the immediate wake of the resolution of the confrontation with Italy.  In fact, 
the Constituent Assembly held its first meeting on the 12th of December, shortly after the 
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Kingdom announced the agreement with Italy.131  Between December of 1920 and June of 1921 
the elected delegates worked to produce a draft constitution.  But the process proved very 
divisive, as a slim majority of the 419 delegates put together a document that established a highly 
centralized state structure, with very little power or authority vested in the lower levels of 
government.132  Radić’s response to the direction the constitutional assembly was taking was to 
first draft a memorandum to the Alexander, the Prince-Regent, in February demanding 
concessions towards a decentralized state, and, when that failed to produce any reaction, to draft 
his own Constitution of the Neutral Peasant Republic, which he proposed would apply only to 
the former Hapsburg territories of Croatia and Slavonia.133  By 12 May, all the main Croatian 
political parties had walked out of the Assembly.134   
Despite the absence of 99 delegates, the Assembly approved the centralist outline of the 
constitution the same day that the last of the Croatian parties walked out.135  By early June more 
delegates had walked out for various ideological reasons as individual articles were submitted to 
a vote.  By the time the final vote on the completed draft of the constitution was taken 161 
delegates were no longer participating in the Assembly.136  The final vote was scheduled for the 
28th of June, Vidovdan (St. Vidus Day) a day a specific significance to the Serbian population.  
Vidovdan was the anniversary of the battle in 1389 which had crippled the medieval Serbian 
Kingdom.  In case there was any confusion about the symbolism of the passage of the new 
constitution on Vidovdan, the official paper of the Narodna radikalna stranka (National Radical 
Party) or NRS which was a new incarnation of the older Serbian Radikalna stranka, and one of 
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the main forces behind the centralist effort stated it clearly in an editorial: the events of St Vidus 
Day 1921 had “restored an empire to us.”137 
The loss of Rijeka in the territorial dispute with Italy and the Vidovdan constitution 
seemed to many in Croatia to validate Radić’s skepticism about quick unification.  This, 
combined with Radić’s leadership in advocating for the defense of Croatian interests drew more 
support for the party from the urban population as well.138  As a consequence the HSS continued 
to improve its electoral strength, though many of the party’s new supporters voted out of 
nationalist sentiment, rather than a belief in Peasantism.  As a result of the parliamentary 
elections of 1923, Radić’s party was not just the largest party in Croatia, but the second largest 
party in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as a whole.139  The HSS repeated its strong 
performance again in the elections of 1925, despite the fact that Radić and most of the leadership 
of the party were in jail for the party’s decision to join the Krestintern (Peasant International), a 
Peasantist organization analogous to the Comintern (Communist International), and also based in 
the Soviet Union.140  The party’s continued electoral strength persuaded the government in 
Belgrade to abandon their efforts to suppress the party, and later that same year the HSS became 
a key partner in a government with the NRS that included 4 HSS members as cabinet ministers, 
and eventually Radić himself joined the cabinet.141  The Radical Coalition government ended 
1927, and Yugoslav politics became even more dysfunctional.142   At the end of 1927, the HSS 
formed a coalition with the Independent Democratic Party (Samostalna demokratska stranka, 
SDS).143  This new coalition, the Peasant-Democratic Coalition (Seljačko-demokratska koalicija, 
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or SDK) was significant because the SDS was predominantly a Serbian party from the former 
Hapsburg portions of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.144  This meant that the HSS 
efforts to resist the strong central government model of the Vidovdan constitution could no 
longer be attributed to just the Croats, but was now an ideological divide of federalism versus 
centralism which crossed national lines.145  This new ideological divide had a distinct geographic 
and historical element as well, as the SDS was based in areas formerly under Hapsburg authority.  
The new coalition also gave Radić, as the leader of the new SDK, the opportunity to aggressively 
seek votes in predominantly Serbian districts because the new coalition was no longer an 
expressly Croatian party.  The formation of the SDK had the potential to fundamentally change 
the political dynamic.  In February of 1928, King Alexander offered Radić the opportunity to 
form a government, which would have made Radić the Prime Minister, but negotiations between 
the various parties failed.146   
In June, 1928 a Radical Party deputy shot five HSS deputies on the floor of the 
parliament in Belgrade, killing two and wounding three, including Stjepan Radić.147   
News of the attack sparked violent riots in Zagreb.148  When Radić arrived in Zagreb after his 
release from a Belgrade hospital he was greeted as a national hero.  In the wake of the 
assassination attempt, however, Radić never recovered from his wounds and died in Zagreb on 
the 8th of August, 1928.149   
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The Magnificent Celebration for S. Radić and his Comrades in Zagreb 150 
 
 
Croatian Sokol (Falcon) Horsemen Leading the Funeral Procession for Stjepan Radić154 
Radić was buried in Mirogoj cemetery after a funeral procession in which approximately 60,000 
people participated while another 150,000 lined the streets of Zagreb from the “Peasant House” 
                                                 
150 "Veličanstveni Doček S. Radića i Drugova u Zagrebu," Svijet, 14, VII 1928. 
154 "Veličanstven Sprovod Stjepana Radića," Svijet, 18 Kolovoz (August) 1928. @ 166. 
168 
 
where his body had laid in state to the cemetery, which included a passage along both the south 
and north side of Jelačić square.155 
Radić’s death did not end his impact on Yugoslav politics.  On the 1st of December, 1928, 
the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Kingdom, Croatian students staged a demonstration 
at the ceremonies to celebrate the event in Zagreb.  The students used three black flags, a 
traditional act of mourning, with each representing a separate event.  The first was for the 
founding of the state which the events were meant to celebrate, the second was to mourn the 14 
people killed on Jelačić square on the 5th of December, 1918, and the third was for Stjepan 
Radić.  In the rioting that ensued, three students were killed.156  One month later, the King 
abolished the 1921 Vidovdan constitution and disbanded the parliament, establishing a Royal 
Dictatorship in response to the collapse of political discourse.  In abolishing the constitution, the 
King also formally changed the name of the state from the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  A main goal of these efforts was to silence the most 
extreme nationalist groups on all sides and allow time for the raw wound of Radić’s 
assassination to heal.  As a result, many of the more extreme nationalist politicians left the 
country to live in exile.157   
The Royal Dictatorship did not end the nationalist politics in Yugoslavia.  Once in exile 
the nationalists began to organize as expatriate movements.  In Zagreb, this was manifested in 
acts of political violence against the Yugoslav regime organized by an expatriate organization 
calling itself the Ustaše.  These violent attacks spurred a strong reaction from the Yugoslav 
security apparatus, resulting in arrests of many prominent political figures that were suspected of 
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sympathies with the expatriates.158  In 1934 a coalition of these expatriate movements succeeded 
in assassinating King Alexander on a royal trip to France.159  Rather than enhancing the image of 
the expatriate nationalists though, the assassination resulted in a demonstration of the deep 
affection Croats had for King Alexander as a person, if not for Yugoslavia as a state.  Over 
200,000 Croats paid tribute to the slain monarch by coming to view his body while it lay in state 
for three days in Zagreb.160  This number is significant as it represented such a large portion of 
the Croatian population at the time, and indicates that almost the entire population of Zagreb, 
approximately 100,000 people, as well as many people from the sounding area, were willing to 
wait for hours to pay their respects.  If the Ustaše had believed their act would be lauded in 
Croatia as justice for the murder of Stjepan Radić and they would be seen as the avengers of 
Croatia’s wounded honor, they were clearly mistaken. 
 
Conclusions 
In analyzing Radić’s political goals and his impact, it is critical to understand the 
centrality of Croatian nationalism to his outlook.  He was, very clearly, a nationalist before he 
was a Peasantist.  In fact, his Peasantism was an outgrowth of his nationalism, a way to solve 
what Radić viewed as the crisis of the Croatian nation.  The social justice elements of Peasantism 
were not ends in and of themselves; they were a tool to be used in solving the national crisis in 
Croatia by resolving the crisis in the rural economy.  One could argue that this nationalist 
element was a veneer necessary to gain access to the Croatian political structure of the time, 
which was focused on issues of nationalism, but Radić’s own biography challenges this line of 
argument.  Though mobilizing the peasantry into the political process was important to him from 
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a young age, this initially manifested itself in trying to engage them in the nationalist cause.  
Radić was recognized and followed as a leader of the university students in Zagreb, not for calls 
of social justice, but for calls of action to confront Hungarian authority and the further 
integration of Croatia into Hungary.  The actual tenets of Croatian Peasantism would not be 
developed until a decade after Radić had become a national hero for leading the protests on Ban 
Jelačić Square in 1895. 
 Though the HSS did well as a political party once universal manhood suffrage became 
law in Croatia, it had little support in Zagreb itself.  The growth for support of Radić’s party after 
1920 in the urban centers of Croatia was due to his fierce efforts to protect Croatian national 
interests, not a groundswell of Peasantist sentiment.  Throughout the Yugoslav period, Radić was 
much more engaged in questions of Croatian national interest than in the Peasantist cause.  This 
was not because he preferred nationalism over Peasantism, but rather because the political 
conditions of the time put nationalist issues at the forefront.  In this way, Radić did bridge the 
urban-rural political divide, but not by creating a national consensus on Peasantism, but rather by 
deferring the issues of Peasantism until more immediate questions about Croatia’s place within 
the community of nations had been addressed, in particular, its place within the Yugoslav 
project.   
 Radić’s desire to bridge the gulf between the dynamic urban society of Zagreb and the 
struggling rural society of the Croatian countryside was clearly deep and sincere.  This goal was 
also a reflection of the two strains of his politics; Croatian Nationalism and Peasantism.  Zagreb 
was the core of the Croatian national project and where Radić himself had become an ardent 
nationalist.  Radić also had experience with the ambivalence of Zagreb’s urban society towards 
peasants.  The city looked down on the countryside with distain, but Zagreb society also 
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embraced individual peasants who came to the city for education, such as Radić’s older brother 
Antun, who had come to the city a peasant boy to attend school and been appointed to the faculty 
of the University of Zagreb when he completed his studies.   
For Radić, the challenge was to persuade Zagrebites to accept the countryside and the 
peasantry in the abstract as they had already proven they could accept some peasants on an 
individual level (provided the individual proved they could contribute to society in a cultural or 
economic way).  The key to this would be convincing urban society that the countryside and the 
peasantry as a whole did contribute culturally and economically to Croatian society.  On the 
other side of this equation, Radić faced the challenge of establishing a sense of nationalism 
within the peasantry themselves.  Given that the peasantry’s main concerns centered on their 
difficult economic situation, any call to nationalism would have to require little from them 
materially to find any receptive ears.  Radić’s solution was simple and elegant.  By locating the 
national character in the peasantry and “village society,” Radić asked nothing from the peasantry 
than that they continue to live their lives, while simultaneously providing the social contribution 
of the countryside to the Croatian national project. 
Though this approach of arguing for a social balance between the urban and the rural on 
the one hand, while placing no material demands on the countryside fit the challenges of 
nationalizing the peasantry well, it did not garner significant support in urban Croatian society, 
as it was a fundamental rejection of the Croatian metropolis vision of the nation.   Radić’s 
general indifference to urban issues was understandable.  Compared to the countryside, urban 
Croatia, and Zagreb especially, was thriving economically and culturally, and therefore seemed 
to him to demand little attention. Yet, this indifference to the city was is some ways only 
superficial.  Radić was a product of Zagreb as much as the countryside and he understood the 
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city’s importance to the national elite, as illustrated by his refusal to allow the HSS to abandon 
the city despite the abuse the party delegates received at the hands of the city’s population.  To 
abandon Zagreb would have been to abandon Croatia in the minds of the national elite. 
 Radić’s commitment to keeping the HSS congresses in Zagreb was an example of one of 
his most unique attributes among his contemporaries in Croatian politics; and understanding of 
the political power of symbolic space. Radić’s own biography was tied directly to Zagreb and 
Ban Jelačić square as much, if not more, than to the Croatian countryside.  It was his exploitation 
of the symbolic power of the Ban Jelačić monument and the square that had catapulted Radić to 
prominence with the general public in Zagreb, and it was this space he had used to re-launch the 
Peasant Party in 1918 after the collapse of the Hapsburg Empire.  This understanding of the 
power of symbolic space may have been intuitive rather than intellectual, as Radić never actually 
mentioned Ban Jelačić Square when referring to the incident, and the choice of the square as the 
site of the demonstration in 1895 was as much a product of a confluence of circumstances, such 
as the coincidence of the 16th of October being the anniversary of Jelačić’s birth and the square 
being a venue for the Emperor’s promenade that day.  
In this context, Radić’s two political uses of Jelačić square were strategic and planned but 
in very different ways. The choice of the square as a venue for the 1895 demonstration was 
centered on the desire for the largest possible audience for the act of burning the Hungarian flag.  
The fact that the Ban Jelačić monument provided an opportune frame for the event on the 
anniversary of Jelačić’s birth was a stroke of luck for the students, but not a central focus of the 
event.  The choice of the statue as a venue for the flag burning seems to have been defensive, 
allowing the students to declare their loyalty to the Imperial system while simultaneously 
rejecting Hungarian efforts at political assimilation.  What transformed this act from a university 
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students’ prank into a major political event was less the act, than the reaction by outsiders.  
Absent the broader European response and the pressure from Vienna and Budapest, Ban Khuen-
Herdervary was poised to let the incident pass into obscurity.  But the trial and the prison 
sentences of the students fractured the passive Croatian political elite and catapulted Radić to the 
status of a national in Zagreb. 
The demonstration in 1918 with the HSS delegates was distinctly different.  Though the 
event took a very similar form to the 1895 demonstration -- a street march to the Ban Jelačić 
statue -- there were key differences.  In 1895, the statue had been a venue of opportunity, but in 
1918, it was clearly chosen for its symbolic national value.  The Peasantist delegates singing of 
patriotic songs at the monument brought the contradictions of the Croatian Metropolis model of 
national development into sharp focus.  Radić’s demonstration was a direct challenge to the 
Croatian political elite, implicitly asking them how they could claim to be the nation’s leaders 
when they ignored 80% of the nation’s population.  But Radić’s demonstration was not an angry 
or confrontational march on St. Mark’s Square, the clearly recognized space for public political 
action: it was a mobilization of the urban elites’ own use of urban space for evoking national 
sentiment, Ban Jelačić statue as site of singing patriotic songs.  By 1918 Radić understood how 
the national character of the square and statue could be used to symbolically leverage a political 
argument. 
The decision to bury Stjepan Radić in Mirogoj cemetery can be seen in the same light.  
The lavish funeral procession followed by the interment of Radić in Zagreb’s main cemetery 
illustrated the degree to which the city had come to embrace him as a nationalist leader.  It tied 
the countryside to Zagreb in a very deep, emotional sense.  But the practical effect was also to 
reinforce the Croatian Metropolis vision the city of Zagreb had cultivated because the burial of 
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Stjepan Radić as a national hero transformed Mirogoj into a Croatian national cemetery in the 
imagination of the entire population of Croatia.   
Ultimately, the urban population of Zagreb could not embrace Stjepan Radić so 
completely without also embracing some elements of his Peasantism, but it would be almost a 
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 In contrast to the intense contestation in the political arena in Croatia between 1895 and 
1935, the process of urban development followed an uncontested trajectory of modernization.  
But this was a modernist building project attuned to the possibilities of etching into the city 
fabric resonant representations of Croatian national identity.  The previous crafting and symbolic 
coding of the square and the Ban Jelačić statue as its centerpiece was a poignant development for 
the Croatian Metropolis project. As I chronicle in this chapter, the subsequent modernist city 
building project sought to build on this.  A flurry of new development and restructuring that I 
detail in this chapter can be seen as inspired by the success of the physical and symbolic 
producing of the square. Physical and symbolic changes, not surprisingly, also included 
continued modernization of the square. 
 
Zagreb as the Growing Metropolis 
Just as during the 1850 to 1895 period of urban development, the growing level of 
political tensions between 1895 and 1914 did not seem to negatively affect the city’s growth.  
The city continued to build, but in many cases the building was upward instead of outward as 
older buildings were improved or completely replaced with taller, more modern structures.  This 
vertical expansion was the result of a combination of several factors, including advances in 
architectural design in the city, a growing bourgeois with financial resources to afford larger and 
more elaborate construction, and a change in the local governmental structure which limited the 
city government’s authority to regulate land outside the city proper. The city added two 
significant palaces of national culture in Donji grad.  The Art Pavilion, located south of the 
Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Science, was completed in 1898.  Part of the pavilion had been 
used in the Croatian Pavilion at the Hungarian Millennial Exhibition in Budapest in 1896, and 
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then transported by rail to Zagreb.1   The National and University Library was completed in 
1913, and sat at the southern end of the western leg of the “green horseshoe.”2  The city also 
modernized by building of a system of public transportation using first horse drawn, and later 
electric trams.  Economically, the city also began building a significant industrial base.  In 1885 
the city had only 19 total “industrial enterprises;” by 1910 the number had grown over 500% to 
108. But this industrialization process was still in its early stages, as even by 1910 the industrial 
labor force only made up approximately 8.3% of the city’s total population.3 
Ban Jelačić Square was very much a microcosm of the city in all these regards.   One 
architectural historian of Zagreb referred to the square in the period up to 1895 as a place of 
“Palaces, Shops, and Banks,”4 but that is even more descriptive of the period between 1895 and 
1914.  Though one large mansion was built on the north side of the square in 1889, the rest of the 
houses there, though they were large by comparison to many houses in the rest of town, were 
hardly palatial.  By 1914 though, almost all the older houses had been replaced on the square by 
new multi-story buildings with elaborate façades.  Not all of these buildings were private 
residences.  In this way, the square reflected the very mixed use of urban space in the city.  In 
fact any single building would often have a shop or café on the ground floor with a mix of 
private apartments and offices on the upper floors.  The significant exceptions to this pattern 
were the financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies, which often occupied 
their own buildings.  The element of the economic fabric of the city not specifically represented 
in the square was the industrial sector, but that component was present indirectly with the 
                                                 
1 Ivo Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada (Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006). @ 171. 
2 Ibid. @ 191. 
3 Percentages derived from data in tables 3 & 4 in Jack C. Fisher, "The Continuity of Urban Patterns under 
Socialism: The Yugoslav Experience" (Syracuse University, 1962). @ 74 & 76. 
4 Olga Maruševski, Od Manduševca do Trga Republike (Zagreb: 1987). @ 44. 
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installation of tram tracks in 1892 and then overhead electric wiring when the tram system was 
converted from horse to electric power in 1910.5   
In 1907, a significant modification was made to the square which both modernized it, and 
emphasized the statue as a central feature of the square.  Asphalt was laid on it and a pedestrian 
island was built on the southern portion of the square on either side of the Ban Jelacic 
monument.6  The result was to give the square a more dynamic and user-integrated presence, 
while focusing people on the square even more directly towards the statue.  At the same time, 
this change was necessary because increasing population density was leading to increased traffic 
density in both trams and private vehicles on the square.  As the trams took up space private 
vehicles had used on the street at the south side of the square, those vehicles needed a place to go 
that would not block pedestrian access to the trams when they arrived.  The pedestrian island 
created a space where people could enter and exit the trams on the northern track without 
interference from horse drawn and motorized carriages.  But to make the new traffic system on 
the square work, the Manduševac Well was removed and paved over on the square’s eastern 
side. 
None of these changes affected the square’s role as the city’s main market space, but 
planners were also thinking about changing this aspect of the square as well.  The square, as the 
linkage point between the older and newer parts of the city, was a significant point of 
intersection for the city’s traffic pattern.  The presence of the city’s main daily market there was 
beginning to impede that function.  As both the size and density of the population grew in the 
city, the number of merchants, and consequently the amount of space they occupied on the 
square, grew along with the number of vehicles trying to use the square to get from one part of 
                                                 




the city to the other.  In 1908 Victor Kovačić, a rising star in the Croatian architectural 
community, developed various plans for the regulation of the eastern side of the square, the 
neighborhood of Dolac (just north of the square), and Kaptol.  One of these plans called for two 
new market spaces, one north and one east of the square,7 which would allow for moving the 
merchants off of the square and freeing it up for the free flow of vehicle traffic.   
Another subtle change in the square at this time was its emergence as a symbolic 
touchstone of all aspects of life, which was deeply connected to Croatian geo-politics.  This new 
symbolic dynamic for the square was exemplified at the end of World War I, when the square 
was used by the local media to illustrate concern over the deteriorating social order in the city.  
In October of 1918 the newspapers carried daily stories of armed robbery, assaults, and even an 
occasional home invasion.  On the 26th of October Obzor reported “…one merciless event, which 
may have heavy consequences, and used as an illustration of the contemporary era.”8  The 
incident was the non-fatal shooting of a waiter at a café on Jelačić square.  The attack seemed to 
have no reason or cause.  Given the daily reports of crime in the city, with armed robbery 
becoming a daily occurrence, this event seems unremarkable.  But the fact that the attack had 
happened at a café on Jelačić square represented an emergence of random, potentially deadly, 
violence into the daily life of the entire city.  Though random violence was a fact of life through 
out the city during the crisis days at the end of World War I, it was not until this even on the 
square that the urban society of Zagreb recognized the threat to social order such violence posed.  
Up until this event, individual acts of violence were acknowledged, yet the broader pattern was 
ignored.   
 
                                                 
7"Regulacia Zagreba," Svijet, 12 Ožuljak (March) 1927. 
8 "Pucao na Konobara," Obzor, 26 Listopad (October) 1918. 
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Zagreb as a Yugoslav City 
Within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Croatia had always been a peripheral part of the 
Hapsburg economic structure.  Croatia in general had been of little concern to the Hungarian 
government’s plans for economic development.  Zagreb’s industrialization and urban growth had 
been primarily the product of  local investment and neither of the two rail lines running through 
the city had been built to service Zagreb and integrate it into the Imperial economy, but rather to 
establish links between the German part of the Empire and the Sava River port town of Sisak, or 
between Budapest and the Dalmatian coast.9  Zagreb had therefore been something of a laggard 
in economic development compared to the core of the Hapsburg lands.  In the new Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes though, Zagreb was one of the two most industrialized cities with 
more capital at its disposal than the new capital city of Belgrade.   
The city’s relative economic strength was demonstrated early on, when the banks in 
Zagreb effectively ignored the new Central Bank in Belgrade and established their own methods 
of investment and debt refinancing.10  By 1926, just seven years after unification, Zagreb had 
four times as many industrial enterprises as Belgrade and twice as much capital at its disposal.11  
With all of the new capital available in the city, a new wave of construction and modernization 
began in earnest.   
One of major modernization projects was focused on moving the city’s main market off 
of Jelačić square.  The city government decided to implement part of Victor Kovačić’s 1908 plan 
which called for a new market in the Dolac neighborhood.  This was not just a new market 
square, but a space intended to allow the main market to move off of Jelačić square.  In order to 
                                                 
9 Jack C. Fisher, "Urban Analysis: A Case Study of Zagreb, Yugoslavia," Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 53, no. 3 (1963). 
10 John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country 2nd ed. ed. (Cambridge, New York 




provide sufficient space for the same number of merchants in a location less than half the size of 
Jelačić square, the market would be built on two levels, one a standard open air market square, 
and the other a modern, enclosed market below.   
 
Artist Conception of the Dolac Market Square as Approved for Construction12  
The Dolac neighborhood was the perfect location for such a market, as it was built on the hillside 
leading up to Kaptol, which allowed for a design in which people could enter the lower market at 
ground level from the south, and the upper market at ground level from the north and east.  
Construction on the new market began in 1926 and when it was completed in 1930.    The 
consequence of building the market though was the destruction of the Dolac neighborhood.  
Dolac had been an area of mostly small private houses on a few short, winding, narrow roads 
                                                 
12 "Novi Trg na Dolcu," Jutarnji List, 7 Veljače (February) 1926. 
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with a small square of its own.  The new market had removed the center of the neighborhood.  
But that was not the only effect; many of the rest of the houses had also been removed and 
replaced with modern multi-story buildings similar to those in the rest of Donji grad.   
There was a significant amount of privately funded modernization taking place on Jelačić 
square itself as well.  In 1925 the southern portion of the Gradske Šedionice (City Savings Bank) 
building was completed.  In 1929 one of the more famous houses on Jelačić square, Hatzova 
kuča (the Hatzov house) in which a local landmark, Velika kavana (the Great Café), had been 
located since 1863,13 was torn down to make way for a modern seven story hotel.14  Now, this 
richly symbolic square was to carry the clear imprint of architectural modernity.  The changes to 
the appearance of the square were not limited to new construction.  Many of the older elaborate 
façades from the historicist period were replaced with starkly un-elaborate modernist ones.  The 
completion of the Dolac Market in 1930 ended the role of the square as the city’s main 
marketplace, and only a limited number of venders who could fit onto part of the pedestrian 
island around the Jelačić monument were allowed to operate on the square. 
To some in Zagreb, the Dolac market project was merely a first step in the transformation 
of the older parts of the city in the immediate vicinity of Jelačić square.  Early in 1927 Croatian 
magazine Svijet (World) published an article ostensibly about the challenge of managing the 
exploding growth Zagreb was experiencing, but the core of the article was actually about the 
situation in the city center.15  
Dolac is already half demolished, yet we don’t see that the city is doing anything.  
The beautiful plan of architect Kovačić looked at the regulation of Kaptol, Dolac, 
and Vlaška street was received 15 whole years ago by the city leaders, but today 
no one thinks about it. Dolac and Tkalčićeva are the ugliest parts of the city, and it 
                                                 
13 Olga Maruševski, Iz Zagrebačke Sponeničke Baštine (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2006). @ 155. 
14 "Kronologija Trga Republike u Zagrebu." 
15 "Regulacia Zagreba." 
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has been 20 years since the destruction of the Bakačeva tower, and Kaptol still 
stands crippled and unspeakable today...16 
 
This critique echoed Iso Kršnjavi’s critiques of the plans for the development of the north side 
of Ban Jelačić Square five decades earlier.  Kršnjavi had argued that simply allowing new 
building was not enough, but that the plans for urban development needed to be meaningful.17   
This critique by Svijet was similar, in that is attacked the failure to modernize some areas, such 
as the rest of the Dolac neighborhood and Tkalčićeva street, while simultaneously criticizing 
what it considered a failed improvement, the removal of the fortifications directly in front of the 
Cathedral (the Bakačeva tower) in allow easier access for the general populations.  
 
Cathedral Prior to the 1880 Earthquake18  
The ultimate focus of the article was on a proposal to remove a collection of buildings 
just northeast of Ban Jelačić Square, between the square and the Biskupski dvor (Bishop’s 
Castle) which surrounded the main Cathedral in Kaptol.  The Cathedral had been a particular 
                                                 
16 Ibid. @ 218. 
17 Olga Maruševski, Iso Kršnjavi Kao Graditelj (Zagreb: Društvo Povjetničara Umjetnosti SR Hrvatska, 1986). @ 
228. 
18 Rudolf Horvat, Prošlost Grada Zagreba (Zagreb: Hrvatski Rodoljub, 1942). @ X. 
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focus of improvement beginning in 1880, when a strong earthquake had seriously damaged the 
structure.  The current Cathedral had initially been built in the thirteenth century, and then heavy 
stone fortifications built around it in the sixteenth century.19   
 
Rebuilt Cathedral 190520 
After the earthquake severely damaged the structure, it was rebuilt, but in a Baroque 
style, reflecting the patterns of spatial power within other Hapsburg city of the Empire.21  As the 
city’s population expanded dramatically, the Cathedral became a popular venue for Catholics 
within the city.  The fortifications presented a significance impediment on two levels.  First, they 
                                                 
19 Josip Bilić, Hrvoje  Ivanković ed., Zagrebački Leksikon A-Lj, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod 
Miroslav Krleža, 2006). @ 478 & 485. 
20 Horvat, Prošlost Grada Zagreba. @ XII. 
21 Franz A. J. Szabo, Gary B. Cohen, ed., Embodiments of Power: Building Baroque Cities in Europe, vol. 10, 
Austrian and Habsburg Studies (New York: Berhahn Books, 2008). 
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significantly restricted access to the Cathedral itself, making it difficult for parishioners to enter 
and leave.  Additionally, the high walls blocked the public view of the elaborate Baroque façade, 
defeating a significant part of the reason for using this style in the first place.  As a result, the 
portion of the fortifications, known as the Biskupski dvor because it also housed the office of the 
Bishop, and later the Archdiocese of Zagreb, directly in front of the Cathedral had been removed 
in 1906.22  
Svijet published two plans, Kovačič’s pre-war plan from 1908, and a new one designed 
by Svijet itself.  Kovačič’s plan for Kaptol was part of an integrated concept including the Dolac 
market.  It called for a wall of large archways that would replace the wall section removed in 
front of the Cathedral, as well as build a similar arched wall to recreate the old walled city 
boundary between Kaptol and Ban Jelačić square, but made no significant changes to the 
surrounding streets.   
        
Comparison of the Kovačić (left) and Svijet (right) Plans for Kaptol and Vlaška Street 23 
                                                 
22 Josip Bilić, ed., Zagrebački Leksikon A-Lj. @ 486. 
23 "Regulacia Zagreba." @ 217. 
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The Svijet plan was much more ambitious than the primarily cosmetic changes proposed by 
Victor Kovačić.  The Svijet plan called for a dramatic change to the local area by removing an 
entire block of private property in order to create a new public park just south of the Biskupski 
dvor, and opening up a direct view of the Cathedral from Ban Jelačić Square.  Rather than 
recreating the historical separation between the ecclesiastical enclave of Kaptol, and the 
commercial part of the city, as symbolized by the old Harmica, now Ban Jelačić Square, Svijet’s 
plan sought to visually integrate Kaptol into the space of the square.   
 
 
Artist’s Rendition of the Svijet Plan for Kaptol as Viewed from Jelačić square 24 




But rather than acknowledge these significant differences between the plans, the writers at Svijet 
sought to portray their plan as a true fulfillment of Kovačić’s vision. 
How well we know from conversations with Kovačič, his main idea was to close 
off Kaptol and the church on all sides so that it evoke in the viewer a picture of 
medieval works, such as the church once was the most beautiful palace in Zagreb: 
the archiepiscopal palace rid of all development so that throughout his door he 
could have an unobstructed view.  This is what our picture shows.  From Jelačić 
square  it would be possible to see the entire palace and the entire park before the 
castle.25 
 
To support this interpretation, it was necessary to argue that all of Kovačić’s plans and writings 
reflecting this aspect of his vision had been lost, but that the intent could be derived from his 
other plans and writings.26  Thus, the writers of Svijet transformed Kovačić’s vision of a Kaptol 
returned to its historical isolation from the rest of the city, into a justification for visually 
integrating it into Ban Jelačić Square, while simultaneously removing another block of 
disorderly individual housing plots from the center of the city and replacing it with orderly 
public space. Another significant public modernization project involved removal of the city’s 
main hospital on the southwest corner of Ban Jelačić Square, with the intention of replacing it 
with a modern hospital building in a new location elsewhere in the city. The hospital itself was 
over 120 years old and was clearly in need of replacement or significant modernization. 
In October of 1927 Svijet published a proposal to use part of the land for a new City 
Council building which would be built on both sides of Ilica, the main commercial street leading 
into the square from the west.27  One feature of this proposed building was a multi-story 
connecting segment with 5 arches across Ilica which would resemble a gateway, thus 
transforming the square from an imagined gateway into the city into a real, if only symbolic, one.  
But this plan never gained sufficient traction, possibly because it did not take full advantage of 
                                                 
25 Ibid. @ 218-219. 
26 Ibid. 
27 "Predlog za Gradnju Gradske Vijećnice u Zagrebu " Svijet, 15, Listopad (October) 1927. 
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the significant rise in commercial value to the land the hospital occupied.  Instead the city 
developed a plan which called for transforming the hospital plot into an “endowment block” 
which would then be sold to a developer to pay for the building of the new hospital.28  
 
 
The Proposal to Build a City Hall in Zagreb29 
In 1930 the City Regulation Office held a competition for a plan to build on the 
“endowment block.”30    One entry, by prof. arh. Drago Ibler, called for a tower or Neboder 
(skyscraper) centered between two smaller buildings on the south side of Ilica.  The concept of a 
tower was not unique to this design.  In fact several entries in the competition had envisioned a 
tower either on the north side or the south side Ilica.  Several of the entries had also proposed a 
multi-story “gate” like the one published in Svijet in 1927.  Ultimately none of the 25 entries in 
the competition were accepted, but the idea of the Neboder would re-occur again. Since none of 
                                                 
28 Eve Blau, Ivan Rupnik, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2007). 
@ 130. 
29 "Predlog za Gradnju Gradske Vijećnice u Zagrebu ". 
30 Blau, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 132. 
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the actual entrants in the competition were selected the city continued to seek a unified design for 
the entire space of the old hospital.    
 
prof. arh. Drago Ibler’s Proposal for the “Endowment Block” 31 
 
   
 
Design Examples from the “Endowment Block” Competition (unidentified designers) 32 
 
Urban investment was not limited to the immediate vicinity of Jelačić square.  Once the 
economic dislocation of war had ended and the political instability of the founding process had 
stabilized, many projects which had been deferred were implemented. One of these projects was 
the establishment of a large public park on the eastern side of the city.  To accomplish this, the 
                                                 
31 "Futurističke Osnove," Svijet, 18. I. 1930. @ 89. 
32 Ibid. @ 88-89. 
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city purchased the Maksimir park from the Zagreb Catholic Archdiocese in 1922, and improved 
it by establishing a zoological park there as well in 1925.33 
 
The Practical Challenges of Growth 
The rapid economic development and industrialization resulted in an explosion of the 
urban population of Zagreb.  The population of the city roughly doubled from approximately 
100,000 in 1910 to approximately 200,000 by 193134.  The economic boom of the 1920s 
provided a significant amount of new capital which could be used for a new phase of urban 
modernization.  But this new wave of urban growth also confronted the city with something of a 
crisis in spatial management.  All this urban development had broadly conformed to the concept 
of the original plan established in 1864/65 and further embellished in the subsequent 1887/88 
plan.  There was little change in the older parts of the town, Gradec and Kaptol.  In the hills 
north of the old Gornji grad (Upper Town) area the Croatian economic elite built individual 
houses on the meandering roads leading into town.  The new Donji grad (Lower Town), between 
the hills and the rail lines, developed as the new, bourgeois area with a mix of multi-story 
apartment buildings, mansions, and “public” buildings interspersed with public squares and 
parks.  Industrial enterprises primarily occupied the land between the rail lines and the Sava 
River.35  This part of the city was also a growing residential area because this land fell outside of 
the jurisdiction of the Zagreb city government, and therefore the building regulations did not  
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Regulatory Plan from 1889 (never enacted) 36 
                                                 
36 Base Image from Ivo Maroević, Zagreb Njim Samim (Zagreb: Dureux, 1999). @ 35 
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apply there.  As a result, poorer, working class people could build small houses close to the 
industrial enterprises that they often worked in.    
The issues caused by rapid urban growth and the change in urban character in Zagreb 
were not unanticipated by the city’s planners.  As early as 1889 the city’s planners had created a 
regulatornia osnova that imagined Zagreb extending all the way to the Sava River,37 but without 
the authority to impose the regulations outside of the existing city territory, the plan was never 
implemented.  In 1907 a member of the city engineering staff had proposed a new regulatornia 
osnova which envisioned dramatically reconfiguring the city based on its emerging industrial 
character.  This plan was as bold in its vision as the 1865 plan had been.  It called for removing 
the railroad tracks that were acting as a barrier to the city’s southward expansion, and re-routing 
them south of the Sava River.  This would free up movement and allow for the development of 
all the land up to the northern bank of the Sava without obstruction.  To deal with the issues of 
potential flooding along the Sava’s banks, the plan called for the river to be completely canalized  
as it passed through Zagreb.  Because the land south of the existing railroad tracks was now 
needed for industrial production, the plan moved the proposed Sava River harbor of the original 
plan out to the southeast of the city.  This plan was ultimately rejected by the Hungarian 
government, in significant part because of the enormous cost that removing and rebuilding the 
rail lines would entail, which would have been paid for either by the Hungarian government or 
the railroads themselves, which were Hungarian owned enterprises.38  
In 1922, the central government in Belgrade promulgated a new law on local governance, 
which diluted the very strict division of authority that had been established by the Austro- 
                                                 
37 Ibid. @ 35. 
38Snješka Knežević, "Milan Lenuci and the Urbanism of Zagreb," in Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, 
Strategy, Practice (Zagreb: ACTAR, 2007). @ 88 and image @ 102. 
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Hungarian Empire.39  In 1923 the city published a new regulatornia osnova which expanded the 
space available for building to the east.  This plan was not a re-conception of the city, but rather 
an extension of the existing pattern with very little attention given to the area south of the rail 
lines, but it did link the city directly with its eastern suburbs.  Though the plan did provide 
immediate relief for the needs of the city to expand housing inventory, it was clearly not 
sufficient as a permanent solution to the significant problems that urban growth were beginning 
to cause. 
   
Regulatory Plan for the city of Zagreb, 192340 
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40 Base Image from Maroević, Zagreb Njim Samim. @ 59. 




This plan was only a stop-gap measure, designed to ease the immediate need for more 
housing.  This was evidenced by the almost immediate call from elements of the urban 
establishment for a new regulatornia osnova.  In 1927, the Svijet article entitled Regulacia 
Zagreba (Regulation of Zagreb) which opened by identifying the key problem facing the city:  
 “After the war Zagreb began to grow rapidly. On all sides there were many refugees who sought 
refuge here and many outsiders arrived to seek wealth.”41  The result had been a dramatic 40,000 
person increase in the city’s population since the end of the war in 1918.42  Though the city had 
made efforts to accommodate these people, to the author those efforts had been poorly planned 
and shortsighted.  As a result: 
Instead the city enabled construction on the first empty site, has put on hold 
expropriating empty construction sites, allowing speculation to build where it was 
clear that for several years, you have to clear the area. Rather than remove the 
first war huts on the Brickyard, the city in several places is unsystematically 
building houses in bad taste.43 
 
The article then took the city to task for the situation: 
Eight years have passed since then, the city still has no r egulatory plan to deal 
with the situation, and particularly on the periphery people still built as they want 
and are thus creating new townships, which are bad in every respect: for those 
who must reside there and for the city of Zagreb, which to these great victims 
must sooner or later provide regulation of these neighborhoods, give them roads, 
power and water.44 
 
This introduction to the article was followed up by a strong attack on the city building 
and planning office and their management of areas already under city regulation, which had 
allowed construction in the “commercial quarter” (the area regulated by the 1923 plan) which 
was “quite unfortunate and tasteless, which in the foreseeable future will not be able to be 
                                                 






repaired.”45  The magazine then addressed a deeper issue, an apparent disconnect between the 
appearance of the city, and the reality of the challenges facing it: 
We love to hear from strangers, as a major city Zagreb is so nice and neat, and 
this is probably the first and legitimate view the city gives, a cozy feel, but what 
we the citizens see best of Zagreb is our large mistakes, which have not been 
corrected and are awaiting a regulatory plan, which again can not be compiled 
until the issue of the railway stations and tracks are resolved and the issue of the 
regulation of the Sava.46 
 
Yet after making this broad critique of the city’s management of growth after the end of the First 
World War, and its continued complacency about the condition of the city, the article shifts 
attention to the heart of the city, and focuses on the area immediately north of Jelačić square.47 
This dramatic shift in the focus of the article indicates that, though managing the growth of the 
city was important to the city’s opinion makers, it was the core of the city, in and around Jelačić 
square, was still their main concern.   
The city government responded to the need for dealing with the developing needs of the 
city by creating the City Regulation Office from the existing City Building Office.  Though the 
new organization’s first project was the competition for the development of the “endowment 
block,” the plot of land on Jelačić square where the old hospital had stood until the 1920s, one of 
the primary purposes of this new organization was to develop a long term plan for Zagreb that 
could manage the phenomenal growth the city was experiencing.48  To accomplish this task, the 
City Regulation Office once again proposed to use an open project competition.49  The concept 
of such architectural competitions was very popular in Zagreb at that time, but the scope of this 
project was much larger than anything previously announced in the city’s history: a competition 
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for a new urban plan for the entire city.  The competition was initially proposed in 1928, and 
formalized in 1930, with an exhibition of the entrants’ plans to be carried out in 1931.50  
In support of the competition, the city published the formal announcement of the 
competition in 1930: the Competition for the Remaking of the General Plan for Redeveloping, 
Broadening and Regulation of the City of Zagreb Data and Directives51 which provided the 
guidance to competition entrants as to what the city was looking for in their proposals.  Not 
surprisingly, given the scope of the project, the document ran to 69 pages of text and over a 
dozen pages of illustrations and pictures of the city.  Because the competition was international 
in character, the document also went to great length to describe the city, assuming that many 
firms that might be interested in competing would have little personal knowledge of Zagreb.  The 
result was a document that both described Zagreb as its city leaders wanted it to be seen by the 
world, but also confronting the challenges the city needed to overcome if it was to continue 
growing successfully.   
At the very beginning, the document provided an overview of the current situation the 
city confronted, which the document directly calls a “crisis,” and the goals for the competition, 
including solutions to all the “problems which prevent the normal and rational growth of the 
city.”52  These issues included “the railway problem; which will resolve the question of crossing 
streets and traffic in general”, as well as “the question of the Sava and the Sava port,” and the 
“longitudinal growth of the city.”53  Pages 4 to 49 describe the city and its perceived place in 
Croatian and Yugoslav society.  It is not until the last 20 pages that the document elaborates 
specifically what it is looking for in the new plan for the city.  
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The 45 pages of background information consist of 22 separate sections describing 
Zagreb.  These sections provide a significant insight into how the city leadership of Zagreb 
understood the city’s role as a city both as they themselves perceived it, and as they wanted it to 
be perceived from the outside.  Section 9, “Zagreb as an economic center”, discusses the logic of 
the city’s dominant economic position within Yugoslavia, stating that this was both a result of 
the city’s “geographic position” and the connections stemming from the period when Croatia had 
been part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.  The document goes further to elaborate that 
“Then, Zagreb was the seat of the Croatian, Slavonian, and Dalmatian government, and a large 
number of central offices…” which “every day” drew large numbers of people to the city.54  This 
argument is interesting on two separate levels.  First, it creates an impression of the political 
order of 1848 as the persistent reality of the entire Hapsburg period.  Second, it ties economic 
success for the city to a specific geo-political order, Zagreb as the capital of the Triune Kingdom.  
It is important to note that this argument is raised in the section on the economic role of the city, 
not the political role. 
The section which specifically discusses the city’s political function is section 12, 
“Zagreb as a national, cultural, and political center.”  This section, in fact, mentions almost 
nothing about Zagreb’s historic role politically, instead focusing on the cultural role of Zagreb in 
“south Slavism.”  
Although Zagreb, already from older times was an important city in Croatia from 
the political and cultural viewpoint, its development to today’s cultural and 
national center begins to flow from the beginning of the 19th century when the 
work of the national awakening with which the enthusiasm and belief in the future 
of southern Slavism overcame beyond the night of the old German and Latin 
spirit of Zagreb.55 
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In this way the document formally avoids and, in fact seeks to obscure the issue of which 
particular nation Zagreb was a “national center” for.    
The issue is addressed by identifying the period of the “Illyrian revival” as resulting in 
the founding of the “most important cultural institutions of Zagreb.”56  As the document states: 
It [the Illyrian revival] was the precursor of a part of the great phenomenon of 
Bishop Strossmayer, which was the idea of the revival realized in real life 
things[,] the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts and the University, which 
placed Zagreb in the cultural center of the Slavic south.57 
 
This passage is notable because it ties the Illyrian movement, which was already waning when 
they were founded, to these two institutions, using Bishop Strossmayer as the specific linkage.  
Bishop Strossmayer was one of only three individuals mentioned by name in the entire 
document, so the choice to do so was obviously significant.  The reason for this recognition is 
related to his standing as not only a significant figure in the Croatian national project, but also his 
strong support of Yugoslavianism as leader of the National party.  This invocation of Bishop 
Strossmayer allowed the authors to then describe the large number of cultural institutions in 
Zagreb as part of a broader Yugoslav cultural project.  
In this way, the authors of the Competition Announcement established an argument for 
Zagreb being not only the Croatian Metropolis, but the Yugoslav Metropolis as well.  That 
implication is further re-enforced by a passage near the end of the background portion of the 
document, Section 22. “Nearby surroundings,” states that “The local area of Zagreb has, as with 
our entire state, a predominantly peasant character.”58  This statement implies, while also being 
vague enough to deny the implication, that Zagreb is the only true urban center in Yugoslavia.   
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Though the Competition Announcement provides illuminating insight into the city 
leadership’s understanding and framing of the relationship between Zagreb and Yugoslavia, the 
documents primary focus was on the city itself; its current conditions and its future needs as an 
urban landscape and social system.  To that end the document was very clear and direct in its 
discussions of the authors’ present understanding and the future goals of the city. 
Section 14. Structure and parts of the city, establishes the core of the city, as seen by the 
authors, both in its physical form and its function in the opening paragraph:  
The core of the daily life of Zagreb is Jelačić square.  Around it are located the 
business and commercial parts of the city and along Ilica to Pejačević square, 
along Jurišićeva street and the start of Vlaška street, along Marovska and 
Nikolićeva and the north and west sides of Zrinki square.  From this commercial 
center, where the business life from day to day more completely concentrates 
itself, shops locate themselves… along the main exit thoroughfares of Ilicia, 
Vlaška street and Maksimir way and further down Savska way to the city’s 
boundaries.59 
 
This clearly presents Zagreb as a city where daily life revolves around business, commerce, and 
consumption.  Daily life is also clearly depicted as centered in Lower Town generally, and 
Jelačić Square specifically.   
 The remainder of this section describes the city in a way that shows the significance of 
the urban political elites attached to each part of Zagreb’s urban landscape.  The next three 
paragraphs describe the remainder of Lower Town.  Industry is not mentioned until the fourth 
paragraph, and even here the point is to re-enforce Zagreb’s commercial character, referring to 
the concentration of “offices of various industries” in the newly developed eastern portion of the 
city, rather than the productive portions of the enterprises.  Gradec and Kaptol are discussed in 
the sixth and seventh paragraphs with the elite enclave of privates houses to the north of the city 
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discussed in the eighth paragraph.60  The text then turns to the less wealthy part of the city.  The 
ninth paragraph details the area south of the railroad tracks and north of the Sava River, which is 
described as the location of “old rural communities (Horvati, Trnje, Petruševec, Žitnjak, 
Vukomerec).”  This portion of the city consisted of primarily one and two story houses.  But in 
addition to these older rural towns, this paragraph discusses a newer phenomenon which had 
emerged after the end of the First World War; the “divlje kuće” or “wild houses.”   These were 
houses built on “county land” without city permits on the periphery of the older villages and the 
city itself.  It is not until the 10th paragraph that the industrial development of the city is directly 
addressed.  Neither the number of industrial enterprises nor the significant growth in their 
numbers is even mentioned, simply the matter of fact description that most of this activity is 
concentrated along the rail lines and in close proximity to the city natural gas plant, with a 
mention that the leather tanning industry is located separately from the rest.61 
 It is not until after the discussion of the new industrial parts of the city that one 
historically significant economic sector of the city is finally mentioned.  Obrt (skilled 
craftsmanship) receives only one stand-alone sentence/paragraph of discussion: “Craftsmen’s 
workshops are located throughout the city, but mainly in direct proximity of the commercial 
district and along the main access roads.”62  The contrast here to the opening of this section and 
the elaborate discussion of commerce is striking on several levels.  Throughout the previous 
periods of Zagreb’s development obert had been considered a key part of the city’s economic 
activity and an important element of its cultural identity, evidenced by the founding of the 
Museum of Arts and Crafts in 1880 and the construction of the museum’s building (one of the 
larges of the city’s privately funded “public” buildings) in 1888.  By the authors’ own 
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description, the main concentration of artisan workshops coincided with the city’s commercial 
activity, so it is significant that this sentence was not simply included in the first paragraph, but 
rather set off completely separate, and as the last entry on the city’s economic organization. 
 After a brief paragraph on the military sites located in the city, the authors return to the 
issue of “wild” construction: 
“Wild buildings”, which except in the southern parts of the city, where they are 
mainly, stand in small groups, more or less along the entire periphery, the result 
of the great influx of population into the city and from which originated the great 
housing misfortune.  C onstructed [are] in total close to 4,000 of  this type of 
houses, and [it] has been counted that in them live around 40,000 people.63  
 
This clearly was a significant concern to the city government, and though not stated here in as 
stark terms, was the “crisis” the city was facing.  This massive housing deficit was one of both 
quantity and quality.  Over 20% of the city’s population was living in housing not built to the 
city code despite the significant expansion of the area zoned for residential construction in 1923.  
And this was not for a lack of building either, as by 1930 most of the land newly zoned for 
housing in 1923 had already been developed with high density, multi-story apartments. 
 The authors then dedicated a significant amount of text on how the city planned to deal 
with this issue.  The problem was not one of simply building more housing.  The area where the 
city envisioned more high density apartments was already occupied by the “wild” buildings, and 
though the city might have the authority to demolish them if they did not meet minimum 
standards, doing so would displace 40,000 people without anywhere for them to go.  The city 
government fully appreciated the dilemma it faced with this situation, and had already developed 
a plan to deal with it.  Property owners in the affected areas were given the opportunity to apply 
for a “temporary permit” for their property which would give them until 1948 to bring it up to 
the city building standards that would be imposed by the new regulatory plan.  If they chose not 




to upgrade their property they would be given a building permit for a “small house” in an 
undeveloped area of the city that would be specifically designated for low density residential 
building. Residents who did not own the properties they lived in were to be given priority for 
new apartments in the city as they became available, thus allowing them to move out and giving 
the owners the chance to rebuild to the new building standards for the area.  The final paragraph 
of this section explains the areas of the city where building would be prohibited until the 
regulatory plan was adopted.64  These two paragraphs are worth particular note because they 
appear distinctly out of place, as they deal not specifically with the existing “Structure and parts 
of the city” but rather with the goals of the plan, which technically are not addressed for another 
25 pages.  Clearly the authors in the City Planning Office found it impossible to discuss Zagreb 
as it existed without also discussing the city as they imagined it in the future. 
 The next 25 pages of the Announcement discusses in great detail every aspect of the city 
before beginning the specific requirements that entrants to the competition must meet in Part C 
on page 50.  Section 1 covers “The scope of territory for which is sought a plan,” and defines this 
as the “entire contemporary territory of the city of Zagreb” and states that the plan should 
provide sufficient housing for a population of 350,000 residents.  Section 2 is titled simply the 
“Railway question” and deals with the overall issues involved in improving traffic flow between 
the parts of the city north of the railroad tracks and the portions of the city south and west of the 
tracks while simultaneously maintaining the capacity of the rail system to function.  
 Mere functionality for the rail system was not all the city planners were concerned with.  
This section of the Announcement is a six page, detailed discussion of the significant 
improvements they envisioned for the city’s rail network.65  This included a new Main Railroad 
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Station for passenger travel in the same location as the existing one, but designed to allow people 
and cars to cross under it, so the station would no longer block access to the newer parts of the 
city between the railroad station and the Sava River.  In addition to the new passenger station, 
the requirements for two more new rail facilities were spelled out: one new station dedicated 
completely to freight traffic was envisioned, and a separate new rail yard for parking train 
engines and rail cars was also written into the requirements.   In total, this discussion of the 
“Railway question” takes up nearly one third of the entire text for the actual requirements for the 
submissions to the competition, giving an indication of how central the city planners saw the 
solution to this issue as a key to expanding the city. 
 The contrast between the very elaborate details of the proposed solution to the “Railway 
question” and the rest of the requirements for proposals is driven home by the next section, 
entitled the “River Sava and Sava harbor.”  This section laying out the requirements for planning 
the new harbor and the areas along the river banks is only five sentences long.66  Given that these 
two issues, “the railway problem” and “the question of the Sava and the Sava port,” were giving 
equal weight at the very beginning of the document, the preponderance of detail for dealing with 
one, and the total lack of detail in dealing with the other points to a very different view of the 
significance of them.  “The railway problem” was a real, critical issue facing the city that the city 
planners had already envisioned a very detailed solution to.  “The question of the Sava and the 
Sava port” was an aspiration, one to be achieved, but not clearly envisioned as to how, and thus 
left to the competitors to design. 
 The next section was truly the heart of the competition guidance with regard to the future 
city plan: “The division of the city and surrounding areas for future use.”67 This section provided 
                                                 
66 Ibid. @ 56-57. 
67 Ibid. @ 57-58. 
204 
 
the broad, macro-vision of the future city, and called for the designers to provide plans for all the 
basic requirements for a modern urban community.  The key to this section was the final part, 
which provided guidance to the designers on “Types of construction zone the designer can at his 
discretion, change…”68  The designers were specifically prohibited from any prospective 
changes to Gornji grad: “Gornji grad … is to be excluded from any regulation, so as to retain its 
historical-cultural characteristics and individuality.”69  In contrast, areas of “wild houses” were 
to be a particular target for regulation.  This guidance showed an interesting ambivalence about 
private property.  Two types of areas were to be protected, private housing designed around 
“small block houses, which will be easily able to adapt to the situation.” and “to the extent 
possible, take into account existing [economic] facilities…”70  Beyond these limitations though, 
the areas of “wild houses” were a blank canvas for designers to work upon.  And the designers 
were reassured that the private property issues of the owners of these “wild houses” would not be 
an impediment to the realization of their plans: 
Implementation of the regulatory basis in these areas is known to be facilitated by 
the new Construction Law, which is now done, and which provides for 
expropriation and compensation of land for this purpose. Individual wild houses 
are not though indicated in the plans, but these settlements of houses can be easily 
distinguishable from the small plots…71 
 
Thus, commercial interests were to be protected, and private housing which could easily be 
conformed to a regular, orderly urban grid was to be preserved.  But the small, disorderly 
arranged private houses were to give way to a modern urban grid. 
 The reminder of the Competition Announcement covered the details of what the future 
plan should include.  New public squares and parks, several new public buildings (mostly in 
                                                 






Gornji grad), schools, libraries, theaters and sports facilities were all to be part of the plan.  Also, 
space was to be provided for new churches to support the growing population, and a new city 
cemetery was called for, as Mirogoj was thought to be too small to be sufficient for the future 
population of the city.  One significant issue of note in this broad set of guidance: a specific call 
for a decentralization of the city’s markets.  The Competition Announcement intended that: 
“…the area of [urban] expansion of course have access to decentralize marketplaces according to 
a rational and economical system, and ensure an equal division among the urban areas of the 
daily marketplaces and so situate them.”72  In this regard, the planners were establishing a 
preference for a “rational and economical system” over the existing social pattern, which the 
author’s themselves had identified previously, of Dolac and Jelačić square as the center of daily 
life in the city. 
 The final pages raised a particular challenge to the competition designers.  As the authors 
of the competition announcement stated:  
From the aesthetic side, one of the most important questions which needs to be 
resolved in Zagreb is the organization of Kaptol and its surroundings.  Because as 
is historically known in Zagreb, Kaptol, with Gornji grad is the most important 
part of the city.73 
 
The Announcement then recounted the recent history of the Cathedral and the Bishop’s Castle, 
expressing the view that the decision to remove the wall in front of the Cathedral had been a 
significant mistake, and one goal of the new plan was to address the problem.  The authors did 
mention Victor Kovačić’s vision for a project that would fuse the old imagery with a modern 
functionality, but also that it was still unrealized.  The author’s description of the goals 
established in relation to the Cathedral bore a striking resemblance to the general goals of the 
Svijet magazine plan from three years earlier, though there was not direct call for the removal of 
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the private houses south of the Bishop’s Castle.74  Beyond the esthetic issues, the Competition 
Announcement raised a new set of concerns.  These were the practical issues of the need for the 
local road network to handle the truck traffic necessary to service the new market at Dolac.  This 
required addressing the entire area of Kaptol, the remaining part of the Dolac neighborhood, and 
Tkalčićeva street to ensure easy access to and from the market for larger vehicles.  But this 
functionality needed to be accomplished in a way that kept with the “esthetic” of the area and did 
no further damage in the view of the city residents.75  This note of caution was the final 
statement of the Competition Announcement. 
 In 1931, fifty two entries were put on display and evaluated by the competition judging 
panel.76  As with the competition for the Endowment Block project the year prior, no first place 
winner was chosen, but prizes were awarded for a number of the entries.77  The City Regulation 
Office then took the plans and used them for inspiration in the development of what would 
become the official proposal for the new regulatornia osnova for the city, though there would be 
a five year wait for the final product of that effort to be produced.  
 
Continued Development after 1931 
The international design competition did not mean an end to development projects until 
the new official urban plan was developed and approved.  The housing crisis in particular 
required immediate attention, and the city could not wait years to address it.  There were also 
other projects already underway, such as the “Endowment Block,” which needed to move 
forward.  But by 1931 the challenges to continued urban development were significant.  The 
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primary issue facing the city was the impact of the world wide economic crisis of the Great 
Depression, which dramatically reduces the amount of private capital available to fund building 
or modernization projects. The Endowment Block project was one of the first casualties of the 
crisis.  In 1931 the city’s main hospital was torn down, but a lack of capital prevented progress 
on the plan to replace the building.78  This plan called for a large, unified structure that would 
cover one and a half blocks, and included a 16 story Neboder in the same location as the one 
proposed by prof. arch. Ibler. 79  
 
Svijet Magazine Cover: the Yugoslav Royal Standard over Jelačić square80 
 The extent to which the Neboder became imbedded in the spatial imagination of the 
Zagreb elite was illustrated, literally on Svijet magazine’s cover.  The iconography of the cover 
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was a combination of the perspective of Jelačić square from the top of the future Neboder with 
the Yugoslav Royal Standard over the city, celebrating the royal visit by the King of Yugoslavia 
to Zagreb.  The image was intriguing, because as the coverage of the King’s visit within the 
magazine indicated, the King participated in no major events on the square during his visit.  The 
image was allegorical.  It reflected the image implied in the Competition Announcement a year 
prior;81 a modern Yugoslavia (the Kings Standard) resting on the foundation of a modern Croatia 
(the Neboder on Jelačić square). 
On the 26th of March, 1932, the Saturday of Easter weekend, the newspaper Večer 
published an opinion piece entitled “Easter hope” headlined: “Of which we are expecting 
alleviation of unemployment and poverty” with the first line of the sub-headline reading 
“resurrection from new construction.”  
 
Of which we are expecting alleviation of unemployment and poverty 82 
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The piece was illustrated with a sketch of the new design for the Neboder from the “endowment 
block” as well as other sketches illustrating concepts for the project.83 Though the item was 
illustrated with images of the imagined future of the “endowment block,” it was about much 
more; it was a modernist, urbanist manifesto for economic recovery.  The writers of Večer 
argued that the key to economic recovery was in urban development projects, such as the 
Endowment Block, which would lead to a broad recovery though employment of skilled labor 
and the need for materials that such construction projects demanded.  The solution to Zagreb’s 
economic crisis, they argued, would be found by pursuing solutions to Zagreb’s urban issues.  To 
accomplish this, the paper called for a partnership of public investment with private developers, 
through the city government’s provision of loans to developers.  These loans were to be used for 
both “rebuilding neighborhoods” and “building modern neighborhoods in the city,” which would 
help alleviate the housing crisis.  In addition, Večer called for fulfillment of commitments for 
money to be invested to both maintain and improve the city tram system.   
Three days after the Večer piece ran, a public exhibition opened for the proposed plan for 
the Endowment Block.  This exhibition included the three of the images used to illustrate the 
Večer piece, which were parts of the architects formal design proposal, as well as an architectural 
model of the project.84  Despite this concerted effort to build momentum behind the unified 
Endowment Block project, funding for such a massive endeavor was impossible to find in 1932.  
Rather than wait for economic conditions to improve, the city moved forward by maintaining the 
design in principle, but breaking the actual plan down into thirteen component plots of land and 
selling them off to individual developers, with one of the plots reserved for the Neboder that had 
been part of the unified project.  With the land thus subdivided, half of the plots were sold and 
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developed immediately, including two of the three plots facing Jelačić square, with six of the 
buildings completed by the end of 1933, another completed in 1934, and an eighth completed in 
1935.85  But the Neboder itself remained un-built. 
The Endowment Block was not the only development plan the city put forward after 
announcing the international design competition.  In January of 1932, the city announced an 
effort to alleviate the housing problem by converting the city’s motorcycle racing track into a 
new housing area.86  The proposed housing area was generally undesirable, being on the far west
side of the city, far from the commercial center in Donji grad and the new industrial 
development south of the main train station, and separated from the rest of the city by both a 
canal and the rail lines running west out of the city.  The focus of the Večer story about the 
project though focused on the popularity of the motorcycle racing track and the problems with 
placing a residential neighborhood in the area.  The paper’s headline for the story was: “The Fate 
of the Motorcyclists Track…” indicating more concern about the popular entertainment venue, 
rather then excitement over the new housing area.87 Yet, the land was a space that the city 
government could regulate, and therefore, it represented an opportunity for the city to manage 
continuing growth and get ahead of another round of “wild building” construction on the 
periphery of the city while waiting for the new general plan still years in the future.   
In 1933 several Croatian architects participated in the fourth Congrès International 
d'Architecture Moderne (The International Congress of Modern Architecture or CIAM).88  This 
particular congress was a significant one, as it focused not on just architecture, but “the 
Functional City” and the relationship between architecture and urban planning.  The participants 
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engaged in a comparative study of 33 cities (including Zagreb) in an effort to establish a 
scientific foundation for universal rules of urban planning.89  One of the key outcomes of the 
congress was a new view of the most effective form of urban structure.  This new view called for 
individual buildings, with significant green space surrounding them.  This was diametric 
opposite of the previous views which had guided the regulation of Zagreb up to that point, with 
its unified façades and open interior courtyards.  Such a building pattern as the CIAM congress 
was proposing was not totally alien to the city either.  Small, stand alone multi-unit apartment 
buildings with centralized open spaces had been used as a basis for quickly built refugee housing 
in the city since 1921.90  But these buildings were seen as somewhat temporary structures, built 
and paid for by the city government, and designed for easy and quickness of construction, rather 
than ideal solutions for long term housing.   
In 1935, the city approved the development of a townhouse project, which did break 
significantly from previous methods of urban building in the city.  The First Savings Bank 
Cooperative settlement was an effort to deal with the housing crisis by creating a new form of 
domicile.91  Rather than apartments, this development would consist of privately owned row 
houses.  In the economic environment of the Great Depression, where private capital for larger 
development projects was difficult to organize, this project had an eminent logic, allowing for 
micro-capital to fill the void. The project also allowed owners to choose one of three floor plans 
for their unit.92 The row houses of this project served both and economic and social function.  On 
an economic level, this form of construction allowed to maximize the number of units per parcel 
of land, while simultaneously reducing the cost per unit over a stand alone house.  On a social 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. @ 168. 




level, the continuous façade of the row house supported the use of space to transmit the ideal 
image of bourgeois citizenship, in the same way that the flush façades of the larger, multistory 
buildings of Donji grad had up until that point.  Even the choice of multiple floor plans served 
this dual economic and social purpose, creating desirability to the units through a sense of 
agency and individuality inside, out of public view, while at the same time imposing the 
conformity of the ideal bourgeois citizen externally. 
Also 1935, an effort was made prepare the public for the impact the new regulatornia 
osnova would have on Kaptol.  Svijet published a cover story entitled simply, Regulatica Kaptola 
u Zagerbu.93  This article, unlike the one published in 1927 focused only on Victor Kovačić’s 
vision for Kaptol.   In contrast to the 1927 article, there was no attempt to visually connect the 
Cathedral and the Bishop’s Castle with Jelačić square.   
 
Victor Kovačić’s 1910 Plan for Dolac, Kaptol, and Vlaška Street 94 
                                                 
93 "Regulacija Kaptola u Zagrebu," Svijet, 9, Veljača (February) 1935. 
94 Ibid. @ 135. 
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But the article did reproduce two of Kovačić’s plans, both of which called for the removal of the 
private houses built on irregular plots of land just south of the Bishop’s Castle.95  Beyond this 
though, the article portrayed Kovačić’s ideas as deeply patriotic.96  One of his proposals was for 
a statue of Nikoli Zrinski, a Croatian nobleman made famous for his defeat of an Ottoman 
invasion, to be place in the vicinity of the Cathedral.   
Kovačić’s own patriotic feeling were expressed in the same reasoning as follows: 
"The order of such construction and raising of a monument to Nikola Zrinski, 
glorious fighter for Christianity against the Turks, would be developed for the 
Croatian people in the shadows of the Christian Cathedral on the site, which once 
served to defend against the Turks, a famous historical place.97 
 
This was used to argue for an explicitly Croatian, rather than a simply Catholic focus to his 
desires.   
In addition to this argument buttressing the nationalist character of Kovačić’s ideas, the 
point was made that these plans were also all nearly a quarter of a century old, thus establishing 
an historical element to them.  Beyond this though, Svijet made a visual argument. 
Svijet magazine had a practice of publishing two covers, and outer cover, which was purely 
visual, and an inner cover, which was the beginning of the feature article of the issue.  In this 
case, the magazine used two different images of the Cathedral.  On the outer cover, they 
presented an image of the rebuilt Cathedral from a particularly striking view on Tkalčićeva street 
which was well known to the current population of the city.  But this image was contrasted with 
the inner cover, which showed the Cathedral as it had existed before the 1880 earthquake.  The 
images were a subtle reminder that the “historic” Cathedral in the popular imagination was, in 
fact, a relatively new building, barely half a century old.  In this vein, Kovačić’s ideas for the 
regulation of Kaptol were nearly as historic as the Cathedral itself.  As a result, Kovačić’s 
                                                 
95 Ibid. @ 134-135. 




concepts, which were clearly modern in design and function, were now presented as historical in 
character and an overtly nationalist statement.  Modern, rational urban planning was to be 
implemented as the fulfillment of an historical, national project. 
 
   
Cover (Left) and Interior Cover (Right) of Svijet Magazine, 9 February, 1935 98 
 
Conclusions  
 After erecting the Ban Jelačić statue and inscribing the square with potent Croatian 
national meaning in the late nineteenth century, the drive to modernize and implant Croatian 
national meaning in broader Zagreb continued unabated from 1895 until 1935.  The modernist 
project to fulfill the idea of the Croatian Metropolis progressed essentially unchallenged in 
practical terms from the 1895 until 1935.  But this project was piecemeal, rather than a unified, 




coherent plan.  It was economic conditions, rather than political or social conditions that 
challenged those who sought to pursue the Croatian Metropolis project.  Elements were added to 
the urban landscape as economic conditions permitted.  But the dramatic success of the Croatian 
Metropolis project was one of its own worst enemies in terms of rational urban development.  
The massive influx of population, especially after the end of the First World War, overwhelmed 
the existing regulatornia osnova.  It was the response to this challenge that eventually brought 
criticism of the management of urban development into the open. 
  The piecemeal approach allowed an attack on two levels, one practical, the other 
esthetic.  On the practical level, the lack of a coherent long range plan resulted in the city always 
reacting, rather than preparing for the next influx of population.  Even the 1923 regulatornia 
osnova was a partial measure, focusing on only a portion of the city’s territory, and even though 
the plan produced a dramatic increase in the city’s housing inventory, the continued growth of 
population resulted in no net change in the number of people living in “sub-standard” housing.  
The lack of a long range plan had also resulted in the phenomenon of “wild houses” outside of 
the older parts of the city, and the fully regulated Donji grad area.  This is what allowed the 
practical objections to the city’s management of development to segue into an esthetic critique as 
well.  Beyond the practical matter of the irregular patter of development, these buildings were 
also a distinct contrast from the well ordered Donji grad.  These wild buildings were built to 
individual needs and they were placed where space allowed, rather than according to the 
exacting building code of the city of Zagreb.   
On the practical level, these neighborhoods of “wild houses” were a challenge to the city 
that needed to provide services, and the building code was also somewhat a guarantee of safe 
living conditions.  But the esthetic of these areas was one of “the village” rather than a modern 
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city as well.  The significance of this esthetic is reinforced by the fact that despite the deep 
concern over the “wild buildings” of the periphery, no mention was made of the illegal buildings 
of the “parallel city” which had been built between 1850 and 1895, and continued to be built, in 
Doniji grad.  The buildings of the “parallel city” were every bit as “wild” as the “wild houses” of 
the periphery, but were invisible to the public, and therefore, apparently, of much less concern.  
Another element of the esthetic critique focused on the older, irregular buildings of the older 
parts of town.  The description of Dolac and Tkalčićeva street as the “ugliest” parts of the city 
indicate a deep desire to see these older parts of the city rebuilt in a modern, orderly way. 
The city leadership responded to these challenges by creating the City Regulation Office 
in 1928, and embarking on a program of deliberate, long term planning.  The Endowment Block 
project was a clear example of this on the micro level, and the plan for a new regulatornia 
osnova was an effort to create a new, long term plan to manage the city’s growth from 
approximately 200,000 up to 350,000 residents.  But once again, economic challenges impeded 
the implementation of these plans.  The collapse of private capital forced the Endowment Block 
to be piecemealed.  The guidance for the Competition Announcement did lay out a broad vision 
for a modern, orderly metropolis, but despite the success of the international competition for a 
new general plan for the city did not produce an actual plan to fulfill it.  
Though the modernists were continuously pragmatic in their approach, two significant 
changes did take place near the end of the period.  First, the modernists began to portray their 
plans for modernization as the fulfillment of historic development.  The repeated reference to 
Victor Kovačić’s plans provided a vehicle for this.  The city’s decision to implement Kovačić’s 
plan for the Dolac market provided a basis for this argument, leading to further calls to 
implement his other plans for the area in and around Jelačić square. The second significant shift 
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that did begin to manifest itself at the end of this period was a more explicit statement of their 
patriotic and nationalist views.  This indicates that those holding the modernist position could no 
longer take for granted that their views would be understood as supporting the Croatian national 
project.  The decision to support the concept of a strong Yugoslavia built on the foundation of a 
modern Croatia, as expressed in the Competition Announcement of 1930, was now one that need 






























 The period from 1936 to 1940 witnessed a new period of significant public contestation 
over the future of Zagreb’s urban development.  This chapter chronicles both the urban focus of 
this contestation and its use as a means to debate Croatia’s role in Yugoslavia. I thus show the 
emergence of a new form of Croatian nationalism, one that symbolically rejected modernization 
as a means of national development and embraced preservation as a means to ensure Croatia’s 
survival as a national community.  This contestation, pivoting around modernizing older Zagreb, 
was initiated by publication of the city’s proposal for the new regulatornia osnova.  This new 
proposal was in the tradition of the 1864 Urban Plan rather than the 1923 Urban Plan.  It was a 
grand re-imagining of the city which would once again transform Zagreb into a modern urban 
space, particularly the area between the city’s railroad tracks and the Sava River.  The focus of 
the public contestation that emerged was not over the broad sweep of the proposed plan, but 
rather over the plan’s impact on the older parts of the city.  This public contestation represented a 
significant shift in public view over the appropriate way to deal with the city’s urban spaces, 
away from modernization and towards preservation.  In this regard, the public contestation over 
the 1936 regulatornia osnova was embedded in, and part of, a significant shift within the 
Croatian national project.  This chapter illuminates these dynamics. 
 The timeframe of this chapter is not intended to suggest that efforts to preserve older 
parts of the city began in 1936.  The efforts discussed here and the contestation they produced 
grew out of an older set of efforts and struggles.  This chapter focuses on this timeframe because 
it represents a significant shift in the general public support, and eventually success of these 
efforts at preservation.  Prior to this period, the preservationists were essentially tilting at 
windmills, with a very occasional success, but generally losing their battles.  By 1931 though, 
they had established the general idea of historical preservation of older parts of the city as a basis 
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for future urban planning.  The significant change in the period from 1936 to 1940 was the fact 
that the preservationists were able to expand the imagined extent of ‘historic’ Zagreb to include 
Ban Jelačić square, a space never previously viewed as ‘historic’ or subject to preservation.  The 
emergence of this new social consensus among the general population of Zagreb, that Ban 
Jelačić Square was a site of historical significance which needed to be preserved, represented a 
diametric shift from the previous view of the square as a showcase of modernization and national 
progress.   
The significance of this shift in view is in the both real and imagined roles of Ban Jelačić 
Square at the time.  The square was both the center of social life within Zagreb, and a deeply 
national place, which was seen to reflect the charter of Croatia through its physical form.  The 
shift in popular understanding of the square, from a place that should be continually improved 
and modernized, to a place that should be viewed as historical, and therefore preserved from 
damage, represented more than a shift in architectural taste.  It was a fundamental shift in the 
popular understanding of the role of the Croatian national project, as the population saw Croatia 
itself reflected in Ban Jelačić Square.  This shift in public sentiment was publicly chronicled and 
debated, yet that debate has been largely overlooked to date because it was essentially rendered 
moot in the spring of 1941 by Yugoslavia’s defeat and occupation.  But it is important to 
remember that, though the debate ultimately had little impact on future urban development in 
Zagreb, those participating in it had no way to know that at the time. 
 
The 1936 Proposed Regulatornia Osnova 
 After the conclusion of the 1931 international competition for a new regulatornia osnova, 
the City Regulation Office consolidated the entries and began working on a formal, official 
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proposal.  Five years later, the plan was completed and revealed for the public.  The official 
proposal bore a strong resemblance to several of the proposals.1   
 
General Regulator Plan for the City of Zagreb (1936)2 
 
 The plan was distinctly in the tradition of the grand design, as exemplified by the 1864, 
1887, and 1907 proposals.  Some key features of the plan were a new road grid for the area 
between the railroad tracks and the Sava river, an extension of the long Zrinjevac park south of 
                                                 
1 Eve Blau, Ivan Rupnik, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice (Barcelona: ACTAR, 2007). 
@ 166. 
2 Base Image from Ivo Maroević, Zagreb Njim Samim (Zagreb: Dureux, 1999). @ 87. 
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the main railroad station to the river, and a large sports complex south of the Sava River.  The 
plan also included a Sava river port to the southeast of the city, and a major new rail yard to 
support the new port.  The plan for the new residential areas between the railroad tracks and the 
river called for essentially removing all the existing private housing on the meandering streets 
and roads, and replacing it with modern buildings on a modern road grid. 
The reaction to this plan did not focus on any of these broad projects, but rather on 
proposed changes to the older part of the city.  The frame of the debate that would evolve was 
taking shape before the plan was actually published.  In 1935, the newspaper Večer published an 
article with the title: “Over the previous 800 years Zagrebites had more success fighting the 
demolition of historical buildings and sights, than today”3  The article recounted a series of 
disputes in the city’s history where the population had successfully prevented the destruction of 
older buildings for new construction.  The article therefore presented resistance of, and 
constraints to new construction as “historic” or “traditional” urban behavior for the residents of 
Zagreb, a characteristic of the city’s population that the modernists were now ignoring in their 
relentless efforts to transform older parts of the city.   
 The Večer article indicated the extent to which modernization was becoming a significant 
concern within the urban population Zagreb, but also the degree to which the preservationists 
had been generally unsuccessful in challenging the broad push to continue to modernize the older 
parts of the city.  This concern with preservation was reflected in a broad shift taking place 
across the Croatian elite.  Many Croatian writers and artists were beginning to use the peasantry 
as a lens to illuminate the Croatian national experience, just as many Croatian politicians had 
been drawn into Peasantism as a means to express their nationalist sentiments.   
                                                 
3 "Prije 800 Godina Zagrepčani su se s Više Uspjeha Borili Protiv Rušenja Historijskih Gradjevina i Znamenitosti, 
Nego li Danas," Večer, 7 Prosinca (December) 1935. 
223 
 
The extent to which elite views of the peasant had changed could be seen in the way 
peasants were presented in Croatian literature by the mid 1930s.  One of the clearest examples of 
this was Miroslav Krleža, who had become widely recognized as a key leader in the Croatian 
community of writers.  Krleža had become famous for his works of fiction, both stories and 
plays, which had been compelling drama, and also strong social criticism.  His early works had 
focused on the Croatian elite and the urban population of Zagreb.  But in 1936, Krleža published 
an epic poem, Balade Petrice Kerempuha (Ballads of Petrica Kerempuh), which recounted 
hundreds of years of Croatian history.  But unlike his previous works, this grand narrative was 
told from the perspective of the peasant, not the landed elite or the urban gentry.  The main 
character of this epic, Petrica Kerempuh, has been described as the “traditional figure of a wily 
peasant.”4  This choice of characterization was even more striking, as Krleža was engaging in “a 
Marxist critique of restrictive, middle-class society on all levels of his literary activity…”5 and 
therefore, much more sympathetic to the urban working class rather than the rural peasantry.  
Krleža’s choice of a peasant as his subject for telling his sweeping narrative of Croatian history 
reflected two significant social realities of the period.  First, the peasant was increasingly 
becoming a focal point of Croatian elite thinking about the issues of nation and nationalism.  
Second, the urban working class was a relatively new phenomenon within Croatian society, and 
therefore, attempting to tell the story of Croatian history across centuries from a new perspective 
(one not focused on the social elite) could not use the urban proletariat as a vehicle; it simply had 
not existed except for the last few decades.   
                                                 
4  This particular work was also notable in that it used the older Kajkavian dialect used in and around Zagreb, rather 
than the literary standard Štokavian. Ralph Bogert, The Writer as Naysayer: Miroslav Krleža and the Aesthetic of 
Interwar Central Europe, vol. 20, UCLA Slavic Studies (Columbus: Slavica Publishers, 1990).  @ 55 & 77. 
5 Ibid. @ 113. 
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 Writers, such as Krleža, had the luxury of shifting the focus of their narratives and 
characters to embrace a new idea of Croatian national identity which reflected Stjepan Radic’s 
focus on preservation rather than modernization as the key to national fulfillment.  The general 
urban population of Zagreb did not have such an option.  There was no “peasantry” or “village 
society” in Zagreb to preserve.  The Croatian Metropolis project had focused on the physical 
reality of the city as the community’s means of both participating in and expressing the Croatian 
national project since 1850.  In the quest for something to apply the new nationalist desire for 
preservation upon, the city itself became a viable object of focus.  This new impetus towards 
preservation, combined with the very public, though somewhat limited, contestations over urban 
development of the previous decade provided a field upon which those who wanted to contest 
the modernizing trajectory of the Croatian national project within Zagreb could engage the 
previously hegemonic modernist vision.  The new proposed regulatornia osnova of 1936 
provided an object of contestation, but not the only object.  The symbolic struggle would also be 
carried out on Jelačić square. 
 This shift in public expressions of support for preservation within Zagreb coincided with 
a significant new push by Croatian politicians to extract concessions from the central 
government in Belgrade.  In 1932, the Peasant-Democratic Coalition (SDK), which was the 
product of a political merger of the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) and the Independent 
Democratic Party (SDS), had issued a statement declaring the new constitution and government 
promulgated under the Royal Dictatorship in 1931 as illegitimate and calling for Yugoslavia to 
be transformed into some form of confederation.6  This established the SDK as the de facto 
opposition party of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav National Party (Jugoslavenska 
nationalna stranka, or JNS), the unofficial party of government.  In the elections of 1935 the 
                                                 
6 Branka Magaš, Croatia through History (London, San Francisco, Beirut: SAQI, 2007). @ 527. 
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SDK took nearly 38% of the votes across Yugoslavia (the JNS took just over 60%), and 75% of 
the vote within the Croatian majority portions of the country.7  The leadership of the SDK, still 
heavily dominated by members of the HSS, used this strong electoral showing to renew the push 
for dismantling the centralized government structure and establishing some form of self 
government for Croatia.  Thus, the emergence of popular support for the preservationist 
perspective coincided with the renewed Croatian push for political autonomy.  
 
The Origins of the Urban Preservationist Efforts 
 The outlines of this struggle were established early on.  The preservationists presented 
their attack on the modernists vision as a narrow critique, rather than a broad assault on the 
project overall.  The 1935 Večer article cited previously was an example of the direction this 
mode of contestation would take.  The article did not challenge the goal of modernizing Zagreb.  
Rather, it challenged specific projects as damaging to the historic character of the city.  This 
argument had power because it was based on ideas which had already been established within 
the consciousness of the urban population of Zagreb, including the modernist camp.   
The concept of spatially transforming the city from its old dyadic division between 
Gradec and Kaptol, into a new dyad of Novi (New) and Stari (Old) was codified in the mid 
1920s, when the local historian Emilij Laszowski published an updated history of Zagreb entitled 
simply Stari i Novi Zagreb.8  This work had clearly divided the city into historic and a modern 
parts, with Donji grad , the grand, modern city envisioned in 1864, as “Novi Zagreb” and Gradec 
and Kaptol as “Stari Zagreb.”  This construction was not an invention of Laszowski’s, but rather 
reflected the way the population of the city had come to see Zagreb’s urban space by the 1920s.  
                                                 
7 Ivo Goldstein, Hrvatska Povijest (Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2003). @ 259. 
8 Emilij Laszowski, Stari i Novi Zagreb (Zagreb: Braća Hrvatskog Zmaja, 1925; reprint, 1994, Školska knjiga). 
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Laszowski’s book also showed the extent to which the Croatian Metropolis vision of Croatian 
nationalism was embedded in the urban elite of Zagreb.  The first paragraph of the book stated: 
Are there anywhere Croats, for whom would not be dear Zagreb-city, the heart of 
all the Croats, the heart of Croatian culture and national consciousness. All the 
history of Zagreb is closely connected with the history of the Croatian people and 
its culture. Therefore it must be that every Croat has an interest in the history of 
Zagreb and its traditions.9  
 
But this work also showed how the Croatian Metropolis vision was already beginning to 
change into a preservationist trajectory by 1925.  The work was published by the Braća 
Hrvatskog Zmaja (the Brotherhood of the Croatian Dragon), an organization which had been 
founded in 1905.  The organization saw itself as “a guardian of Croatian sacred objects and 
traditions,”10 and spent much of its time collecting and preserving archival materials, but it also 
engaged in efforts to preserve historic buildings.  The book itself recounts one such effort that 
ultimately failed; a house in Dolac which had some historic significance.  Laszowski recounts 
the history of the Plemić house, and the efforts to save it.11  The preservation efforts began in 
1908, when Victor Kovačoć's plans for a new market in Dolac were first produced.12  But, as 
Laszowski admits, “The energy behind destruction [of the Plemić house] was very strong.”13     
The goal of this effort was limited, and not intended to halt the new market project or save the 
entire Dolac area, only this single building.  Yet despite this limited goal and the support of 
several prominent individuals, including a personal appeal by Iso Kršnjavi to the mayor in 1911, 
the final plans published in 1925 called for the demolition of the Plemić house to make way for 
the new Dolac marketplace.14 
                                                 
9 Ibid. @ 3. 
10 Juraj Kolarić, "Uvodna Riječ," in Stari i Novi Zagreb (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1994). @ 8. 
11 Laszowski, Stari i Novi Zagreb. @ 22-32. 
12 Ibid. @ 30. 




The struggle over this historic house in Dolac illuminates several important realities 
about the preservationist perspective in Zagreb before 1936.  First, the movement had its origins 
in the urban elite of Zagreb, and thus it was not just Stjepan Radić and his fellow Peasantists who 
were contemplating preservation as an important element of the Croatian national project.  
Secondly, though the movement was established by ‘insiders’ of the Croatian Metropolis project, 
these preservationists in Zagreb did not have much power or influence initially.  Even with more 
than a decade to plan and the backing of a few very significant individuals in Croatian society, 
they could not mobilize enough support to save a single building.  The preservationists 
themselves admitted that the modernists had a ‘very strong energy’ supporting them, and that the 
preservationist camp was fighting against a more powerful opinion in support of modernization 
at the time. 
Despite this balance in their favor, the modernists themselves had generally accepted this 
new division of the city and the goal of the preservation of Stari Zagreb in the 1931 competition 
announcement.15  But to the modernists, Stari Zagreb was seen as limited to a specifically 
defined area.  The competition announcement had specifically exempted Gradec from any new 
regulation, and specifically recognized the historic character of Kaptol and cautioned planners to 
take this into consideration in solving the traffic issues around Dolac.16  The call to respect the 
historic character of Stari Zagreb was very much a call to the modernists to abide by the 
guidelines and goals they had already set out.  But the preservationists also appropriated unto 
themselves the power to define which areas fell within these ‘historic’ older parts of the city. 
                                                 
15 "Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba Podaci i Smjernica,"  
(Narodne Novine, 1930). @ 58 & 68. 
16 Though, this view was not universally held among the modernists, as the calls to completely redesign parts of the 
older city in Svijet Magazine indicated.  
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The modernist initial response was an effort at accommodation.  They seem to have 
viewed the debate over the preservation of Stari Zagreb as a minor detail which had already been 
addressed in a broader culmination of the latest grand modernizing design.  The preservationists 
made no effort to derail the massive land clearing project south of the railroad tracks. The city 
even went so far as to add the phrase “and historic preservation of Kaptol” to the end of the 
official title of the regulatornia osnova proposal when it was formally sent to Belgrade for 
approval from the central government.17  But this accommodation did not satisfy the 
preservationists.  Once the general principle had been conceded by the modernists, the 
preservationists began to argue for a broader definition of Stari Zagreb.   
 
A Shift in Public Sentiment 
The incident that appears to have sparked the preservationist into stronger action did not 
relate to the new regulatornia osnova, but was a skirmish the developed unexpectedly in the 
spring of 1938 over construction on Jelačić square.  The contestation itself erupted in a matter of 
days, and was over almost as soon as it began, but it was very significant because it revolved 
around the space of Jelačić square, which even though it was no longer the city’s daily market, 
had remained central to the daily life of the city.  By 1930, Zagreb had six distinct sets of tram 
lines comprising 17 kilometers of track, all of which either originated in or passed through Ban 
Jelačić Square.18  Thus, not only did the city’s road system depend on Ban Jelačić Square to 
function as a linkage point between the older and newer parts of the city, but the public 
transportation system had established the square as the central linkage point as well.  This 
created a structural pattern that “pushed” the general population into the square.  In addition to 
                                                 
17 HDGZ-GPZ, "Generalni Regulacioni Plan za Grad Zagreb, 1932-1938,"  (Br. 13 veza sv. 59-68: F 24.). 




this structural “push” the emergence of the numerous cafes on the square through the second half 
of the 19th century also produced a cultural “pull” that augmented the main market as a reason to 
go to the square.  The result was the emergence of Ban Jelačić Square as a place for people to 
meet in a social setting.   
As the city grew larger, the logic of Jelačić square as the community’s space for social 
gathering grew stronger as the population growth was driven significantly by large migrations 
from the countryside.  This meant that much of the city’s population was very unfamiliar with 
the city itself.  But because of Jelačić square’s dual function as market and as transportation hub 
for the city, even the newest arrivals quickly became acquainted with the square’s location.  
Even after the main market had moved to Dolac, the square’s role as transportation hub meant 
that people going to Dolac would pass through the square on their way.  Thus, even newcomers 
with limited knowledge of the local geography would come to know the square very quickly.  
The square’s position as one of the city’s very few universally recognized locations and the fact 
that the city transportation system literally pulled people there led logically to Jelačić square 
being established as the city’s recognized meeting place.  
The population of the city did not just choose the square, though.   The population of 
Zagreb chose a specific space on the square as the recognized place for social connection: the tail 
of the statue of Ban Jelačić.  This social consensus was described by an Austrian who had arrived 
in Zagreb as a five year old child in 1938.  In his memoirs Wolfgang Georg Fischer described his 
experiences upon arrival in Zagreb: “…first I came to know the city’s landmarks… before 
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anything else the huge statue on the main city square devoted to Ban Jelačić.”19  Fischer includes 
this passage in his description of his personal fondness for the statue: 
Winking to each other, the people of Zagreb call out:  
 
Po grbom, po lepom,   Come rain or come shine, 
   Rendes pod repom!      Let’s meet under the tail! 
 
By that they mean the bronze tail on the horse….20 
 
 
The choice of the statue as meeting place is understandable, as it was located in the center of the 
square, and, with the removal of the Maduševac Well in 1912, was the only definitive landmark 
left on the square until the installation of a public clock in the late 1920s.  The choice of “under 
the tail” may seem odd at first glance, but there is logic to this particular location.  The back of 
the statue was the closest part of the monument to the largest part of the city and the tram lines 
on the south side of the square.  Thus, the tail was the closest part of the statue to the points 
where the majority of the city’s population would be arriving to the square. 
In this way, the square took on a new role in the lives of the residents of Zagreb.  The 
square became not only a functional space, where the necessities of survival were available.  The 
square now served a social function which drew the population to it, even if they did not intend 
on staying there once they had gathered in their social group.  In this way the square remained 
central to the daily life of the city past the end of its functional centrality as the main market 
space for the city.  It was this new social role of the square in the practice of daily life in Zagreb 
that ensured its importance would not diminish after the departure of the main market place. 
                                                 
19 Wolfgang Georg Fischer, Moblierte Zimmer, Munich 1975, @ 89-90. cited in: Dunja Rihtman-Aguštin, "The 
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In 1937 a new building project was announced that would replace one of the older houses 
built on the north side of the square and replace it with a new building owned by Assicurazionni 
Generali, an Italian insurance company.  The building had been designed by a well known 
Italian architect in Rome, in the Italian modernist style.21  The public reaction to the project was 
not a product of the concept of a new building, but the result of the process of building it.  For 
the new building to be built, the old one had to be removed.  This was accomplished in the spring 
of 1938 with the result that a new view of Gradec, now more often called Gornji grad (Upper 
Town), was created.  For the first time in almost eight decades, people could stand on Ban 
Jelačić Square and see the older part of the city. 
 The response from the population of the city was intense interest in the new view.   On 
the 18th of May Hrvatski dnevnik (Croatian Diary), the “Organ of the right wing of the HSS,”22 
published a piece with a photograph of the view entitled “From Jelačić square is opened a view 
onto Gronji grad.”23 The article argued that the new situation should be made permanent and the 
permit to build on the location be withdrawn.  In presenting this idea, the paper specifically 
contrasted the image of the old city with the modern buildings being built on the square, extoling 
the “romantic location” of the older part of the city and declaring that “This contrast between the 
new and modern Jelačić square and the old Upper Town distinguishes deeply and 
impressively.”24   
Three days later, Hrvatski dnevnik published another article with the same photograph 
entitled “The View From Jelačić Square” and a headline which stated: “Zagrebites wish [hope] 
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that the view from Jelačić Square to Upper Town won’t be cutoff by a tall building.”25  The 
article was described as a consolidation of a large number of letters to the paper from the public. 
We received several letters from citizens, from which we bring in short this:  
The view from Jelačić square as can be seen today after the demolition of 
buildings on the corner and Radic [street] and Jelačić square, is the same as it was 
in 1851.  In those days ban Jelačić issued the provision, by which to carry out the 
project with the foundation and construction of a walking park around the entire 
Gronji grad. These files still exist and were transferred into the regulatornia 
osnova of the Zagreb City program among other walks still raise a nice view of 
Gronji grad from Jelačić square. The city's government,  as a general obligation 
for the case of building a skyscraper, should call public proceedings before 
dividing society with a building permit, so that citizens who are interested in the 
vicinity, and those who are interested in this question as citizens of Zagreb, may 
make statements about this project. 
 
This effort to tie the preservation of the new view of Gornji grad to Ban Jelačić himself 
represented a deliberate effort to present the goals of the preservationist as a necessary act of 
respect for the Ban and his vision of the city. 
Shortly after the piece ran, another, larger article appeared in the Zagreb press by Gjuro 
Szabo, a local historian, titled “The Resurrection of Old Zagreb.”26  In this piece, Szabo argued 
that the new view was important because it connected the population of Zagreb to their forgotten 
past.  He lamented of the current generation of Zagrebites that “They pass along the streets of 
Lower Town as if they no nothing of the existence of Upper Town, which in truth, not long ago 
was Zagreb, which built Lower Town.”27  The piece included two photographs, to show how the 
new view compared to the view of Gornji grad in earlier times. But the photographs themselves 
actually illustrate how little interest there had been in this particular visual connection in the past.  
The photograph of the “Former Jelačić Square” was not taken from ground level, but from either 
the top floor or roof of a building on the south side of the square. 
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The View Upon Gornji Grad From The Former Jelačić Square28 
 
The View Upon Gornji Grad Today29 




 This is clear when the two photographs are compared, as the photograph taken in 1938 was from 
a much lower angle.  The absence of an actual image, either as an artists drawing or a 
photograph, of the view as it had existed before the first building blocking the view of Gornji 
grad from the square indicates that interest in the view was only piqued after it had been 
blocked. 
On the 25th of May, the newspaper Obzor, now the voice of the urban establishment in 
Zagreb, voiced support for the proposal of leaving the view open as well, arguing that there must 
be some way to reach an accommodation with the land’s new owners to leave the plot open.30  
Obzor did not completely support the idea of leaving the site vacant, but rather supporting 
building a shorter building that would not block the view, perhaps with a café on the roof so 
people could relax and enjoy the view in comfort.31  Despite this broad consensus across the 
political spectrum opposing it, no public hearings were held and the Assicurazionni Generali 
building project proceeded on schedule. 
This broad agreement across the entire spectrum of the Zagreb press supporting a call for 
historic preservation was new, and represented a broad shift in general sympathy for the 
preservationist perspective.  Perhaps, because the issue in question was not even a technical 
matter of historic preservation, some parts of the urban establishment felt comfortable supporting 
the call to leave the new view intact.  But the core of the argument to preserve the view, as 
expressed by prof. Gjuro Szabo, was not just to enhance the aesthetic of Jelačić square, but to 
counteract to some degree the success of the modernists in establishing the new, modern parts of 
the city as the lived space of Zagreb.  By maintaining a direct view of the older part of the city in 
Jelačić square, the preservationists sought to establish a permanent reminder of the ‘historic’ 
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character of the city, and thus make Stari Zagreb part of the lived space of the city for its entire 
population. 
The emergence of a broad consensus in support of preserving the historic view of Gornji 
grad seems to have encouraged them to engage in even more efforts and directly challenged the 
portions of the regulatornia osnova which they saw relating to Stari Zagreb.  On 24th of June, 
1938 the city government formally proposed a package of three laws to enact the new urban 
plan:   
Regulation for the execution of the general regulation plan for the city of Zagreb 
 
Regulation for the execution of the general and conservation plan for the 
historical part of Zagreb 
 
Building Regulations for the City of Zagreb32 
 
These three separate proposals indicate how significant the preservationist challenge was 
becoming, by the proposal of a separate law specifically focused on historic preservation of the 
older part of the city.  The law’s specific wording also indicated the extent to which the 
preservationists were making progress.  The 1936 proposal had included the phrase, “historical 
preservation of Kaptol.”  This new law was less definitive in title, and therefore encompassed a 
larger part of the city than just Kaptol. 
 The challenge to the new urban plan began before the laws were even formally proposed.  
Building on the momentum of the Assicurazionni Generali efforts, one Dr. Petar Knoll wrote an 
extensive critique of the new plan entitled, Stari Zagreb (A Review of the Regulatory Plan), 
which was published in the journal Zagreb, the “The Social Review for Zagrebians” in June.33  A 
summary of the same plan was published in Večer on the 14th of June, 1938.  The paper billed 
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the review as the “cries from the heart of every good citizen of Zagreb «Leave Stari Zagreb in 
Peace»”34  The sub-headline asked “Is Zagreb unable, from its enormous territory, to preserve a 
small place for the monuments of its own cultural past?”  The significant aspect of Dr. Knoll’s 
critiques of the new plan was how it sought to shift the debate.  Despite the attention grabbing 
headline of the story, the new regulatornia osnova did not impose any physical changes on stari 
Zagreb.  The preservation of Gradec and the limits on new regulation for Kaptol had been 
accepted as a foundation of any new plan going back to the 1931 competition announcement, 
which had stated very clearly that “Gornji grad … is to be excluded from any regulation, so as to 
retain its historical-cultural characteristics and individuality.”35 and “Because as is historically 
known in Zagreb, Kaptol, with Gornji grad is the most important part of the city.”36 
 Dr. Knoll was not arguing for merely preserving the areas where there was now public 
consensus, but for expanding the zone of regulatory protection to areas that had a spatial 
influence on the ‘historic’ parts of the city.  The reference to Gornji grad in the critique was not 
limited to the hilltop community, but the streets surrounding it, Ilica, Bregovita ulica, Duga 
ulica, and  Mesnička ulica.37  This approach was clearly illustrated by Dr. Knoll’s call for 
restrictions on development along Ilica.   This street was a main thoroughfare from the western 
part of the new Donji grad into Jelačić square, and owed it significant growth as a middle class 
shopping center to the fact that it connected Jelačić square to Savska street, and was therefore the 
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northern boundary of the area “which is known to be the future center of the new lower town” 38 
from the original concept of Zagreb’s development dating back to the early 1860s.  By the late 
1930s, the street was already fully developed.  The new building regulations put no limit on how 
tall buildings on Ilica could be.  As a result, Dr. Knoll argued that because Ilica ran along the 
bottom of the hill upon which Gronji grad sat, future construction of tall buildings would block 
the view of the older part of town, as well as well as leave those on the walking park around 
Gronji grad nothing to see but the back side of new building, which would block the view of the 
newer parts of Zagreb.39  This concern was clearly based not in preserving the physical integrity 
of Stari Zagreb, but in preserving the spatial connection between Stari and Novi Zagreb; an echo 
of prof. Gjuro Szabo’s argument as to why the Assicurazionni Generali project on Jelačić square 
needed to be blocked.  Dr. Knoll argued that he did not oppose the establishment of a new 
regulatory plan for the city, nor did he oppose the dramatic expansion for the city envisioned in 
the existing regulatornia osnova plan.  The core of Dr. Knoll’s argument was an effort to expand 
the idea of urban preservation beyond simply preventing the destruction of the older parts of the 
city.  This new concept of preservation called for also maintaining certain aspects of the visual 
and spatial relationships between both the older and newer parts of the city. 
 The challenge presented by the publication of Dr. Knoll’s views was significant enough 
that the authors of the new regulatornia osnova published a detailed response on the 22nd of 
June, two days before the new laws were formally proposed.  Večer billed the response by the 
city planners as the joining of “The battle over stari Zagreb.”40  The response was a very detailed 
effort to refute the preservationist arguments.  Prof. Bauer, the chief city planner, referred to very 
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specific issues, and addressed them in very concrete terms.  The very first point of rebuttal 
illustrates the logic of the response: 
Moving on to some criticism of the objections must be stated:  
1. That for practical reasons the proposed protection is completely 
inappropriate for the block of houses between Ilica, Mesnička street and the 
Dežman passage. This block does not contain even a single house worth 
protecting unless it is possibly the house at Mesnička street no. 1 (The Rosenfeld 
House), which must eventually fall to expand Ilica. The unconditional need for 
the expansion of Ilica is probably not doubted by any rational person in Zagreb, 
and after the expansion there will be a more general debate about the historical 
character which the Ilica criticisms mentioned.  
Even suggesting putting a portion of Ilica under the stricter regulations 
encountered for the construction of historical areas would undoubtedly justify the 
fiercest resistance to the legitimate owners and the public. [emphasis in the 
original]41 
 
Clearly the modernist position was that there were two issues involved in the regulation of Ilicia, 
one of necessity, and the other of public consensus.  The street needed to be expanded, and to 
that end some small sacrifices might be required.  But, there was no public consensus on the idea 
that Ilica itself was an historic part of town, and to suggest that the street was would simply fuel 
resistance to progress, rather than a rational public debate about the proposition. 
The response also specifically addressed the broader issue of the walking park and the 
view, both from and to the park.  The Prof. Bauer countered that the proposed development, 
which the preservationist argument decried, would actually produce attractive buildings that 
would be nice views of their own.   Prof. Bauer also argued that the side of the new buildings 
facing the hill upon which Gradec was located would be just as attractive as those facing the 
street, and cited the recently built Obrin Bank building as proof this phenomenon.  Prof. Bauer 
concluded his response to the critique of the impact of development on the view to and from the 
Strossmayer walking park by stating:  “The prominent law of architecture stating that houses 
should not be built under a hill with a view to the crest refers to a single house but does not apply 




to the entire street or blocks separated by a hill (Prague, Salzburg, Graz).”42  This was an effort 
to mobilize both a recognized consensus on architecture and city planning with a direct reference 
to cities where these principles had been applied successfully in the same way the city planners 
of Zagreb wanted to apply them here.  The core of these responses was more than a simple 
factual rebuttal.  The tone shows an underlying view that the modernists believed the 
preservationists were not being sincere or intellectually honest in their arguments. 
The preservationist position amounted to a clear effort to expand the footprint of Gornji 
grad beyond the hilltop portion of the town, the very reason it was known as the Upper Town, 
onto the streets surrounding it.  At the core of this debate was a shifting of ground under the 
modernist position.  The preservationists were attempting to extend the definition of ‘historic’ 
beyond the previous consensus of Kaptol and Gornji grad, to all of Stari Zagreb.  Such a shift in 
the definition of what was an ‘historic’ part of the city, if successful, would have a significant 
impact on future modernist plans for development in the older parts of the city.  The most 
immediate effect of such a change would be the area between Gradec and Kaptol, which one 
modernist writer had described as the “ugliest parts of the city.”43  This new equation of ‘old’ 
with ‘historic’ would prevent any effort to modernize this part of the city, which was clearly on 
the modernist agenda.   
 The debate between Professor Bauer and Dr. Knoll showed how the debate over the 
modernization of the city had shifted.  The preservationists had advanced from a position of 
focusing on a single building project, to confronting the entire building program in the older 
parts of town.  Dr. Knoll’s arguments with regard to the impact of the new regulations on the 
walking park around Gornji grad also showed how the preservationists had learned to mobilize 
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the aesthetic arguments against modernization previously used by the modernists.  In the 1920s 
and early 30s the modernists had pushed urban redevelopment in the older parts of Zagreb as a 
way to remove “ugly” buildings and disorderly areas to beautify the city.  By 1938, the 
preservationists were mobilizing the aesthetic value of the views to and from the walking park to 
justify limits on new development. 
 It is important to note the preservationists showed absolutely no interest in saving the 
hundreds of buildings which would be demolished throughout the periphery of the city under the 
new plan.  In addition, many of the buildings on the streets surrounding Gornji grad were newer 
than some of the “wild buildings” on the periphery.  Some of the roughly 200 older buildings in 
Stari Zagreb which were endangered by the new regulatornia osnova were in fact, little more 
than peasant houses themselves, though they were tightly packed together, giving them an urban 
form.   They could not be improved up to the modern building codes, but would have to be 
completely demolished if the owners wished to make any improvements to them.  Yet, in the 
minds of the preservationists, these houses were to be protected because of their location in the 
oldest part of the city. 
 It is in the contrast of attitudes about the different parts of the city that the meaning of 
‘historic’ for the preservationists can be gleaned.  Those areas the preservationists considered 
‘historic’ were those areas built in an urban context before the founding of the new Yugoslav 
state.  These buildings were not being saved for their architectural value; many were in fact in 
very poor shape and of little architectural interests.  They were being preserved because they 
were evidence of an urban Croatia that predated even the idea of Yugoslavia.  The ‘wild 
buildings’ on the periphery of the city had mostly been built since then end of World War One 
and the founding of the new Yugoslav state.  Though there were a few older structures in the 
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area on the periphery, for the most part, clearing these areas and replacing them with a modern 
street grid and modern buildings would simply replace one form of the Yugoslav part of the city 
with another.  Therefore, what ‘historic’ really meant for the preservationists, even if they could 
not articulate it, was pre-Yugoslav. 
 The new strength and broader goals of the preservationist movement coincided with 
growing popularity for the SDK.  That increasing strength was reflected in the results of 
parliamentary elections held in December of 1938, where the SDK’s share of the vote grew to 
45% across Yugoslavia.44  Of significant concern to the regime in Belgrade was the fact that this 
growth in electoral power came not just from further solidifying the HSS support in Croatian 
areas, but also with SDS gains in Serbian parts of Yugoslavia as well.45  This fact threatened the 
ability of the regime in Belgrade to ensure future electoral victories.  
In addition to this mounting domestic political pressure, the government in Belgrade was 
also facing a rapidly deteriorating international environment.  Yugoslavia had cultivated close 
ties with France after World War I.  Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s Yugoslavia, along 
with Poland and Czechoslovakia, had been a key part of Anglo-French efforts to contain, initially 
the Soviet Union, and later a resurgent Germany as well.  In March of 1938, Germany had 
annexed Austria, creating a mutual border between Yugoslavia and Germany and raised the 
specter of a new irredentist claim to Slovenia, in addition to the Italian claims on Dalmatia, the 
Hungarian claims against Croatia and Slavonia, and Bulgarian claims to Macedonia.  
Yugoslavia’s position deteriorated further in September of 1938, when France and England 
compelled Czechoslovakia to accede to German demands and surrender the Sudetenland, and 
then remained passive in March of 1939 when Germany annexed Bohemia.  By the summer of 
                                                 




1939 it was conceivable that disaffection in Croatia could be used as a pretext to engineer an 
effort to dismantle the Yugoslav state as well, which could lead to open war. 
This combination of domestic and international pressures led to serious negotiations on 
decentralizing the government of Yugoslavia.46  In the summer of 1939 the Sporazum 
(agreement) was worked out between the SDK representatives and the government in Belgrade 
on Croatian autonomy.  By the end of August, 1939, the various laws required were passed 
through the Yugoslav parliament to create an autonomous Croatian Banovina with broad self-
governing powers. 47  This effectively brought into reality Stjepan Radic’s vision of a Croatian 
republic within a Yugoslav state, and the SDK with the HSS as the majority member of the 
coalition, became the governing party of this territory.48 
 The political uncertainty revolving around the new political push for Croatian autonomy 
had essentially put any other contentious political issues to the side, including the approval of the 
new regulatornia osnova.  No significant action was taken to move the three laws required for 
the implementation of the plan after they were proposed in the summer of 1938.  This delay 
allowed more time for other alternatives to be proposed.  One significant alternative plan was 
published in 1939, in the journal Zagreb.  The proposals was an new plan to resolve the “railway 
question” by removing the tracks that separated Donji grad from the newly planned residential 
district to the south, but leave the main train station in its original position.49 
The author of the plan, Eng. Mondecar, opened his argument for the change by stating: 
Recently, Hrvatski dnevnik reported on the solution of the railway junction in 
Zagreb as presented in the regulatornia osnova. I therefore offer this proposal, if 
the regulatornia osnova is for change - a change in my belief is absolutely a must 
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- let it be a basic question or backbone of the plan, the railway issue resolved 
radically… [bold in original]50 
 
This “radical” plan would abandon the concept proposed in the original competition 
announcement of three separate rail stations51 and re-route the main rail lines outside around the 
city. Though the author called his concept radical, it was similar in many ways to the 
regulatornia osnova proposed in 1907, which had envisioned removing the railroad track 
entirely from the center of town and placing three separate train stations in the eastern, western, 
and southern outskirts of the city.52   
 
Map of Alternative Plan for the Solution to the Railroad Question53 
The new plan retained the now five decade old Main Train Station, which would now be located 
in nearly the exact center of the expanded city. The railroad tracks would reach the main train 
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station by running north-south in the area which had been designed in the official regulatornia 
osnova as a long park running south of the train station to the Sava River, essentially an 
extension of the Zrinjevac park north of the railroad station.     
Initially, this plan would seem to have little connection to the desire to preserve the 
‘historic’ parts of the city, but preservation was very much at the core of the proposal.  Zrinjevac 
and the rest of the Green Horseshoe in Donji grad had become a home for Croatia’s national 
institutions.55 The new city plan implied this new park area was to serve the same function for 
the future.  Though no specific institutions were identified as planned to move to the new park, 
that this was already being envisioned was clear from some of the competition entries in 1931.  
One entry by a Croatian architectural firm in particular expressly called for moving all the key 
national and city institutions into a consolidated national mall south of the Main Train Station. 
By replacing the new park with a new rail yard, the Zagreb journal proposal essentially 
forestalled the movement of older institutions from older parts of the city as had been the 
deliberate policy of the city for over half a century.  This would ensure that Gornji grad would 
remain the physical home of Croatia’s key seats of power, and the Green Horseshoe would 
remain the home of the city’s cultural institutions.  The removal of the new central park thus 
would prevent key institutions from being embedded in the most modern, Yugoslav part of the 
city.  Therefore, what appeared on the surface to be a practical effort at a better solution to the 
“railroad question,” was also a very effective way of preserving Zagreb’s symbolic spatial order 
and ensuring that Croatia’s national institutions remained in the Croatian part of Zagreb.56 
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Proposal for the Park South of the Main Train Station, 1931 Competition57 
  
A Defining Defeat for the Modernists 
The creation of the Croatian Banovina at the end of 1939 established the HSS in power in 
Croatia.  One of the effects of this was to put the HSS in a much stronger position in relation to 
local governance in Zagreb itself.59  This lead to a struggle with the modernists over the 
completion of key element of the endowment block project: the Neboder.  As discussed in 
Chapter 6, the endowment block project was initiated as a way to accomplish several of the city’s 
goals simultaneously.  The land for the project was located on the southwest corner of Jelačić 
square, where the testament hospital had been located.  The plan had been to sell off the land to 
private developers to pay for the construction of a new, modern hospital.  In 1932 a new, 
detailed, plan for the endowment block was displayed for the public.  Part of this plan included a 
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16 story skyscraper or Neboder on Jelačić square.60  With the advent of the global economic 
downturn of the Great Depression, investment capital for such a large building project as the one 
proposed was very hard to raise.   As a result, the city adopted the new design in principle, but 
broke the actual plan down into 13 component plots and sold them off individually, with one of 
the plots reserved for the Neboder that had been part of the unified project.  With the land thus 
subdivided, 6 of the plots were sold and developed immediately, and another 5 were sold and 
developed by 1937.61  But the Neboder remained un-built. 
 In 1937, the same year as the Assicurazionni Generali announced their new building, the 
Czech firm Bata announced that they intended to build a Neboder designed by Drago Ibler on the 
empty plot they had purchased the year previously.62  This new project, was approved by the city 
in 1938, but began facing several challenges.  The first challenge was the political uncertainty 
surrounding the situation in Czechoslovakia at the time.  From the spring of 1938 until the spring 
of 1939 Czechoslovakia was locked in a territorial dispute with Germany which brought Europe 
to the brink of open war.  Germany’s annexation of all of Czechoslovakia in March of 1939 
ended the crisis, but it was months before Bata, the firm which wanted to build the Neboder 
could move forward with the project.  By then the HSS was firmly in control of the governing 
apparatus in Croatia, including the local government in Zagreb, and they moved to block the 
construction.    
 The reason for the move to prevent the construction of the Neboder was a fundamental 
shift in public perception of the character of Ban Jelačić square.  An indication of this shift was 
evident in the 1937 article in Hrvatski dnevnik calling attention to the new view of Gornji grad: 
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At the time of the removal of Testament Hospital on Jelačić square, there were 
many discussions and proposals, what types of houses and buildings needed to be 
built on the grounds of the former Testament Hospital.  Many were misled from 
one proper standpoint, that on this place needed to be built houses, which would 
in an architectural view appear in collective unity with the buildings on Jelačić 
Square… [Ellipses in original] But – how that question was resolved – we know.  
We received those modern “boxes”, which to every layman, who is not [even] 
acquainted with architectural culture, bothers and stings in the eyes.  They appear 
only for material use – and in the unity and beauty of Jelačić square no one can 
imagine.63 
 
The “boxes” in question were the two plain brick and glass buildings built on either side of the 
plot of land reserved for the Neboder in the original endowment block project.  This shows a 
sentiment that modern buildings were no longer an appropriate form on the square, but it does 
not explain why. 
Underlying this shift in sentiment was a transformation of the meaning of the Ban Jelačić 
monument in the minds of the population of Zagreb since the end of the First World War. The 
end of World War I had also ended the central focus of Croatian political life up to that point, the 
perpetually contentious relationship with Hungary.  This emptied the Ban Jelačić monument of 
its popular meaning as the symbol of that perpetual struggle with the Hungarians.  Ban Jelačić’s 
monument was now seen by the population of Zagreb as reflecting all of Croatian history.  As 
Rebecca West describes the statue in 1937: 
For this is one of the strangest statues in the world.  It represents Yellatchitch[sic] 
as leading his troops on horseback and brandishing a sword in the direction of 
Budapest, in which direction he had indeed led them to victory against the 
Hungarians in 1848; and this is not a new statue erected since Croatia was 
liberated from Hungary.  It stood in the market-place, commemorating a 
Hungarian defeat, in the days when Hungary was master of Croatia, and the 
explanation does not lie in Hungarian magnanimity.  It takes the whole of 
Croatian history to solve the mystery.64 
 
                                                 
63 "S Jelačićevog Trga Otvorio se Pogled na Gornji Grad." 
64 Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia, 1994 ed. (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1994; reprint, 1994). @ 48. 
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From this point, West begins a six page history of the Croats beginning with the arrival of the 
Slavic tribes in Southeastern Europe in the 7th century.  Despite the impression she gives before 
this passage to have just discovered the subject of the statue (her feigned ignorance can be 
attributed to literary license), this was West’s third trip to Yugoslavia and she had many friends 
among the Yugoslav elite, including in Zagreb.  The interpretation that “It takes the whole of 
Croatian history to solve the mystery.” was not just hers; it was her interpretation of how those in 
Zagreb had explained the statue to her, which she was now explaining it to the reader.  A new 
generation of Zagrebites had re-interpreted the Ban Jelačić monument to represent contemporary 
political circumstances.   
 This shift in the public understanding of the Ban Jelačić monument is not surprising, as it 
is simply the continuation of the pattern that had been established shortly after the monument 
had been installed.65  The significance of the resistance to the Neboder project is that it indicates 
that the understanding of the statue as monument to all Croatian history had been extended 
beyond the statue itself, and now was imbedded in the entire space of the square as well.  This 
thread of the debate over the Neboder was clearly articulated in the spring of 1940, in Večer, 
which published a full page editorial expressing deep frustration with the situation.  The paper 
was especially vexed by the fact that the city government was now resisting the implementation 
of the very plan that it had approved in 1932 and again in 1938.  The editorial directly confronted 
the preservationist argument by stating: 
Now look upon our Jelačić Square.  And say, what is on that square still that can 
be saved?  And what is on the square that needs to be saved?  And what on it, 
except the horse and rider, is historical?  And the city authority just [say] on that 
Jelačić Square [there is] something to save.  What, nobody knows.66 
 
                                                 
65 See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the shifting of the orientation of the Ban Jelačić monument in the public 
imagination of the population of Zagreb. 
66 "Je li Opravdana Borba Protiv Nebodera," Večer, 8, IV. 1940. 
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In a purely factual sense, the paper was correct.  By 1940, the statue of Ban Jelačić was the 
oldest and most historical element of the square.  Almost every other element of the square had 
been removed, replaced, or somehow rebuilt in the 74 years since the statue’s installation.   But 
the paper also understood this issue was not entirely one of fact.  Večer acknowledged that the 
government resisting the Neboder project was a response to a shift in public opinion about 
development on the square, admitting with incredulity: “And now it is in fashion to fight against 
the skyscraper on Jelačić square!”67   
Večer’s use of the term “in fashion” was an indication that the modernists saw the shift in 
public opinion as merely temporary, and subject to change, as with any other popular fashion.  
Yet there is evidence within their own arguments that the modernists may have lost the debate 
over the Neboder because they themselves we already half preservationist in their thinking.  The 
question “And what on it, except the horse and rider, is historical?” has embedded in it an 
understanding of the statue that was ultimately an inversion of its original purpose.  When the 
Ban Jelačić statue had been originally imagined and installed it had two clear purposes, which 
were aspirational, rather than “historical.”  One was to modernize the city of Zagreb, to 
symbolically elevate it from the collection of medieval towns into a national metropolis.  
Another was to concretize the specific geo-spatial political order of 1848; a unified, autonomous 
Croatia with Zagreb as its capital.  The Ban Jelačić statue was therefore as much, if not more of a 
challenge for the future as it was a monument to the past.  It was a challenge to build a city 
worthy of the idea of the Croatian Metropolis, and a challenge to become a unified, autonomous 
state once again. 
The modernist acceptance of the Ban Jelačić statue as “historical” was an inversion of the 
statue’s original purpose.  When it was imagined and installed, the statue had been about the 




future, much more than the past.  The acceptance of the “historical” nature of the statue by the 
modernists is particularly significant, because the original purpose of the statue itself could have 
been a powerful argument in support of their goals.  The presence of the statue, when tied to its 
original purposes, could have been used to point to Jelačić square as the “historic” showcase of 
Croatian modernity.  By not making this point, the modernists allowed the Neboder to be 
imagined as a challenge, rather than a complement to the Ban Jelačić monument. 
The population of Zagreb was re-orienting the Ban Jelačić statue in time in the same way 
a previous generation had reoriented the statue in space.  Between the 1870s and 1900, the 
population of the city had reoriented the statue from facing Vienna to facing Budapest.  In that 
process, they had also reoriented the statue in time, from the future, to the present: from the 
statue leading forward into the future, to the statue representing the present circumstance of 
Croatia and its relationship with Hungary.  But by the late 1930s, the statue looked back, into all 
of Croatia’s history. 
This transformation in the public image of the statue is completely understandable based 
on two specific aspects of the statue; first as a place of history, and second as a place of memory.  
As a place of history, the Ban Jelačić statue had been a key piece of the public political theater 
which Stjepan Radić had used to launch his political career 1895.  The statue had also been a key 
place in Radić's re-launching of the HSS at the end of World War One.68  These events had 
created a place in Croatian history for the Ban Jelačić monument.  Radić's role as both the most 
prominent Croatian politician of the time, and his role as both national here and national martyr 
clearly reinforced this historic element of the statue as a place.  Where Stjepan Radić's exploits 
may have been interesting, but abstract, to the general population, Radić's funeral was not.  And 
                                                 
68 See Chapter 5 for an extensive discussion of these issues. 
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even if they had not been on Jelačić square for the event, the photographs published afterwards 
focused on the square.69 
Perhaps, more important than the historical nature of the square in the era of Stjepan 
Radić, was the significance of the square, and the Ban Jelačić statue, in daily life.  On a level that 
was much more personal though, the emergence of the statue as a central element of the daily life 
of the city meant that it would become embedded in the memory of the population.  As the 
square and the statue itself became central to the social life of the city, the statue became part of 
their individual life of much of the population of the city.  Once this transformation in social 
space was effected, the statue would become embedded in many personal memories.  This was 
particularly true of the urban elite, those for whom the rituals of daily life in the city would be 
most embedded.  Thus, as the statue became a key site of memory, the ability to imagine it as a 
place of the future became much more problematic. 
These changes in the meaning of the statue both complemented and masked the new 
meaning of ‘historic’ in the debate over urban development in Zagreb at the time.  The 
modernists’ (which were essentially the entire national elite of Croatia) tight embrace of 
Yugoslavia at the end of World War One and through the 1920s economic boom had been 
pronounced.  The economic rewards to Zagreb from their entry into Yugoslavia had been 
immense as well, with the city rapidly surpassing the capital of Belgrade in industrial 
development and capital accumulation.70 By 1930, the modernists were even suggesting that 
Zagreb was not just the Croatian Metropolis, but the Yugoslav metropolis as well, at least in 
terms of economic and cultural power.71  In 1931, the magazine Svijet had gone so far as to 
                                                 
69 "Veličanstven Sprovod Stjepana Radića," Svijet, 18 Kolovoz (August) 1928. 
70 Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country  @ 120. 
71 "Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba Podaci i Smjernica." 
@ 18, 48. 
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directly tie the idea of the Neboder to the idea of Yugoslavia by using the image of the Yugoslav 
Royal Standard over Ban Jelačić Square, flying from the imagined top of the new building.72  
Thus, modern had been paired with Yugoslav in the public imagination in Zagreb through the 
first decade of Yugoslavia.   
As general sentiment turned against the centralized governing model of the Yugoslav 
system in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the term historic began to change into not just a term 
connoting importance to the past in the context of urban development in Zagreb.  By the late 
1930s the term historic was used to describe anything that predated Yugoslavia’s founding in 
1918 regardless of its architectural significance or connection to events of historic significance.  
But even using this broad new definition of historic it would have been difficult to apply it to 
Ban Jelačić square in total.  By 1940, the only building that was both historic in character and 
appearance on the square was the Felbinger house.73  Every other building had been replaced or 
significantly changed since installation of the Ban Jelačić monument.  Even the grand palaces 
which had been built on the square’s north side before the First World War had been stripped of 
their elaborate façades and now were starkly modernist in appearance.  This indicates that the 
extension of the designation of historic to the square, and the use of that designation to block the 
building of the Neboder was about something deeper.   
By 1940, the term historic, in the context of Zagreb’s urban debate, was seen as Croatian, 
the opposite of modern and Yugoslav.  Thus, the square was now historic because it was a 
definitively Croatian national space.  Building a modern, and thus Yugoslav, Neboder was 
therefore a transgression of the square.  It did not matter that the older building had been 
removed a decade earlier and that the space for the Neboder project was a temporary one story 
                                                 
72 Svijet, 13. VI. 1931. 
73 "Kronologija Trga Republike u Zagrebu," Čovjek i Prostor, Ožujak (March) 1977. 
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shoe store.74  The problem with the Neboder was its modernity.  Its height would dominate the 
square and overshadow the Ban Jelačić monument.  The Neboder’s form would be embedded in 
the daily life of the city, embedding Yugoslavia at the heart of the Croatian Metropolis.  Thus, 
the fact that it was “in fashion” to oppose the building of the Neboder was as much about 
resistance to Yugoslavia as it was about resistance to the project itself. 
Ultimately, the HSS government gave the modernists almost everything they desired.  In 
April of 1940, just before the first municipal elections in the new autonomous Croatian 
Banovina, the new leadership of the city government approved the three key laws which were the 
legal foundation for implementing the 1936 regulatornia osnova.75  But the small part they held 
back, approval to build the Neboder, was the most critical symbolically.  By expanding the 
imaginative definition of ‘historical’ to Ban Jelačić Square, the preservationists had taken control 
of the center of daily life in the city.  The square was no longer to be a showcase of the 
modernity of the Croatian nation, but a monument to its history.  The center of daily life in 
Zagreb now reinforced the preservationist vision of the Croatian national project.  But this was 
not simply a top down decision, as even the modernists confessed.  It was a reflection of the 
views of the broad majority of the city’s population.  The shift in the imagined space of the 
square reflected a fundamental shift in the core trajectory of the entire Croatian national project 
had shifted from one of modernization to historical preservation.  On a practical level, 
modernization would continue, but the key symbolic space of Zagreb would be a place of 
history, not continued modern development. 
 How the modernists could deal with the loss of the square as a key symbolic space was 
illustrated by a piece published in Večer on 20 June, 1940, described as a “letter from a 
                                                 
74 Blau, Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. @ 135. 
75 Perić, Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. @ 238 
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citizen.”76  It took the city government to task for its failure to maintain the square in a condition 
befitting its significance.     
All the citizens of Zagreb looked with joy on the beautiful masonry 
building of the Assicurazioni Generali on Jeličeć square. The delight of 
Zagrebians was even greater when the building was finished. - However, just as 
the building was finished, they began to dig a sap, a canal and that construction 
lasted for months, delaying traffic, besides, everyone can calculate the damage, 
which is borne by traders, inaccessibility to individual stores and about the 
windows, do not speak ... They dug a canal, covered a canal, but what is the most 
beautiful: earth, which is piled on those gullies, and the Zagreb citizens and 
pensioners have remained until now good natured – disappointed – about this 
land, and such plans for the north eastern part of Jelačić square ... 
 For months and months in front of the most beautiful and most important 
Palace on Jelačić square in many places the ground is unpaved, uneven and 
dangerous for the dainty feet of the fairer sex ... During the rains the pit fills with 
water, mud is created, the same at the various town merchants, customers in the 
surrounding stores, all in the heart of our white Zagreb-city. 
 I believe as soon as relevant and as soon as possible to put right this part 
of Jelačić square and finally pave the north-eastern side of Jelačić square so it is 
really beautiful and the pride of the Croatian metropolis. It is time to put it in 
order, I have no doubt, that the government and the mayor will take care of the 
heart of Zagreb and put it in order as required. Your constant reader and 
subscriber. L.77  
 
This letter demonstrates how the HSS government’s stewardship of the square could be 
mobilized against it, and how embedded the idea of the Croatian Metropolis was in the discourse 
of the city.  In fact, the letter reprises the same verbiage of the welcome to the Emperor in 1895, 
referring to the “our white Zagreb” as well.  But at the core is a challenge to the current city 
government to maintain the square in a state that befitted the Croatian Metropolis.  Despite the 
final statement of confidence in the city government to “put it in order as required,” the tone of 
the letter was a lack of confidence.  It was, in a sense, the modernists turning the tables back on 
the preservationists, demanding the new HSS government maintain the square to the standards of 
the ‘historic’ site they claimed to hold it as.  If the new government could not maintain the 
                                                 




square, the modernists would use that fact as a reminder in the daily life of the city to contrast the 
preservationists with the modernists.  The modernists wished to build grand buildings on the 
square and could accomplish that task, as they just had with the Assicurazioni Generali building.  




 The period of 1936 to 1940 was one in which there was a significant contestation over the 
symbolic trajectory of the Croatian national project, from a modernizing direction to one of 
preserving Croatian society while maintaining the material modernizing aspects of the Croatian 
Metropolis project.  This contestation was carried out across Croatian society, but one of the 
significant areas of this contestation was the future development of the urban space of Zagreb, 
and Ban Jelačić Square in particular.  By 1938, the idea of urban preservation had become 
embedded across the entire spectrum of the urban elite.  By 1940, the preservationists had shifted 
public perceptions to the point where Ban Jelačić Square itself was seen as an historic site in 
need of protection from modernist designs. 
The focus on preserving spaces in Zagreb allowed the urban elite to shift the symbolic 
trajectory of the Croatian national project from modernization to preservation.  This symbolic 
shift did not require abandoning the Croatian Metropolis model of nationalism or practical steps 
for continued modernization.  Since the focus of this urban preservation was limited to the old 
core of the city, this new urban preservationism did not impede the actual growth of the city; 
therefore there was no threat to Zagreb’s place as the Croatian Metropolis.  This urban 
preservationism therefore represented a powerful synthesis of the urban centered national project 
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of the Croatian elite with the Peasantist vision of strengthening Croatia through active efforts to 
preserve key parts of society.  Urban preservationism was a way to symbolically embrace a key 
element of peasantism, without practically changing the urban focused modernizing trajectory of 
the Croatian Metropolis.  Eventually, urban preservationism changed into a means to 
symbolically oppose Yugoslavia’s political order.  
It is interesting to note the extent to which this synthesis affected both sides of the 
political debate.  The Croatian Peasant Party saw itself as an institution for the broad rural 
population of Croatia.  Hrvatski dnevnik (Croatian Diary), as the name implies was meant to be a 
national newspaper.  Yet it became a key voice in the effort to block the Assicurazioni Generali 
project on Ban Jelačić Square. The extent to which Stjepan Radić, the founder of the Peasantist 
movement was associated with Ban Jelačić Square may partially explain this, but only partially.  
The arguments mobilized by the paper were much more on the level of both the history of the 
city, and the current concerns of the population of Zagreb, rather than tied to the square as a key 
part of Radić’s biography.  This implies that the Peasantist movement itself was accepting, and 
becoming an active part of the Croatian Metropolis model of the national project. 
Though the debate over the 1936 urban plan was important at the time, it was ultimately 
irrelevant on a practical level.  By the time the plan was approved in the spring of 1940, World 
War Two was already underway.  In roughly a year, Yugoslavia would cease to exist until re-
emerging again in 1945.  The significance of the debate was that it provided a forum to push the 
boundaries of what parts of the city were ‘historic.’  This would eventually allow Ban Jelačić 
Square to be included in the ‘historic’ space of the city, and thus a place that needed to be 
preserved.  This is the fundamental change in the imagining of space that would have long term 
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consequences.  It would color every attempt to modernize the square after 1945 as a symbolic 
slight to Croatia in the name of Yugoslavia. 
The role of the urban space of Zagreb in this process is significant.  The mobilization of 
the Ban Jelačić statue by Stjepan Radić during his life meant that the monument was now 
embedded in the Croatian historic narrative.  This combined with the end of the political 
relationship with Hungary resulted in a temporal shift in the orientation of the statue, from the 
present, to the past.  This was compounded with the emergence of the Ban Jelačić statue as a 
central element of social life in the city, turning the statue into a place of personal memory for 
the population of Zagreb.  This is not to claim that this shift in popular understanding of the 
statue drove the symbolic shift from modernization to preservation, but rather that it created a 
powerful symbolic element within the city that could reflect that shift.  The preservationist did 
not have to work to convince people the statue was historic, the space of the city did the work for 
them.  But this shift should not be taken as merely a product of the shifting politics.  It is also 
clear that the shift in understanding of the statue facilitated the broader public shift towards 
preservationism as well.  The fact that the modernists themselves saw the statue as historic shows 





























This study has argued that the production of an “urban space” (Zagreb) and specific urban 
micro-spaces (the central square and the Ban Jelačić statue in central Zagreb) was crucial in the 
constitution, transmission, and contestation of Croatian national identity between 1850 and 1940.  Space 
here proved to be more than a simple passive container.  Alternatively, it was a made product whose 
endowed symbolic content became a routinely negotiated element in many people’s lives which helped 
shape their political beliefs.  At work was a process of spatiality – the human appropriation and 
construction of symbolic space – that proved a formidable political resource.    
My work suggests that spatiality is a powerful tool to illustrate the connections between nation, 
city, and square.  Ultimately, the population of Zagreb collapsed the imagined spaces of the national and 
the local into a single place.  Zagreb was both a representation of Croatia, while the idea of what Croatia 
should be was central to the development of the real space of the city.  Further, the population of the 
city collapsed this unified imagined space into Ban Jelačić square, creating a place that was understood 
to be a reflection of both the nation and the city, while simultaneously being the center of daily life for 
the community.  
In this context, this urban space became a significant place of contestation over the character of 
the Croatian national project.  Beginning with the Illyrian movement, and continuing through the 
implementation of the Croatian Metropolis vision of the national project, the broad trajectory had been 
one of protecting Croatia though cultural, social and economic modernization.  This modernizing 
trajectory remained unchallenged until the emergence of the Peasantist movement at the beginning of 
the 20
th
 century.  The Peasantist vision of Croatia was essentially diametrically opposed to the 
modernist vision.  The Peasantists saw cultural and economic modernization not as protecting or 
advancing Croatia as a nation, but as destroying the core of Croatia’s national distinctiveness, the 
‘village society’ of the rural countryside.  This contestation between those who supported a modernizing 
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view and those who supported a preservationist view of the trajectory of the Croatian national project 
was played out in Zagreb through debates over the proper way to deal with older parts of the city in 
terms of urban development, and eventually in the debate over building a Neboder (skyscraper) on Ban 
Jelačić square.  The popular support for blocking of the Neboder project that emerged at the end of the 
1930s indicates the emergence of a new symbolic trajectory for the Croatian national project, an urban 
preservationism, which combined the urban focus of the older modernization vision, with the 
preservationist elements of Peasantism.  
  
National Identity Constitution - Metropolis at the Heart of Nation  
This study shows that the imagined space of Croatia was an integral part of the imagined space 
of Zagreb as Croatian Metropolis.  The focus on Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis was, in itself, an 
important statement about how the Croatian national elite imaged Croatia as it should be: a modernizing 
urban nation.  The goal from the outset was to transform Zagreb into a city that would be the center of 
all aspects of Croatian life.  All Croatian economic, cultural, and political activity would be tied to the 
city.  
An indication of how this need to centralize all significant aspects of life in Croatia is the idea of 
the Port of Zagreb.  When initially formalized in the 1864/65 regulatory plan for the city, the port would 
have been necessary to accomplish the goal of creating a national economic network centered in Zagreb.  
By the 1880s, the rise of Zagreb as the main rail hub in Croatia had made the need for a port in Zagreb 
much less pressing.  Developments over the next 40 years, as Zagreb’s population growth dramatically 
outpaced every other city in Croatia and made it the dominant urban center, made the port even less 
relevant to establishing Zagreb as the economic center.  Yet the idea of the port persisted, and was a 
requirement in the 1931 international competition for a new regulatory plan and a key part of the new 
plan proposed in 1936.  The idea of Zagreb as Croatian Metropolis was so embedded in the Croatian 
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elite’s idea of Croatia as a nation, that they simply could not imagine Zagreb without a port on the Sava 
River, regardless of the necessity or practicality of such a port facility.   
More significant that the economic image of Zagreb as metropolis was the cultural and political 
image.  Within the Croatian elite, the idea was embedded that Zagreb was both the proper and the only 
location where one could be effective in influencing national development.  This idea predated even the 
formal unification of the city, going back to the Illyrian period of the Croatian national project, when 
the city had been the burgeoning core of Croatian print culture, collecting writings reflecting national 
sentiment from across the Triune Kingdom, then publishing and redistributing them across Croatia.  But 
the Croatian Metropolis model changed this interpretation of the city’s role in Croatian national culture, 
making Zagreb not a collection point, but the fount of Croatian culture.  
The Croatian Metropolis project also blurred, to some extent deliberately, the lines between 
culture and politics.  Many cultural figures also became important political actors, especially in the 19
th
 
century, when the Hapsburg Empire at times dramatically curtailed political activity.  It is interesting to 
note that many of the most prominent cultural and political actors of this time period were not from 
Zagreb.   Ljudevit Gaj, Bishop Strossmayer, Ante Starčević, and Stjepan Radić were all from various 
parts of Croatia, and all eventually dedicated themselves to building Zagreb as the Croatian Metropolis.  
Though, it could be argued that in the case of Ante Starčević and Stjepan Radić, they had little choice as 
peasants but to go to Zagreb to further their education, and remained there to further their efforts.  But 
the facts do not support that contention, at least not past high school.  No such argument captures 
Ljudevit Gaj or Bishop Strossmayer, both of whom were from fairly wealthy families and both had 
completed their educations elsewhere before choosing Zagreb as a place to partake in nation building.  
Even Stjepan Radić, the great advocate of the Croatian peasantry, would not let the Croatian Peasant 
Party abandon Zagreb for its party congresses, thus re-enforcing the city as the center of Croatian 
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national politics. His decision to be buried in Mirogoj, Zagreb’s main city cemetery, tied the Croatian 
peasantry emotionally to the city in a way that was unprecedented.    
  
National Identity Transmission - Nation at the Heart of Metropolis  
From the beginning of the Croatian Metropolis project, Ban Jelačić Square was a central 
physical and symbolic part of the endeavor.  The square’s location and role as the city’s main market 
placed it at both physically and practically in the center of the daily life of Zagreb.  Simply changing the 
name from the older Harmica was an act of national identification, as that name was derived from the 
Hungarian government tax charged to the merchants who operated on the square.  The installation of the 
Ban Jelačić monument solidified the transformation of the square into a national place.  It also was 
intended to symbolize the city’s transformation into a modern, national city by placing a modern, 
national hero at its center.  The statue was not just a monument to Ban Jelačić though, it was also a 
monument to the geospatial order he had established as Ban: a unified, autonomous Croatia with Zagreb 
as its capital.  The statue was also seen as a challenge to elevate the square and the city to be worthy of 
the monument at its center.  
Beyond the square, the space of the city itself was meant to transmit a sense of Croatian national 
identity.  This dynamic began before the city’s unification and the building of the National Center in 
Upper Town during the Illyrian period, but was dramatically intensified with the development of the 
“Green Horseshoe” after the 1870s.  Over the next 50 years, grand palaces of Croatian national culture 
were erected in Lower Town, including the Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Croatian National 
Theater, the Art Pavilion, and the National and University Library.  These many grand palaces of 
culture ensured that where ever someone went in Lower Town, they would be reminded of the Croatian 
character of the city.  
But the city was not just intended to transmit a sense of Croatian identity.  The city was designed 
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to convey a specific image of Croatian society.  This was not Croatia as it existed at the time, but 
Croatian as the national elite imagined it should exist: modernizing, Central European, and bourgeois.   
The means to accomplish this task was the combination of the general urban plan and the building 
regulations.  The urban plan of 1864/65 established a city of regular, large geometric city blocks with 
wide, straight streets.  The building regulations required all private buildings be built on the street, and 
flush with one another, so that the residential portions of the town presented a unified face to the public.  
Buildings were also to be a minimum of two stories tall, with the ability to be expanded upward in the 
future.  There would be no place for small, individual houses, which could be reminiscent of the 
countryside, in this new urban landscape.  
Ban Jelačić Square became a focal point for the transmission of national identity. Very quickly 
after the installation of the statue, plans began to circulate to elevate the square to a level of grandness 
worthy of the monument at its center.  Though no grand, unified plan was ever adopted for the square, 
special building regulations were established specifically to ensure that all buildings on the square 
would be appropriate to the significance of the space.  In the late 1920s the modernists sought to ensure 
that not just the buildings on the square, but also those that could be seen from the square, were 
appropriately modern and orderly.  Also in the late 1920s, the idea of building a modern skyscraper or 
Neboder emerged as part of a broader modernization project.  To the modernizers in Zagreb, such a 
building would be an important representation of the modernity of Croatia as a nation.    
  
National Identity Contestation – The Image of Croatia in Ban Jelačić Square  
The modernizing urban vision of Croatia faced little challenge until the end of the nineteenth 
century.  Yet, as with all ideological movements, the urban focused modernizing Croatian national 
project faced some important inherent contradictions.   The modernizing Croatian national project had 
been nearly completely focused on urban society and urban development.  Its politics were mainly 
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focused on questions surrounding the relationship between Croatia and other national communities in 
the region, and the main venue for political expression was through party newspapers and pamphlets.  
This model of Croatian nationalism and Croatian national politics essentially ignored the roughly 80% 
of the population of the identified territories of Croatia who were rural and illiterate peasants.  This had 
a pragmatic political logic, as the right to the franchise in the Hapsburg Empire was based on either 
membership in the nobility or levels of taxes paid, which excluded many lower income urban residents, 
let alone almost the entire peasantry.  But this intense urban focus created significant potential for the 
formation of an alternative concept of the Croatian nation focused on the as yet unaddressed peasantry.  
Furthermore, while economic modernization in Croatia had meant an ever improving standard of living 
and quality of life in Croatian urban centers, the effect was exactly the opposite in the countryside.  By 
the end of the 19
th
 century, the urban national elite in Croatia were also seeing themselves much more 
aligned with the broader Yugoslav project, and at the end of World War I would embrace the new 
Yugoslav state very quickly.  
The response that emerged to contest the urban focused Croatian national project was an 
ideology that addressed specifically the contradictions of the ideology.  Where the urban national elite 
envisioned Croatia as modernizing, Central European, and bourgeois, Croatian Peasantism posited a 
nation that was traditional, culturally rooted in Croatia’s rural countryside, and predominantly peasant 
in character.  To the Peasantists, urban concerns should be at least balanced with those of the 
countryside.  To that end, the Peasantists argued that the rapid modernization of the country should be 
slowed until adequate safeguards had been put in place to halt and reverse the economic dislocation that 
modernization was causing.  
Though a key part of the Peasantist program was to establish a proper balance within Croatian 
society between the urban and rural elements, this effort remained unrealized.  The Peasantists did make 
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significant electoral inroads in urban areas of Croatia after the founding of the Yugoslav state, but this 
new popularity was based much more on the Peasantist’s leader, Stjepan Radić, being identified as a 
staunch defender of Croatian national interests in the new Yugoslav system, rather than any sympathy 
for the Peasantist’s social program.  Though the call to preserve the countryside and ‘village society’ 
never gained much traction with the Croatian urban elite, Stjepan Radić himself was embraced by the 
population of Zagreb.  His resistance to a quick unification set him distinctly apart from the rest of the 
Croatian political establishment.  As opinion in Zagreb soured on the Yugoslav project, Radić's initial 
skepticism and ardent advocacy for Croatia's position and interests earned him immense popularity in 
the city.  His death in 1928 as a result of wounds suffered on the floor of the national parliament in 
Belgrade shocked all of Croatia, and his burial in Zagreb’s main cemetery essentially converted Mirogoj 
into Croatia’s national cemetery.  But the extent to which the cities population embraced Radić as one 
of their own, while rejecting his broader social program of Peasantism created an inherent contradiction 
of its own which would have to be resolved.  
The entry of Croatia into the Yugoslav state project in 1918 was broadly embraced at the time 
by the Croatian urban elite.  Almost literally over night Croatia went from being a junior partner in 
Hungary, a state that was itself a partner in the Hapsburg Empire, to being at least an equal, and in 
economic terms senior partner in the Yugoslav state.  The broad global economic expansion of the 
1920s drove rapid growth in Zagreb, and through the 1920s and into the early 1930s the modernists 
continued to develop plans to both expand the city of Zagreb and redevelop the older parts of the city.  
The modernists were not shy in tying Croatian development to a positive image of Yugoslavia as well.  
The idea was even proposed, though somewhat indirectly, that Zagreb was in fact the Yugoslav 
Metropolis now.  But by 1935 the modernist embrace of Yugoslavia was becoming problematic, and 




The modernist vision for most of the older parts of town can be seen in the Dolac market project.  
This project was not just about building a new, modern market space for the city, but transforming the 
entire area around the market by removing the older houses and replacing them with modern multi-story 
apartment buildings.  The Dolac market project was seen by the modernists as merely the first step in 
completely modernizing the part of the city between Gradec and Kaptol.  Plans of this type were not 
limited to the Dolac neighborhood either.  The proposed plans for the modernization of Vlaška street 
just south of Kaptol in the late 1920s demonstrate the broader goals of the modernists: to remove the 
older, irregular construction in the older parts of town and replace it with modern, orderly spaces.  
Whereas the modernist goals were simply a continuation of a well established modernizing 
project dating back at least to the 1860s, the first hints of urban preservationism emerged in 1905 with 
the founding of the Braća Hrvatskog Zmaja, though this organization, with a few rare exception, was 
not initially successful in its urban preservation efforts (though it must be noted, that physical 
preservation of historic buildings was only a part of the group’s overall purpose).  Beginning with the 
Bakačeva tower in front of the Cathedral in Kaptol in 1906, and continuing on through the effort to save 
the Plemić house in 1925, the group met will little success at mobilizing public opinion for the 
preservation of buildings of ‘historic’ significance.  Yet by 1935 the preservationist position was 
becoming prevalent enough to put the modernists somewhat on the defensive.  By 1938, the 
preservationists were calling not just for preservation of single buildings, but entire streets, and by 1940, 
the modernists were forced to admit, at least with regard to the Neboder project on Ban Jelačić Square, 
the preservationist opinion was dominant.    
There is no indication that the urban preservationist movement started out with the intention of 
‘capturing’ Ban Jelačić Square.  Yet, there were social factors that empowered the movement, and an 
inherent logic to the movement that would eventually lead it in that direction.  One key social factor was 
the emergence of a consensus for the need to preserve specific, ‘historic’ parts of the city.  The 
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indication of this consensus was the response by many of the modernists, including Victor Kovačić, a 
leading modernizer, to the removal of the Bakačeva tower. Once this consensus formed, the debate that 
emerged would not be about the desirability of historic preservation, but its limits.  A second social 
factor supporting the preservationists was that the Croatian national project, like all such projects in 
Europe, had used older peasant folk tales and folk songs as vital intellectual capital from its very earliest 
period.  The urban national elite, now challenged by a Peasantist national ideology could employ the 
older buildings and streets of Zagreb as their own urban form of culture, their historic contribution to 
the national project.  This meant that over time, a space such as Jelačić square, which had been central 
to the growth and integration of the city through its role as daily market since the 17
th
 century, would be 
seen as an historic space.  Ultimately, this was a contest in which the modernists were at a distinct 
disadvantage due to their own successes in the past.  Having successfully transformed the physical 
spaces of Zagreb into representations of Croatia, the modernists’ willingness to demolish places they 
acknowledged had some degree of cultural value made them appear willing to sacrifice the nation for 
modern efficiency.  Their program, which had initial been seen as modernization in the name of nation, 
became viewed as modernization at the cost of nation.    
The Neboder project was not about removing any existing structure though, it was a symbol of 
the trajectory of the Croatian national project.  By blocking it, the preservationists were making a 
statement about the very nature of Croatia as a nation. The highly charged political environment in 
Yugoslavia after Radić's death made open debate over Croatia's participation in Yugoslavia very 
problematic.  The Neboder project therefore became a proxy for the debate over Croatia's role in 
Yugoslavia.  To the preservationists, the Neboder exemplified the modernist vision of the late 1920s 
and early 1930s of a strong Yugoslavia built on the foundation of a modern Croatia.  To build such a 
modern, Yugoslav structure on an ‘historic’ Croatia place such as Ban Jelačić Square was unacceptable.  
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To the preservationists, the Neboder would not further elevate the Ban Jelačić monument, as previous 
new buildings on the square had, but overshadow and diminish it.  The emergence of broad opposition 
to the Neboder project within the population of Zagreb indicates a significant shift in sympathy away 
from the modernist trajectory and towards the preservationist trajectory by 1940.  
 
Landscape and Monuments  
Recent work on monuments has emphasized how monument projects have been used to adapt 
historical narratives and solidify a dominant political party or social groups’ view of history.  The Ban 
Jelačić monument project illustrates that in the Croatian case there was a different dynamic at work.  
Local leaders deliberately cultivated ambiguity in a monument’s design.  In this case, the deeply divided 
national political establishment in Zagreb chose not to use the monument to attempt to impose a single 
image of national identity supporting a particular view of Croatia’s geopolitical position, but rather to 
seek a common basis of agreement and to deliberately avoid points of contention to ensure the success 
of the monument project.  This compromise, and inherent ambiguity within the meaning of the 
monument, made it particularly susceptible to re-interpretation.  Thus, rather than solidifying a 
particular view re-enforcing either the pro-Vienna or the pro-Budapest perspective, the statue was 
continually re-defined to express the popular understanding of Croatia’s geopolitical position.  The goal 
of the Ban Jelačić monument was to enshrine a particular geospatial order, a unified, autonomous 
Croatia with Zagreb as its capital, not a particular political perspective as to how best to achieve that 
goal.  
Over time, the monument turned to face Hungary because the statue came to symbolize Croatian 
resistance to Hungarian efforts at political integration in the public imagination of Zagreb.  Once this 
understanding of the statue’s meaning took hold in the public’s imagination it seemed symbolically 
proper that the statue confronting Hungary should face Hungary, and that Ban Jelačić’s sword should 
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point at Budapest, and so in their minds, it did.  Once Hungary was no longer a significant element in 
Croatian politics the statue’s meaning expanded to encompass all of Croatian history.  Neither of these 
meanings was originally intended, but rather emerged from the popular understanding of Croatia’s 
geopolitical challenges, and the emergence of a social consensus that the statue’s purpose was to reflect 
those challenges.  The statue’s original ambiguity aided the process.  But this process was cumulative, 
in that the new understanding of the statue’s meaning did not cause people to lose their belief that the 
statue pointed towards Hungary, even though that particular detail was no longer expressly relevant to 
the statue’s new symbolic purpose.  
Beyond the formal monumentalizaiton of Zagreb, this project demonstrates that monuments can 
be more than embedded in local space; they can be transformative to local space.  The Ban Jelačić 
monument was intended to elevate Zagreb in the minds of the population of the city, to transform the 
populations’ view of the city, from an older, medieval city, into a modern city.  The monument was not 
envisioned in isolation.  It was one part of a broader modernization project.  The new building codes 
and the new urban plan were the other main components of this effort.  Through these administrative 
measures, Zagreb was transformed into a modern Central European city.  In effecting this 
transformation, the city also came to define Croatian national character as modern, urban, and 
bourgeois.  The Ban Jelačić monument defined the city as both modern and Croatian in the imagination 
of the population, and the city newly built to the new code and in the new pattern of the urban plan 
made that sense of modernity a lived reality.  In this way, the monument and the urban space of Lower 
Town became dual elements of a landscape which transformed how the residents of Zagreb saw their 
city and themselves.   
  
Shifting in Space and Time without Moving  
The core of this study has explored the intricate inter-relationship between the Croatian national 
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project, the urban project of Zagreb, and the lived space of the city.  The goal was to illuminate the 
complex interactions between these elements.  Over the 90 years covered in this study, the balance of 
influence between the three shifted significantly.  What was originally a dynamic of imagined space 
(Croatia) embodied in real spaces (the urban landscape of Zagreb) which was meant to transform the 
lived space of the city, became inverted.  By living the spaces of the city as national spaces, the 
population began to re-read the nation through their understanding of the present.  The population 
transformed the imagined city’s real spaces to reflect their understanding of the current situation.  Thus, 
Ban Jelačić’s statue turned to face Budapest, and Ban Jelačić Square became a space of historic 
significance, not because that was how the urban elite wanted people to see the square and the statue, 
but because that is how the population interpreted them due to their central role in the daily lived space 
of the city.  
One of the most interesting aspects regarding spatiality in this study is the process through 
which the population of Zagreb over time re-imagined the physical and temporal orientation of the Ban 
Jelačić monument.  As initially conceived, the statue of Ban Jelačić was as much a challenge to the 
population of Zagreb and Croatia as it was statement about the past.  On the national scale, the 
monument clearly called to a high water mark of Croatian political achievement, a unified, autonomous 
Croatia.  The loss of that brief achievement, first through the imposition of neo-absolutism, and then the 
Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 and the Hungarian-Croatian Agreement of 1868 was clearly a 
disappointment to the Croatian political elite.  The 1874 statement by Ban Ivan Mažuranić that the Ban 
Jelačić monument showed the way forward for Croatia towards Vienna referenced both the statue’s 
physical orientation to the North, with a slight cant to the East, along with its temporal orientation as a 
guide to the future.  But just over a decade later, the statue was seen as a challenge to the new 
‘Hungarian’ Ban, Count Khuen-Herdervary, and by the time he had left office in 1903, the statue was 
now seen in Zagreb with the tip of the sword clearly pointing towards Budapest.  
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The reorientation of the statue in the imagination of the population of Zagreb from Vienna to 
Budapest is important, but just as significant was the reorientation of the statue in time, from the future 
to the present.  The change in temporal reference was also in a sense a change in tone as well.  The 
orientation towards the future was one that was hopeful for a restoration of the status of 1848.  The 
orientation towards the present was a reflection of continued frustration and confrontation with Hungary 
over the longstanding issues of Croatian autonomy.  After independence from Hungary in 1918, the 
population of Zagreb shifted the statue again, though not in space (they still imagined it facing 
Budapest) but in time.  By the 1930s the statue was a symbol of all of Croatian history.  
These shifts in imagined space and time were a product of complex interactions in imagined 
space, real space, and lived space.  In 1866, when the Ban Jelačić statue was installed, the events it 
commemorated were less than 20 years past.  Most of the political leadership of Croatia at the time had 
not just been alive in 1848, but participated in one way or another in the political or military aspects of 
the events.  For the urban elite of Zagreb, the Ban Jelačić monument was not just a moment to Jelačić, 
but a monument to themselves, what they had accomplished, and what they hoped they could 
accomplish again.  The monument was an effort to transform the real space of the city into one that 
referenced a lived memory of 1848.  But by 1887, the events of 1848 were a distant memory, if a 
memory at all for the population of Zagreb.  The population of the city could no longer personally 
remember the sense of accomplishment of 1848 nor the sense that that accomplishment could be re-
achieved.  Yet, the population of the city was confronted with a monument embedded in the center of 
the city’s main market, at the center of the city’s daily life.  To make sense of it, they found meaning in 
how the statue could represent their present experience, the frustration of the political relationship with 
Hungary.  
Stjepan Radić's use of the statue to frame his burning of the Hungarian flag in 1895, and then to 
re-launch his Peasantist party at the end of World War I, changed the dynamic once again.   Though not 
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really apparent at the time, these events embedded the Ban Jelačić monument in the Croatian historic 
narrative.  Radić's death at the hands of a political opponent, and his subsequent funeral, included a full 
promenade of the funeral procession completely around the statue solidified the monument's role as a 
part of Croatian history.  Simultaneous with the transformation of the Ban Jelačić monument as a 
Croatian historic space, was its transformation into a key social space in Zagreb, thus firmly conflating 
the historic with personal memory.  Thus, by 1939, at a moment when Croatia as a national community 
had finally achieved exactly what the Ban Jelačić monument had originally been intended to symbolize, 
a unified, autonomous Croatia with Zagreb as its capital, few, if any in Zagreb, saw the statue as a 
symbol of either the future or the fulfillment of the past glory in the present achievement, but simply a 
symbol of the historic character of Croatia as a nation.   
The process by which Ban Jelačić Square itself became ‘historic’ is tied closely to the evolution 
of the Ban Jelačić monument. In practical, lived ways, the square was as historic a site as possible, 
having literally united Gradec and Kaptol into one community through the role of daily central 
marketplace for both communities.  Yet this mundane element of its purpose seems to have left its 
significance unrecognized in the community.  It was the installation of the statue that elevated the 
square in the minds of the cities leaders and residents.  Throughout the period after the statue was 
installed, the square was under continual development, with new mansions, banks, and other 
improvements.  By 1918 tram tracks had been installed, the square had been repaved, and the 
Mandušavac well had been improved, and then later removed.  This relentless change on the square 
passed with little comment until the Dolac market project moved the daily market off of the square in 
1930.  By the time the market was moved off the square, other social aspects, the cafes and the 
emergence of the Ban Jelačić monument as a common social meeting place, had transformed its 
function while retaining the square’s role at the center of social life in the city.  This emergence of the 
square into daily life, but not in a mundane way, coincided with the emergence of the Ban Jelačić statue 
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as a purely historic site.  Thus, memory and history become commingled in the square.  Lived space 
became central to the transformation of the square into an historic space.  
The statue and the square were not the only place in Zagreb where this phenomenon took place.  
Throughout the city the physical structures built by generations of modernizers were no longer new and 
modern, but becoming part of the history of the city and the lived memories of its inhabitants.  By 1935, 
the Yugoslav Academy building was already 55 years old, the Croatian National Theater was 40 years 
old, and the Art Pavilion at the southern end of Zrinjevac was 37 years old.  Even the National and 
University Library building was over 20 years old at this point.  Novi Zagreb was quickly becoming part 
of the past.  This left the modernists with two options, expansion and the creation of a new Novi Zagreb, 
and redevelopment in the older parts of town, a dynamic which would essentially form the foundation 
for urban development in Zagreb for the next half a century.   
 
Territoriality  
The fact that territoriality has not been central to this study is not to imply that the Croatian 
national project was not territorial in nature, as it clearly was.  In particular, the desire to achieve a 
degree of sovereignty over Dalmatia was a central goal dating back to the Illyrian period.  This project, 
rather, has highlighted the degree to which territoriality is not just about establishing recognized 
boundaries, but also about establishing geopolitical order.  The concept of “Jelačić’s Croatia” as 
embodied by the Ban Jelačić monument was not just about transforming the disparate parts of the 
Triune Kingdom into a unified Croatia and establishing claim to those territories.  The monument was 
also establishing Zagreb as the indisputable metropolis of this unified territory.  In the Croatian case, 
territoriality was as much about the center, Zagreb, establishing itself as the core, and the rest of the old 
Triune Kingdom as the periphery.    
This process was re-enforced through the national exhibitions which were periodically staged in 
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Zagreb after 1850.  These national exhibitions accomplished two territorial functions.  First, they 
reasserted Zagreb’s claims on these territories, as well as familiarizing the population of Zagreb with 
these various regions at a time when the vast majority of the population could not easily travel to see 
them for themselves.  But the exhibitions also served to re-enforce in the rest of the old Triune 
Kingdom, the role of Zagreb as center.  This was not about establishing a particular region as the center, 
but the city itself as the center, with the regions connected to each other through the new national 
metropolis.  Ultimately, in the Croatian case, the development of the national core was a deliberate 
outcome of the urban-national project of the Croatian Metropolis.  
  
Contingency  
Though not expressly discussed in the main text of this study, it is important to appreciate that 
the entire process of the development of the Croatian Metropolis was, to use Allen Pred’s terminology, 
an historically contingent process.  As a small nation embedded in larger, multi-national political and 
economic structures, Croatia was often subject to changes far outside the capacity of local actors to 
prevent or significantly modify.  Over time, many of these changes both constrained and enabled local 
actors in their efforts to constitute, transmit, and contest the idea of Croatia as a national community.  
This first major contingent event occurred well before even the Illyrian period, with the return of 
the Sabor to Gradec in 1776 after fire seriously damaged the town of Varaždin where it had been moved 
in 1756.  Absent the fire, there is no indication when, or if the Sabor would have returned, and without 
the Sabor, Zagreb would have had not political claim to the role of capital city.  The urban revolts of 
1848 was another set of events that the emergent national elite in Zagreb had no control over.  Given the 
significance of 1848 in the formation of the geospatial order of a unified, autonomous Croatia with 
Zagreb as its capital, it is important to recognize that the circumstances which produced it were far 
beyond local control.  The imposition of the neo-absolutist system in the Hapsburg Empire in 1850 also 
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created a situation that focused the elite of Zagreb on urban development rather than national political 
development.  By 1866, when the neo-absolutist regime was being dismantled, the core elements of the 
Croatian Metropolis project, the Ban Jelačić monument, the new building regulations, and the urban 
plan, were already in place.  The earthquake of 1880 was also a significant contingent event, as it 
dramatically increased the rate at which older buildings were replaced with new construction which had 
to comply with the new building regulations.  The earthquake also set in motion the process of 
rebuilding the Cathedral in Kaptol, and the removal of the section of wall in front of it, which was 
significant because it sparked the emergence of urban preservationism with the Croatian elite in Zagreb.    
The list of key contingent events could continue throughout the period of this study.  World War 
I (both its onset and its end), the assassination of Stjepan Radić, and the Great Depression, to name just 
a few, were all events that the leaders and participants of the Croatian national project had little or not 
control over.  The events that I have analyzed in this study are not a chronicle of predetermined actions 
and reactions, but rather a process of the Croatian national project’s leaders navigating the 
circumstances they were confronted with.  The leaders of the Croatian national project were adept at 
shifting focus over time to deal with new circumstances.  Going as far back as the Illyrian period, the 
Croatian national project had effectively shifted focus when progress in one particular field was 
blocked.    
It is also important to note that contingency extends to more than specific events or conditions 
that provided opportunities for the Croatian national project to pursue their goals.  This study has 
demonstrated a dialectic process, in which the initial urban, modernist thesis of the Croatian national 
project was challenged by a rural, preservationist thesis as espoused by the Peasantist movement.  
Though the inherent contradictions of the urban, modernizing thesis of the Croatian national project 
provided fertile ground for the development of a new, counter thesis, what that thesis would be was in 
no way predetermined.  Across Central and Southeastern Europe Peasantism only achieved governing 
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party status in Croatia and Bulgaria, despite a broad agrarian crisis across the region during the inter war 
period.  There was a definite logic as to why Peasantism would become the counter vision for the 
Croatian national project, but it was not the only possible logic.   
Ultimately, as Allen Pred clearly argued, spatial structuration itself is a contingent process.  
Lived space transforms imagined space when a sufficient number of people redefine a given space 
through their practice of daily life and their expressions of the proper use of space.  In Zagreb, though 
there was a logic to the progression of urban preservationism towards the contestation over the proper 
use of Ban Jelačić Square, there was no certainty that a majority of the city’s population would adopt or 
agree with that logic.  The fact that the population did accept that logic is as much due to the failure of 
the modernizers to mobilize the symbolic resources at their disposal to contest it, as to the power of the 
preservationists to persuade.  The contest over the appropriateness of the Neboder on Ban Jelačić 
Square was lost by the modernists not at the time it was taking place, but before it was even proposed, 
when the social consensus about the meaning of the Ban Jelačić monument was transformed after 
World War I.  By not contesting the new consensus that the Ban Jelačić monument was a symbol of all 
Croatian history, the modernists surrendered their most powerful symbolic resource.  The fact that there 
were strong spatial forces pushing in the direction of re-imagining the statue as a purely historic symbol 
also does not mean that this was the only interpretation possible. Nor does the fact that the new 
consensus about the Ban Jelačić monument formed without visible contestation mean that the new 
interpretation it was inevitable, it merely indicates that no group chose to mount a significant contest it 
at the time.    
  
Implications for Understanding Former Yugoslavia  
This study provides significant new insights into the dynamics of Former Yugoslavia.  There 
was a significant symbolic shift in the trajectory of the Croatian national project in the 1930s away from 
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the modernist trajectory.  That shift away from modernization and towards preservation became 
embodied in the physical space of Stari Zagreb, and eventually extended to Ban Jelačić Square.  The 
extension of the imagined ‘historic’ space of Zagreb to the square meant that after 1945 actions which 
the new Socialist regime took to change the square to advance ideas of socialism and Yugoslavia would 
be cast in a dyadic light by the city’s population: to advance Yugoslavia was to diminish Croatia.  Two 
significant acts in this regard were the removal of the Ban Jelačić monument in 1947 and the 
construction of the Neboder on the square in the early 1950s.  
This also meant that the mobilization of architectural history and urban space by Croatian 
academics and city planners in both the “Croatian Spring” and the 1980s was a reprise of what had been 
done in the late 1930s.  This created an environment where specific terms and spaces could be used to 
conduct a national debate over Croatia’s place in Yugoslavia without drawing direct criticism for being 
anti-Yugoslav.  Thus, discussion about if Zagreb should be considered a metropolis, or the appropriate 
way to renovate Republic (formerly Ban Jelačić) Square, or discussions of the historic character of the 
older parts of the city became a way of engaging in political debate by other means.  It is only with a 
sensitivity to how embedded the idea of the Croatian Metropolis was in Croatia before World War II, 
and how national these types of debates were in the first Yugoslavia, that the embedded national 
discourse in these later debates becomes apparent.  
Ultimately, in an environment where important political debates can not be conducted openly, 
alternate forms of debate must emerge.  In Zagreb, through both the Hapsburg and the Yugoslav 
experiences, the limits on political debate led to the emergence of debates over urban space as a form of 
national politics by other means.  To fully appreciate the true nature of the debates over nationalism and 
national identity in Croatia requires sensitivity to how urban space in Zagreb was mobilized to support 
and contest the national project, without overtly challenging the larger, multinational projects into 
which Croatia was embedded at the time.  
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Implications for the Study of Nationalism  
As stated at the outset, nation and nationalism are concepts which have been a conundrum for a 
large number of scholars across a large number of disciplines.  This project has not sought to resolve the 
debates between competing paradigms of nationalism scholarship.  Rather, it has sought to investigate 
the processes by which national identity is constituted, transmitted, and contesting within a national 
community.  This study has sought to illustrate the way many disparate elements of a society are 
integrated into a national project, and the constitution of a national identity.  A key example of this in 
the Croatian case is the building of the rail network which put Zagreb at the interchange point of two 
separate rail lines.  The decision to create this rail junction in Zagreb was not purely economic.  In fact, 
pure economic imperatives had initially caused one of the rail lines to essentially bypass Zagreb.  
Building the rail lines was a critical element of modernizing the Croatian economy and building a 
modern transportation network to ensure further economic growth with Croatian territory.  Ensuring the 
rail lines passed through Zagreb was not necessary for the purely economic goal of improving Croatia’s 
transportation infrastructure, but it was necessary to ensure the broader goals of the leaders of the 
Croatian national project that Zagreb should become the center of the future, modern Croatian economy.   
It is not clear at this point to what extent the use of cities as analytical objects for the study of 
nationalism and national identity can be applied to cases beyond Croatia.  Though the Croatian case 
does share many commonalities with many national projects, it possesses many unique features as well.  
The general recognition of the Triune Kingdom as legitimate entity which was both part of and separate 
from Hungary within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, even if merely rhetorical, was important in 
reducing the territorial imperative for the Croatian national project, which provided intellectual space 
for developing other ways to advance the national discourse.  The Croatian national projects emergence 
within an existing multi-national structure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire also provided an 
environment where cultural development of national distinctiveness was tolerated, and even 
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encouraged, provided it did not become “political.”  Within this context, urban development became a 
particularly fruitful way to advance the national project without breaching the “political” boundaries 
placed upon it by higher powers.  The Croatian experience also represents the emergence of a national 
project in a territory without an urban core, with the production of an urban core becoming a key 
element of the project.   
Having said all that, Croatia does also bear similarities with many national communities around 
the world which have developed out of an imperial governmental structure.  Many of the world’s 
national communities are also limited in size in terms of both territory and population.  It is also 
important to note that the national projects in the late colonial and post-colonial periods were also taking 
place in an environment of efforts at economic modernization and significant urbanization.  Therefore, 
the simple fact that the Croatian case presented here is located in a different time and place than more 
recent national experiences, should not be taken on its face as a significant impediment to applying this 
















Newspaper and Magazine Articles 
 
Svijet, 13. VI. 1931, Cover. 
 
"Admiral Jugosl. Mornarice u Zagreb." Obzor, 4 Prosinaca (December) 1918. 
 
"Demonstracija." Narodne novine, 18 Listopad (October) 1895, 1. 
 
"Demonstracije Proti Radiču." Obzor, 21 Studena (November) 1918, 3. 
 
"Futurističke Osnove." Svijet, 18. I. 1930, 88-89, 96. 
 
"Glavna Skupština Seljačke Stranke." Obzor, 26 Studena (November) 1918, 3. 
 
"Interpelacije G. Dra. Franka." Narodne novine, 16 Studenoga (November) 1895, 1. 
 
"Interpelacije Sbog Zastavah." Narodne novine, 31 Listopad (October) 1895, 1. 
 
"Izgredi od Četvrtka." Obzor, 8. Prosnica (December) 1918, 3. 
 
"Izgled s Jelačićevog Trga na Gornji Grad." Obzor, 25 Svibanj (May) 1938, 4. 
 
"Je li Opravdana Borba Protiv Nebodera." Večer, 8, IV. 1940, 7. 
 
"Krvavi Dan u Zagrebu." Obzor, 6 Prosinaca (December) 1918. 
 
"Manifestacije u Zagrebu." Obzor, 22 Listopad (October) 1918, 3. 
 
"Na Put k Slobodi." Obzor, 29 Listopad (October) 1918, 1. 
 
"Naputak." Narodne novine, 12 Listopad (October) 1895, 2-3. 
 
"Nepokoreni Duh Hrvatskog Naroda." Večernji list 1990, 2-7 & 16-41. 
 
"Njegovo Veličanstvo Kralj u Zagrebu." Narodne novine, 15 Listopad (October) 1895, 1-4. 
 
"Njegovo Veličanstvo Kralj u Zagrebu." Narodne novine, 16 Listopad (October) 1895, 1-3. 
 
"Novi Trg na Dolcu." Jutarnji list, 7 Veljače (February) 1926, 13. 
 
"Novo Lice Jelačićeva Trga." Večer, 8 Prosinca (December) 1937, 6. 
 
"O Zastavah." Narodne novine, 2 Studenoga (November) 1895, 1-2. 
 




"Odgovor Prof. Bauera Prof. Knollu." Večer, 22 Lipnja (June) 1938, 3. 
 
"Opet Demonstratcije." Narodne novine, 19 Listopad (October) 1895, 1. 
 
"Počast Hrvatskim Revolucionarcima Od 5. Prosinca 1918." Hrvatski Narod, 5 
Prosinac(December) 1941, 2. 
 
"Pogled s Jelačićevog Trga." Hrvatski dnevnik, 21 Svibnja (May) 1938, 7. 
 
"Politički Demonstrianje." Narodne novine, 22 Listopad (October) 1895, 1. 
 
"Predlog za Gradnju Gradske Vijećnice u Zagrebu " Svijet, 15, Listopad (October) 1927, 335. 
 
"Prevrat u Beču." Obzor, 31 Listopad (October) 1918, 1. 
 
"Prije 800 Godina Zagrepčani su se s Više Uspjeha Borili Protiv Rušenja Historijskih Gradjevina 
i Znamenitosti, Nego li Danas." Večer, 7 Prosinca (December) 1935, 5. 
 
"Priprave Za Dočak Njeg. Veličanstva." Narodne novine, 12 Listopad (October) 1895, 3-4. 
 
"Program." Narodne novine, 8 Listopad (October) 1895, 1. 
 
"Program*)." Narodne novine, 10 Listopad (October) 1895, 1. 
 
"Pucao na Konobara." Obzor, 26 Listopad (October) 1918, 3. 
 
"Pustite Stari Zagreb na Miru." Večer, 14 Lipnja (June) 1938, 5. 
 
"Put Ranjenih Zastupnika S. Radić i Drugova od Beograda do Zagreba." Svijet, 21, VII 1928, 92. 
 
"Rasprava Proti Sveučilištnim Djacima." Narodne novine, 12 Studenoga (November) 1895, 1. 
 
"Regulacia Zagreba." Svijet, 12 Ožuljak (March) 1927, 217-21. 
 
"Regulacija Kaptola u Zagrebu." Svijet, 9, Veljača (February) 1935, 133-35 & 48. 
 
"Revolucija u Budimpesti." Obzor, 31 Listopad (October) 1918, 1. 
 
"S Jelačićevog Trga Otvorio se Pogled na Gornji Grad." Hrvatski dnevnik, 18 Svibnja (May) 
1938. 
 
"Seljačka Stranka pred Zagrebačikim Gradjanstvom i Radničtvom." Slobodni Dom 1920, 4. 
 
"Spaljena Magjarska Zastava." Narodne novine, 17 Listopad (October) 1895. 
 




"Tko Sad Vlada u Hrvatskoj?" Obzor, 5 Prosinac (December) 1918. 
 
"Trnje  Idejno Urbanističko Rješenje." Zagreb: Urbanistički Zavod Grada Zagreba, 1965. 
 
"Upadica u Kavani "Corso"." Obzor, 22 Listopada (October) 1918, 3. 
 
"Urbanističlo Program Grada Zagreba Smjernice Za Razvoj." 1963. 
 
"Ustavan Kralj." Narodne novine, 21 Listopad (October) 1895, 1. 
 
"Veličanstven Sprovod Stjepana Radića." Svijet, 18 Kolovoz (August) 1928, 165-72. 
 
"Veličanstveni Doček S. Radića i Drugova u Zagrebu." Svijet, 14, VII 1928, 55. 
 
"Veličanstvo Kralj u Zagrebu." Narodne novine, 14 Listopad (October) 1895, 1-3. 
 
"Vrijeme Je Da iz Zagreba Nestane Spomenika Crno-Žutog Generala Jelačića." Vjesnik, 18 
Srpnja(July) 1947, 2. 
 
"Za Uredjenje Zapadne Periferije: Sudbina Motorciklističkog Trkališta." Večer, 14 Sijčnja 
(January) 1932, 4. 
 
"Zagreb, 21 Listopad." Obzor, 22 Listopad (October) 1918, 3. 
 
"Zidanje Skadara na Jelačićevom Trgu." Večer, 20 Lipnja (June) 1940. 
 






"Croats." In Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, edited by Stephan Thernstrom. 
Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1980. 
 
Hrvatski Djaci Pred Sudom: Stenografski  Izvještaj o Glavnoj Razpravi Proti Hrvatskim 
Sveučilištnim Djacima Održanoj Pred Kr. Sudbenim Stolom u Zagrebu Dne 11 – 16.  
Studenoga 1895. . Zagreb: Dionička Tiskara u Zagrebu, 1895. 
 
"Kronologija Trga Republike u Zagrebu." Čovjek i Prostor, Ožujak (March) 1977, 16. 
 
"Natječaj za Izradu Generalne Osnove za Izgradnju, Proširenje i Regulaciju Grada Zagreba 





Zemljovid 10, Jelačićecva Hrvatska  In,  Hrvatski informativni centar, 
http://www.hic.hr/books/pavlicev/images/s10.gif. (last accessed April 16, 2011). 
 
Abbott, Carl. Political Terrain : Washington D.C., from Tidewater Town to Global Metropolis. 
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999. 
 
Agnew, John. "No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia." Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 97, no. 2 (2007): 398-422. 
 
———. "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations 
Theory." Review of International Political Economy Vol. 1, no. 1 (1994): 53-80. 
 
Albrecht-Carrié, René. Italy at the Paris Peace Conference. Hamden: Archon Books, 1966. 
 
Alderman, Derek H. "Street Names and the Scaling of Memory: The Politics of Commemorating 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Within the African American Community." Area 35, no. 2 
(2003): 163-73. 
 
———. "Street Names as Memorial Arenas: The Reputational Politics of Commemorating 
Martin Luther King Jr. In a Georgia County." Historical Geography 30 (2002): 99-120. 
 
Allcock, John B. Explaining Yugoslavia New York Columbia University Press, 2000. 
 
Altić, Mirela Slukan. Povijesna Kartografija Katrografski Izvori u Povijesnim Znanstima. 
Samobor: Meridijani, 2003. 
 
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, Revised Edition. Revised and extended ed. London, New York: Verso, 
1991. 
 
———. "Introduction." In Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan. London 
New York: Verso, 1996. 
 
Atkinson, David, Denis Cosgrove. "Urban Rhetoric and Embodied Identities: City, Nation, and 
Empire at the Vittorio Emanuele Iimonument in Rome, 1870-1945." Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 88, no. 1 (1988): 28-49. 
 
Azaryahu, Maoz, Rebecca Kook. "Mapping the Nation: Street Names and Arab-Palestinian 
Identity: Three Case Studies." Nations & Nationalism 8, no. 2 (2002): 195-214. 
 
Azaryahu, Maoz. "Mcisrael? On the “Americanization of Israel”." Israel Studies 5, no. 1 (2000): 
41-64. 
 
———. "Street Names and Political Identity: The Case of East Berlin." Journal of 




Bakal, Aleksandar. "Detaljni Urbanistički Plan Centra Zagreba." Urbanistički zavod grada 
Zagreba, 1974. 
 
Balakrishnan, Gopal, ed. Mapping the Nation. London, New York: Verso, 1996. 
 
Banac, Ivo. The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1984. 
 
Barbarić, Damir, ed. Fin De Siecle Zagreb-Beč. Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1997. 
 
Bar-Gal, Yoram. "Cultural-Geographical Aspects of Street Names in the Towns of Israel." 
Names: A Journal of Onomastics 37, no. 4 (1989): 329-44. 
 
Bauer, Otto. "The Nation." In Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan. London, New 
York: Verso, 1996. 
 
Best, A. C. G. . "Gaborone: Problems and Prospects for a New Capital." Geographical Review 
60 (1970): 1-14. 
 
Billig, Michael. Banal Nationalism. London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1995. 
 
Bilić, Josip, Hrvoje Ivanković, ed. Zagrebački Leksikon A-Lj. 2 vols. Vol. 1. Zagreb: 
Leksikografski zavod Miroslav Krleža, 2006. 
 
———, ed. Zagrebački Leksikon M-Ž. 2 vols. Vol. 2. Zagreb: Leksikografski zavod Miroslav 
Krleža, 2006. 
 
Biondich, Mark. "The Politics of Peasantism: Stjepan Radić, the Croatian Peasant Party and the 
Intelligentsia, 1904-1928." University of Toronto, 1997. 
 
———. Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-
1928. Toronto, Buffalo University of Toronto Press, 2000. 
 
Bjork, James. Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism and National Indifference in the Central 
European Borderland. Ann Arbor, 2008. 
 
Blau, Eve, Ivan Rupnik. Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, Strategy, Practice. Barcelona: 
ACTAR, 2007. 
 
Blažina, Zdravko, ed. Zagreb Jučer Danas Sutra. 2 vols. Vol. I, Gradu Zagrebu u Povodu 20 - 
Godišnjice Oslobođenja. Zagreb: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1965. 
 
———, ed. Zagreb Jučer Danas Sutra. 2 vols. Vol. II, Gradu Zagrebu u Povodu 20 - Godišnjice 





Bogert, Ralph. The Writer as Naysayer: Miroslav Krleža and the Aesthetic of Interwar Central 
Europe. Vol. 20, UCLA Slavic Studies. Columbus: Slavica Publishers, 1990. 
 
Borošak-Marijanović, Jelena, ed. 1848 u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: Hrvatski Povijestni Muzej, 1998. 
 
Brubaker, Rogers. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New 
Europe. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
 
Buntak, Franjo. Povijest Zagreba. Zagreb: Nakladni Zavod Matice Hrvatske, 1996. 
 
Chatterjee, Partha. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, 
Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
 
Cohen, Shaul. "Winning While Losing: The Apprentice Boys of Derry Walk Their Beat." 
Political Geography 26 (2007): 951-67. 
 
Cresswell, Tim. Place: A Short Introduction, Short Introductions to Geography. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2004. 
 
Čorak, Željka. Zagreb Pisani Prostor. Zagreb: Mladost, 1994. 
 
Dakić, Slavko. Kritika Apstraktnog Grada o Zagrebu. Zagreb: SVESKE, 1990. 
 
———. "Programske Pretpostavke Uređenja Trga Republike U Zagrebu." Čovjek i Prostor 
XXV, no. 309 (1978): 21-23. 
 
———. "Republic Square in Zagreb." Čovjek i Prostor, no. 288 (1977): Inside Cover. 
 
———. "Urbaistički Modeli Izgradnje Grada i Budući Generalni Urbanistički Plan Zagreba." IZ 
STAROG I NOVOG ZAGREBA VI (1984): 275-85. 
 
Dakić, Slavko, Zorislav Perković, Ivan Rogić (voditelj izrade studije i metodologije), and 
Andreja Stojković. Urbana Drama Donjeg Grada Zagreba. Zagreb: SVESKE, 1989. 
 
de Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven Rendall. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988. Reprint, Paperback Edition. 
 
Deak, Agnes. From Habsburg Neo-Absolutism to the Compromise : 1849-1867. Translated by 
Matthew Caples, Eastern European Monographs. Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 
2008. 
 
Despalatović, Elinor Murray. Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement Boulder, New York  
Eastern European monographs: no. 12, East European Quarterly, distributed by Columbia 





Djilas, Aleksa. The Contested Country : Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
 
Dobronić, Lelja. Bartol Felbinger i Zagrebački Graditelji Njegova Doba. Zagreb: Društvo 
Historičara Umjetnosti Hrvatske, 1971. 
 
———. Zaboravljeni Zagrebački Graditelji. Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 1962. 
 
———. Zagrebački Gornji Grad Nekad I Danas. Zagreb: Izdavački zavod Jugoslavenske 
akademije znanost i umjetnosti, 1967. 
 
Donia, Robert J. Sarajevo : A Biography. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. 
 
Drago Novak, Miljenko Lapaine, Dubravka Mlinarić, ed. Five Centuries of Maps and Charts of 
Croatia Pet Stoljeća Geografskih i Pomorskih Karata Hrvatske. Zagreb: školska knjiga, 
2005. 
 
Duncan, James S. The City as Text: The Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the Kandyan 
Kingdom, Cambridge Human Geography. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990. 
 
Dupuy, R. Ernest, Trevor N. Dupuy. The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. To 
the Present 2nd rev. ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1986. 
 
———. The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present. Revised ed. New 
York, Hagerstown, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, 1977. 
 
Eley, Geoff, and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds. Becoming National a Reader. New York, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996. 
 
Faraco, J. Carlos Gonza, Michael Dean Murphy. "Street Names and Political Regimes in an 
Andalusian Town." Ethnology 36, no. 2 (1997): 123-49. 
 
Fisher, Jack C. "The Continuity of Urban Patterns under Socialism: The Yugoslav Experience." 
Syracuse University, 1962. 
 
———. "Planning the City of Socialist Man." Journal of the American Institute of Planners 
XXVIII, no. 4 (1962): 251-65. 
 
———. "Urban Analysis: A Case Study of Zagreb, Yugoslavia." Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers 53, no. 3 (1963): 266-84. 
 
Flint, Colin, Peter Taylor. Political Geography : World-Economy, Nation-State and Locality. 





Foster, Gains M. Ghosts of the Confederacy : Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the 
New South. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
 
Foucault, Michel. "Space, Knowledge, and Power." In The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul 
Rabinow, 239-56. New York: Random House, 1984. 
 
Franolić, Vladimir. Urbanistički Problemi Zagreba Kao Velegrada. Zagreb: Liber, 1976. 
 
Gallaher, Carol, Peter Shirlow. "The Geography of Loyalist Paramilitary Feuding in Belfast." 
Space and Polity 10, no. 2 (2006): 149-69. 
 
Gary B. Cohen, Franz A. J. Szabo, ed. Embodiments of Power: Building Baroque Cities in 
Europe. Edited by Gary B. Cohen. Vol. 10, Austrian and Habsburg Studies. New York: 
Berhahn Books, 2008. 
 
Gellner, Ernest. "Nationalism and Modernization." In Nationalism, edited by John Hutchinson 
and Anthony D. Smith. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
———. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983. 
 
Glenny, Misha. The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-1999 New York 
Viking, 2000. 
 
Goldstein, Ivo. Hrvatska Povijest. Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2003. 
 
Graham, B., P. Shirlow. "The Battle of the Somme in Ulster Memory and Identity." Political 
Geography 21 (2002): 881-904. 
 
Gramsci, Antonio. The Modern Prince & Other Writings. Translated by Louis Marks. New 
York: International Publishers, 1957. Reprint, 1983. 
 
Greenfield, Liah. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University 
Press, 1992. 
 
Gregl, Zoran, Josip Šentija, Božena Zadro, ed. Zagrebačke Ulice. Zagreb: Nakada Zadro, 1994. 
 
Guntram H. Herb, David H. Kaplan, ed. Nested Identities : Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. 
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999. 
 
Hadžić, Fadil, ed. Slobodni Zagreb. Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1965. 
 
Harvey, David. "Between Space and Time: Reflections on the Geographic Imagination." Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers 80, no. 3 (1990): 418-34. 
 




Hawkesworth, Celia. Zagreb : A Cultural History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. 
 
Henrickson, Alan K. ""A Small, Cozy Town, Global in Scope": Washington D. C." Ekistics 50 
(1983): 123-45. 
 
Herb, Guntram H. "Double Vision: Territorial Strategies in the Construction of National 
Identities in Germany, 1949–1979." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
94, no. 1 (2004): 140-64. 
 
Hobsbawm, E. J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge 
[England]; New York Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
 
Horvat, Josip. Politička Povijest Hrvatska. Zagreb: Binoza-Svjetski Pisci, 1936. 
 
———. Politička Povijest Hrvatska 1. Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1990. 
 
———. Politička Povijest Hrvatska 2. Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1990. 
 
Horvat, Rudolf. Hrvatska Na Mučilištu. Zagreb: Kulturno-Historijsko Društvo Hrvatski 
Rodoljub (Školska Knjiga), 1942 (1992). Reprint, 1992. 
 
———. Prošlost Grada Zagreba. Zagreb: Hrvatski Rodoljub, 1942. 
 
———. Zagreb - Povijest Hrvatskoga Glavnog Grada. Zagreb, 1942. 
 
Hoyle, B. S. "African Socialism and Urban Development: The Relocation of the Tanzanian 
Capital." Tijdschrift Economische voor en Sociale Geografie 70 (1979): 2007-216. 
 
Hroch, Miroslav. Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe : A Comparative Analysis 
of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations 
Translated by Ben Fowkes. Cambridge, New York Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
 
Hubbard, Phil, Rob Kitchin, and Gill Valentine, eds. Key Thinkers on Space and Place. London: 
SAGE, 2004. 
 
Jefferson, Mark. "The Law of the Primate City." Geographical Review 29, no. 2 (1939): 226-32. 
 
Jelavich, Barbara. History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
 
Jelčić, Dubravko, ed. Ante Starčević Književna Djela. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1995. 
 
Johnson, Nuala. "Cast in Stone: Monuments, Geography, and Nationalism." Environment and 





———. "Framing the Past: Time, Space and the Politics of Heritage Tourism in Ireland." 
Political Geography 18 (1999): 187-207. 
 
———. "Memorialising and Marking the Great War: Belfast Remembers." In Enduring City: 
Belfast in the Twentieth Century, edited by F. Boal and  S. Royle, 207-20. Belfast: 
Blackstaff, 2006. 
 
———. "Sculpting Heroic Histories: Celebrating the Centenary of the 1798 Rebellion in 
Ireland." Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 9 (1994): 78-93. 
 
———. "The Renaissance of Nationalism." In Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the 
World, edited by R. J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor, Michael J. Watts. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2002. 
 
———. "The Spectacle of Memory: Ireland’s Remembrance of the Great War 1919." Journal of 
Historical Geography 25 (1999): 36-56. 
 
———. "Where Geography and History Meet: Heritage Tourism and the ‘Big House’ in 
Ireland." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 86 (1996): 551-66. 
 
Johnston, R. J., Peter J. Taylor, Michael J. Watts, ed. Geographies of Global Change: 
Remapping the World. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. 
 
———., David B. Knight and Eleonore Kofman, ed. Naitonalism Self-Determination and 
Political Geography. London: Croom Helm, 1988. 
 
Kampuš, Ivan, and dr Igor Karaman. Tisućljetni Zagreb. Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1975. 
 
Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels. "Manifesto of the Communist Party." In The Marx-Engels Reader, 
edited by Robert C. Tucker. New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978. 
 
Katus, Laszlo. Hungary in the Dual Monarchy : 1867-1914. Translated by Paul Body and 
Andrew T. Gane, Eastern European Monographs. Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 
2008. 
 
Kečkemet, Duško. Grad Za Čovjeka: O Dehumanizaciji Suvremenog Urbanizma. Zagreb: 
Društvo Histoičara Umjetnosti Hrvatske, 1981. 
 
Kent, Sarah A. "State Ritual and Ritual Parody: Croatian Student Protest and the Limits of 
Loyalty at the End of the Nineteenth Century." In The Limits of Loyalty : Imperial 
Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy, 
edited by Daniel Unowsky Laurance Cole. New York: Berghahn Books, 2007. 
 
King, Jeremy. Budweisers into Czechs and Germans: A Local History of Bohemian Politics. 




Klein, Jennifer M. "Croatian Americans." In Encyclopedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society, edited 
by Richard T. Shaefer. Los Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc, 2008. 
 
Knežević, Snješka. "Milan Lenuci and the Urbanism of Zagreb." In Project Zagreb : Transition 
as Condition, Strategy, Practice, 84-89. Zagreb: ACTAR, 2007. 
 
———. "Mjesto Zrinjskog Trga u Genezi Zagrebačke "Zelene Potkove"." RADOVI IPU, no. 11 
(1987): 61-93. 
 
Knight, David B. "Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and 
Regionalism." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 72, no. 4 (1982): 514-
31. 
 
Knoll, Petar. "Stari Zagreb (Osvrt Na Regulatornu Osnovu)." Zagreb : Revija Društva 
Zagrepčana VI., no. 6. (1938): 193-212. 
 
Kolarić, Juraj. "Uvodna Riječ." In Stari i Novi Zagreb, 7-11. Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1994. 
 
Koman, Marina. Zagrebom Kroz Stare Razglednice: LIBAR, 2005. 
 
Kovačić, Krešimir. Priče iz Starog Zagreba. Edited by Branko Matan, Omladinska Biblioteka. 
Ljubljana: Grafički zavod Hrvatske, 1990. 
 
Kulundžić, Zvonimir, ed. Stjepan Radić  Politički Spisi  Autobiografija/Članci/Govori Rasprave. 
Edited by Dubravko Jelčić, Hrvatska Politička Misao Xix I Xx Stoljeća. Zagreb: Znanje, 
1971. 
 
Ladin, Tomislav, ed. Ante Starčević Politički Spisi. Zagreb: Znanje, 1971. 
 
Lampe, John R. Balkans into Southeastern Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
 
———. Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country 2nd ed. ed. Cambridge, New York 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
 
Laslo, Aleksander. "Between Two Building Codes." In Project Zagreb : Transition as Condition, 
Strategy, Practice. Barcelona: ACTAR, 2007. 
 
———. "Internatcionalni Natječaj za Gerneralnu Regulatornu Osnovu Grada Zagreba, 1930-31." 
Čovjek i Prostor XXXI, no. 370 (1984): 25-31. 
 
Laszowski, Emilij. Stari i Novi Zagreb. Zagreb: Braća Hrvatskog Zmaja, 1925. Reprint, 1994, 
Školska knjiga. 
 
Leček, Suzana. Seljačka Obitelj u Sjeverozapadnoj Hrvatskoj 1918.-1941. Zagreb: Hrvatski 





Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith. 1991 ed. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1991. 
 
———. Writings on Cities. Translated by Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas. Oxford, 
Cambridge Mass.: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996. 
 
Leitner, Helga, Petei Kang. "Contested Urban Landscapes of Nationalism: The Case of Taipei." 
Cultural Geographies (Ecumene) 6, no. 2 (1999): 214-33. 
 
Lenin, V. I. The Right of Nations to Self-Determination. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, 1947. 
 
Lewis, Tom. "Marxism and Nationalism." International Socialist Review no. 13 (2000). 
 
Luxemburg, Rosa. "The National Question and Autonomy." Social-Democratic Review 6 (1908). 
 
Mađor, Mirko, ed. Hrvatski Djaci Pred Sudom: Stenografski  Izvještaj O Glavnoj Razpravi Proti 
Hrvatskim Sveučilištnim Djacima Održanoj Pred Kr. Sudbenim Stolom U Zagrebu Dne 
11 – 16.  Studenoga 1895. . Zagreb: Dom i svjet. Reprint, 1995. 
 
Magaš, Branka. Croatia through History. London, San Francisco, Beirut: SAQI, 2007. 
 
Maleković, Vladimir, ed. Anton Dominik Fernkorn : Spomenik Banu Josipu Jelačiću. Zagreb: 
Muzej za Umjetnost i Obrt, 1990. 
 
Malkki, Liisa H. Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology among Hutu 
Refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
 
Maretić, Mirko. Gradski Centri. Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1996. 
 
Markowitz, Fran. Sarajevo : A Bosnian Kaleidoscope. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2010. 
 
Maroević, Ivo. Zagreb Njim Samim. Zagreb: Dureux, 1999. 
 
Maruševski, Olga. Iso Kršnjavi Kao Graditelj. Zagreb: Društvo Povjetničara Umjetnosti SR 
Hrvatska, 1986. 
 
———. Iz Zagrebačke Sponeničke Baštine. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2006. 
 
———. Od Manduševca do Trga Republike. Zagreb, 1987. 
 
Matković, Hrvoje. "Đačke Demonstracije u Zagrebu 1917. Godine." IZ STAROG I NOVOG 





———. Povijest Nezavisne Države Hrvatske. Zagreb: Naklada Pavičić - (Biblioteka hrvatske 
povijesti), 2002. 
 
———, ed. Studije Novije Hrvatske Povijesti. Zagreb: Golden marketing - Tehnička knjiga, 
2004. 
 
Mattioni, Vladimir. "Pogled Iz Trnja." Čovjek i Prostor XXXIX, no. 3/6 (1992): 13-20. 
 
Milčec, Zvonimir. Dolac 55 Godina Najveće Zagrebačke Tržnice. Zagreb: VPA, 1985. 
 
———. "Manduševac na Trešnjevci." Večarnji list, 31. XII. 1990. 1 i 2 I. 1991. 1991, 12. 
 
———. Povratak Bana. Zagreb: BOOKOVAC, 1990. 
 
———. Pozdrav iz Zagreba. Zagreb: Mladost, 1987. 
 
———. Sentimalni Vodič Kroz Zagreb. Zagreb: Mladost, 1985. 
 
———. Zagrebački Gradonačelnici. Zagreb: ALFA, 1993. 
 
Mills, Cynthia, Pamela H. Simpson, ed. Monuments to the Lost Cause : Women, Art, and the 
Landscapes of Southern Memory. Knoxville: The Universtity of Tennessee Press, 2003. 
 
Mondecar. "Grad Zagreb i Željezničko Pitanje." Zagreb : Revija Društva Zagrepčana VIII 
(1939): 396-401. 
 
Mosse, George L. Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality. New York: 
Howard Fertig, Inc., 1980. 
 
Murdock, Caitlin E. Changing Places : Society, Culture, and Territory in the Saxon-Bohemian 
Borderlands, 1870-1946. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010. 
 
Nairn, Tom. Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited. London, New York: Verso, 1997. 
 
Nemes, Robert. The Once and Future Budapest. DeKalb: Nothern Illinois University Press, 
2005. 
 
Newman, David. "Real Spaces, Symbolic Spaces: Interrelated Notions of Territory in the Arab-
Israeli Conflict." In A Road Map to War : Territorial Dimensions of International 
Conflict, edited by Paul F. Diehl. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999. 
 
Newman, David, Anssi Paasi. "Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World: Rethinking 






O'Lear, Shannon, Robert Whiting. "Which Comes First, the Nation or the State? A Multiple 
Scale Model Applied to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Caucasus." National 
Identities 10, no. 2 (2008): 185-206. 
 
Oren, Ami, David Newman. "Competing Land Uses: The Territorial Dimension of Civil–
Military Relations in Israel." Israel Affairs 12, no. 3 (2006). 
 
Osim, Boris. Dugo Putovanje na Dolac. Zagreb: Tržnice i Veletržnice Zagreb, 1997. 
 
Paasi, Anssi. "Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse : The Finish-Russian Border." In 
Borders and Border Politics in a Globalizing World, edited by Paul and David E. Lorey 
Glaster, 117-36. Lanham: SR Books, 2005. 
 
Pavić, Milan. Zagreb Fotomonografija. Zagreb: Orbis i Mladost, 1959. 
 
Pavlicevic, Dragutin. Kratka Politicka i Kulturna Povijest Hrvatske.,  Hrvatski informativni 
centar, http://www.hic.hr/books/pavlicev/index.htm. (last accessed April 12, 2007). 
 
Perić, Ivo. Stjepan Radić 1871.-1928. Zagreb: Dom i Svijet, 2003. 
 
———. Zagreb od 1850. do Suvremenog Velegrada. Zagreb: Muzej Grada Zagreba, 2006. 
 
Perić, Ivan. Suvremeni Hrvatski Nacionalizam : Izvori i Izrazi Zagreb: August Cesarec, 1976. 
 
Pinchevski, Amit, Efraim Torgovnik. "Signifying Passages: The Signs of Change in Israeli Street 
Names." Media, Culture & Society 24, no. 3 (2002): 365-89. 
 
Plavšić, Dušan. "Izložba Projekta za Izgradnju Zakladnog Zemljišta na Jelačićevom Trgu." 
Zagreb: Tisak Zaklade Tiskare Narodnih Novina 1932. 
 
Potts, Deborah. "Capital Relocation in Africa: The Case of Lilongwe in Malawi." The 
Geographical Journal 151, no. 2 (1985): 182-96. 
 
Pred, Allen. "Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time-Geography of 
Becoming Places." Annals of the Association of American Geographers 74, no. 2 (1984): 
279-97. 
 
———. "Social Reproduction and the Time-Geography of Everyday Life." Geografiska 
Annaler. Series B, Human Geography 63, no. 1 (1981): 5-22. 
 
———., Michael John Watts. Reworking Modernity. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
1992. 
 





Premeri, Nada. Muzej Grada Zagreba: Guide. Translated by Graham McMaster. 2nd Enlarged 
ed. Zagreb: Zagreb City Museum, 2002. 
 
Prokopovych, Markian. Habsburg Lemberg: Architecture, Public Space, and Politics in the 
Galician Capital, 1772-1914. Edited by Gary B. Cohen, Central European Studies. West 
Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2009. 
 
Psomopoulos, Panayis. "The Editor's Page." Ekistics 50 (1983): 87. 
 
Qvortrup, Mads. The Political Philosophy of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Impossibility of 
Reason. Manchester, New Yrok: Manchester University Press, 2003. 
 
Radić, Antun. "Na Trećoj Glavnog Skupštini Hrvatske Pučke Seljačke Stranke." Dom, 24 Aug. 
1907, 1. 
 
———. "Za Seljačku Politiku." In Sabrana Djela. Zagreb, 1938. 
 
Radić, Stjepan. "Govor na Noćnoj Sudbonosnoj Sjednici Narodnoga Vijeća Dana 24. Studenoga 
1918." In Stjepan Radić  Politički Spisi  Autobiografija / Članci / Govori Rasprave, 
edited by Zvonimir Kulundžić, 323-35. Zagreb: Znanje, 1971. 
 
———. "Kako Ćemo iz Našeg Zla u Dobro." In Stjepan Radić  Politički Spisi  Autobiografija / 
Članci / Govori Rasprave, edited by Zvonimir Kulundžić, 145-80. Zagreb: Znanje, 1971. 
 
———. Moderna Kolonizacija i Slaveni. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1904. 
 
———. "Moj Politički Životopis." In Stjepan Radić  Politički Spisi  Autobiografija / Članci / 
Govori Rasprave, edited by Zvonimir Kulundžić. Zagreb: Znanje, 1971. 
 
———. "Najjača Stranka u Hrvatskoj." In Stjepan Radić  Politički Spisi  Autobiografija / Članci 
/ Govori Rasprave, edited by Zvonimir Kulundžić. Zagreb: Znanje, 1971. 
 
———. Praški Zapisi  Autobiografska Proza. Zagreb: Znanje, 1985. 
 
———. "Živi Narod." Dom, 8 Sept. 1909, 1-2. 
 
———. Živo Hrvatsko Pravo na Bosni i Herzegovinu. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1908. Reprint, 
1993. 
 
Ramet, Sabrina P. Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the 
War for Kosovo. 3rd. ed. Boulder: Westview Press, 1999. 
 
———. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991. 2nd ed. ed. Bloomington: 





———. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983 Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984. 
 
Rebić, G. "Ushit na Jelačić-Placu." Večernji list, 12. X. 1990, 10. 
 
Renan, Ernest. "What Is a Nation." In Becoming National, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald 
Grigor Suny. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Rihtman-Aguštin, Dunja. "The Monument in the Main City Square: Constructing and Erasing 
Memory in Contemporary Croatia." In Balkan Identities : Nation and Memory, edited by 
Maria Todorova, 180-96. New York: New York University Press, 2004. 
 
Rogić, Ivan. "What Has Happened in Zagreb." In Zagreb Modernity and the City, edited by 
Fedja Vukić, 16 - 39. Zagreb: AGM, 2003. 
 
Rogić, Ivan, and Slavko Dakić. Grad I Plan : Prinos Raspravi O Generalnom Urbanističkom 
Planu. Zagreb: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2000. 
 
Sack, Robert. Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986. 
 
Sagrak, Darko. Zagreb 1941-1945. Zagreb, 1995. 
 
Schorske, Carl E. Fin-De-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture. Vintage Books, 1981 ed. New 
York: Random House, 1961. 
 
Senečić, Vera Č. Šain, ed. Zagreb 1900. Zagreb: Liber, 1974. 
 
Sidorov, Dmitri. "National Monumentalization and the Politics of Scale: The Resurrections of 
the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow." Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 90, no. 3 (2000): 548-72. 
 
Simpson, Martin. "Republicanizing the City: Radical Republicans in Toulouse, 1880-90." 
European History Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2004): 157-90. 
 
Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnic Origins of Nations Oxford: Blackwell, 1988. 
 
———. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and 
Nationalism London ; New York Routledge, 1998. 
 
Smith, John Hutchinson & Anthony, ed. Nationalism. Edited by Oxford Readers. Oxford, New 
York Oxford University Press, 1994. 
 
Soffer, Arnon, Julian V. Minghi. "Israel's Security Landscapes: The Impact of Military 




Soja, Edward W. Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2000. 
 
———. Thirdspace : Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places Cambridge, 
Mass: Blackwell, 1996. 
 
Stančić, Nikša. Gajeva "Još Hrvatska ni Propala" iz 1832-33. Ideologia Ljudevita Gaja u 
Pripremnom Razdoblju Hrvatskog Narodnog Preporoda. Zagreb: Globus, 1988. 
 
Starčević, Ante. Misli i Pogledi. Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1971. 
 
Stauter-Halsted, Keely. The Nation in the Village: The Genesis of Peasant National Identity in 
Austrian Poland, 1848-1914. New York: Cornell Universtiy Press, 2002. 
 
Stilinović, Milica. "Tri Francuza o Zagrebu u Devetnaecetom Stoljeću." IZ STAROG I NOVOG 
ZAGREBA IV (1968): 209-24. 
 
Szabo, Gjuro. Stari Zagreb. Zagreb: Spektar, 1971. 
 
———. "Uskrs Staroga Zagreba." 22, V. 1938. 
 
Šagi-Bunić, Tomislav J. Katolička Crkva i Hrvatski Narod. Zagreb: Kršćanska Sadaršnjost, 
1983. 
 
Šeringer, Branko. "Iz Pvijest Trgova Staroga Zagreba." Zagreb : Revija Društva Zagrepčana II 
(1934). 
 
Šobota, Vlado, ed. Zagrebački Električni Tramvaj 1891.-2001. Zagreb: Znanje, 2001. 
 
Taylor, Peter J. World City Network: A Global Urban Analysis. New York: Routledge, 2004. 
 
Therborn, Goran. "Monumental Europe: The National Years. On the Iconography of European 
Capital Cities." Housing, Theory and Society 19, no. 1 (2002): 26-47. 
 
Todorova, Maria, ed. Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory. New York: New York University 
Press, 2004. 
 
———. Imagining the Balkans. New York Oxford University Press, 1997. 
 
Uhlik, Josip. "Generalni Urbanistički Plan Grada Zagreba." Urbanistički zavod grada Zagreba, 
1970. 
 
Ungaro, Draga. "Konjanik Na Ledu." nedjeljni VJESNIK, 3 Rujan (September) 1989, 7-8. 
 
Verdery, Katherine. National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Culture in Ceausescu’s 




Vukić, Fedja, ed. Zagreb Modernity and the City. Zagreb: AGM, 2003. 
 
Walkowitz, Daniel J., and Lisa Maya Knauer, eds. Memory and the Impact of Political 
Transformation in Public Space. Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2004. 
 
Waters, Mary-Alice, ed. Rosa Luxemburg Speaks. New York: Pathfinder Press, 1970. 
 
Weber, Eugen Joseph. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-
1914. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976. 
 
West, Rebecca. Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia. 1994 ed. New 
York: Penguin Books, 1994. Reprint, 1994. 
 
White, George W. Nationalism and Territory : Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern 
Europe. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000. 
 
Willams, C.H. "Conceived in Bondage - Called into Liberty: Reflections on Nationalism." 
Progress in Human Geography 9 (1985): 331-55. 
 
Wilson, Woodrow. "President Wilson's Message to Congress, January 8, 1918." edited by 
Records of the United States Senate: National Archives, 1918. 
 
Wood, Nathaniel D. Becoming Metropolitan: Urban Selfhood and the Making of Modern 
Cracow. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010. 
 
Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Fourth ed. Thousand Oaks, London: 
SAGE Publications, 2009. 
 
Young, David. "East-End Street Names and British Imperialism." Local Historian 22, no. 2 
(1992): 84-88. 
 
Zahra, Tara. Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the 




Croatian Sate Archives for the City of Zagreb 
 
HDGZ-GPZ. "Generalni Regulacioni Plan za Grad Zagreb, 1932-1938." Br. 13 veza sv. 59-68, F 
24. 
 
HDGZ-GPZ. "Natječaj za Generalu Regulatornu Osnovu, 12 Projekta 1931g." Br. 1-12, veza sv. 
59-68, F 24. 
